Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation in Ethiopia: The Prosperity Party’s Strategy for Political Dominance

By: Sophonias A. Kassa

Introduction

Ethiopia’s transition to multiparty democracy in 1991 was expected to usher in political pluralism and decentralization. However, instead of fostering genuine competition, the ruling party has consistently manipulated the political system to weaken opposition forces while maintaining its grip on power. Following the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)’s transformation into the Prosperity Party (PP) in 2019, this strategy has deepened, with opposition groups either co-opted, suppressed, or internally fragmented.

Scholarship on electoral authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties do not rely solely on repression, but rather employ covert forms of control, such as cooptation of opposition figures and strategic fragmentation of challengers. Cooptation occurs when opposition figures are offered government positions, financial incentives, or political space in exchange for compliance. Meanwhile, fragmentation is encouraged by allowing the emergence of multiple opposition parties that compete against one another rather than forming a unified challenge. Ethiopia exemplifies both of these tactics, reinforcing a political system where the opposition remains divided, weak, and incapable of challenging the ruling party’s control.

These dynamics align with Jean-François Bayart’s theory of “the politics of the belly” (2006), which describes a pattern in African politics where access to the state becomes a means of material accumulation and patronage. Under this framework, elite cooptation in Ethiopia should not be viewed merely as political suppression but as a calculated extension of patron-client networks designed to preserve power, wealth, and status within a closed elite circle.

Ethiopia’s Historical Context: A Pattern of Elite Domination and Exclusion

From the mid-19th century onward, Ethiopia’s state formation has been marked by cycles of elite centralization and the political exclusion of peripheral groups. During the Imperial Era (1855–1935), Emperors Tewodros II, Yohannes IV, and Menelik II pursued state consolidation through territorial expansion. While often praised for preserving Ethiopia’s sovereignty, their campaigns entrenched a hierarchical system dominated by northern highland elites. Southern regions were annexed through military conquest and incorporated into the empire under systems of tribute and subjugation, creating long-term structural inequalities between the center and periphery (Gudina, 2003, p. 144).

Under Haile Selassie’s rule (1935–1974), the Ethiopian state-initiated modernization reforms including infrastructure development and bureaucratic expansion. However, political power remained highly centralized within the imperial court. Despite international engagement and modernization rhetoric, the regime failed to implement meaningful reforms for land redistribution or political inclusion. Ethnic and class inequalities deepened, particularly in rural areas where feudal systems persisted, and governance remained autocratic and hierarchical (Gudina, 2003 ; Bayart, 2006).

The Derg era (1974–1991) introduced a Marxist-Leninist military regime that sought to transform Ethiopian society through revolutionary socialism. Initial reforms such as land nationalization were overshadowed by severe repression and militarization. Political opposition was violently suppressed, most infamously during the Red Terror campaigns, as the state relied on coercive control to maintain power. This period exemplifies what Bayart (2006) describes as a militarized “politics of the belly,” where the state became a site of violent accumulation and exclusion rather than emancipatory transformation (Gudina, 2003; Bayart, 2006, p. 113).

Following the Derg’s collapse, the EPRDF regime (1991–2018) adopted a system of ethnic federalism that promised autonomy and cultural recognition. However, this federal structure was dominated by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which exercised disproportionate control over federal institutions and security structures. While presenting the appearance of decentralized governance, the EPRDF retained tight control over opposition parties, civic space, and economic levers. As Gudina (2003) notes, this era continued the elite-driven exclusion of genuine opposition, with the ethnic federal system functioning more as a mechanism of elite segmentation than democratic pluralism (Gudina, 2003, p. 162).

The emergence of the Prosperity Party in 2019 under Abiy Ahmed was framed as a national reform movement. However, it has largely continued the historical trend of elite consolidation through strategic cooptation and repression. Moderate opposition parties have been integrated into state structures in exchange for compliance, while more defiant groups—particularly those with strong ethnic bases like the Amhara National Movement—have faced imprisonment, surveillance, and internal division. As Bayart (2006) argues, African political elites maintain dominance not through transparent governance but via informal networks, selective violence, and patronage—dynamics that remain central to Ethiopia’s current political system (Bayart, 2006, pp. 17–20; Arriola, DeVaro, & Meng, 2021).

This historical trajectory demonstrates that each successive regime in Ethiopia—despite ideological shifts—has prioritized elite power consolidation over inclusive governance. The ruling party’s strategies today remain consistent with a long-standing pattern of authoritarian resilience masked by institutional reform.

Cooptation and Internal Disillusionment: EZEMA as a Case Study

The Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) serves as a clear example of elite cooptation, where the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) has successfully neutralized an opposition party by integrating it into the political framework while ensuring it does not challenge the status quo. While EZEMA initially positioned itself as an alternative political force advocating for justice, democracy, and reform, over time, its role as a genuine opposition movement has diminished.

A key indication of EZEMA’s loss of credibility as an opposition party is the departure of several prominent figures who were once strong advocates for political change. These individuals left the party after realizing that EZEMA was no longer functioning as a true opposition force but had become an extension of the ruling party’s patronage system. This mirrors Bayart’s concept of the “politics of the belly,” where inclusion in the political system equates to access to state resources, and where opposition is tamed through the promise of personal gain and protection.

According to Arriola, DeVaro, and Meng (2021), coopted opposition parties lose their ability to mobilize resistance because the leadership prioritizes maintaining their political standing over challenging the incumbent regime. This dynamic is evident in EZEMA, where participation in elections substitutes for actual resistance, and public discourse is reduced to symbolic contestation. In doing so, EZEMA legitimizes the regime’s claim to democratic pluralism while reinforcing authoritarian consolidation through elite accommodation.

Amhara National Movement (ANM): A Case of Cooptation, Fragmentation, and Repression

The Amhara National Movement (ANM) represents a hybrid case, where the ruling party employs a mixture of cooptation, fragmentation, and repression to ensure its continued dominance. Unlike EZEMA, which has largely adapted to the political environment imposed by PP, ANM has faced a more confrontational and dynamic response from the ruling party.

Some ANM leaders have been co-opted, taking government positions and working closely with the ruling party. These figures serve as a controlled faction within ANM, ensuring that the party does not fully consolidate as an independent opposition movement. This resembles Bayart’s notion of extraversion, wherein African regimes engage selectively with both internal and external actors to reinforce their own legitimacy and survival.

Meanwhile, the majority of ANM’s top leaders remain in prison, effectively neutralizing the party’s leadership. This selective repression ensures that ANM does not pose a significant challenge to the ruling party, as it lacks strong organizational leadership. Moreover, ANM’s internal fragmentation—with some members advocating engagement while others push for resistance—further weakens its capacity for mobilization. Such divisions are not incidental but strategically cultivated by the ruling party to dilute opposition coherence.

Strategic Political Management: The Prosperity Party’s Dual Approach

By employing cooptation for moderate opposition figures like EZEMA and fragmentation or suppression for ethnic-based challengers like ANM, the Prosperity Party has successfully entrenched its dominance. This dual approach allows the government to:

• Appear democratic by permitting controlled opposition participation.
• Prevent opposition consolidation by dividing potential challengers.
• Neutralize ethnic-based movements before they gain national momentum.

Bayart’s thesis that African politics is deeply embedded in systems of reciprocity, informal networks, and elite accommodation helps contextualize these dynamics as more than just authoritarian tactics. They are part of a deeply entrenched logic of rule rooted in historical practices of accumulation and elite management.

Conclusion: Implications for Ethiopia’s Political Future

The Ethiopian opposition remains structurally weak due to the Prosperity Party’s ability to co-opt, divide, and suppress. While EZEMA represents a controlled opposition that reinforces the ruling party’s legitimacy, ANM exemplifies how ethnic-based movements are systematically fragmented and neutralized.

This pattern aligns with Jean-François Bayart’s theory of the state in Africa, where political power functions as a mechanism for elite accumulation and perpetuation rather than democratic governance. Without cross-ethnic solidarity, resistance to cooptation, and institutional reform, Ethiopia’s political future will remain bound by the logic of “the politics of the belly.”

References

Armstrong, D., Reuter, O. J., & Robertson, G. B. (2020). Getting the opposition together: protest coordination in authoritarian regimes. Post-Soviet Affairs, 36(1), 1–19.

Arriola, L. R., DeVaro, J., & Meng, A. (2021). Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation. The American Political Science Review, 115(4), 1358–1372.

Bayart, J.-F. (2006). The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (2nd ed.). Polity Press.

Gudina, M. (2003). The Elite and the Quest for Peace, Democracy, and Development in Ethiopia: Lessons to be Learnt. Northeast African Studies, 10(2), 141–164.