40 Years After the 1984 Famine: Ethiopia’s Battle with Conflict and Hunger

Ethiopia is one of Africa’s most populous countries, with an estimated population of 130 million in 2024.^[1] As outlined by the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP), in recent years Ethiopia has seen economic growth averaging 10% per annum (from 2007 to 2017) and a reduction of extreme poverty and hunger rates by half (from 61% to 31%) since the early 2010s.^[2] However, over the last 40 years Ethiopia has faced a series of droughts and food shortages, exacerbated by conflict, political instability and extreme weather events.

2. Timeline of conflict and food insecurity in Ethiopia

2.1 1983 to 1985 famine

Between 1916 and 1974 Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie.^[3] In 1974, he was deposed in a military-led revolution. In the post-revolution period, Lieutenant-Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam ruled Ethiopia as a Marxist-Leninist state. He remained in power until 1991.The regime of Colonel Mengistu implemented a series of collectivist economic policies, including the nationalisation of land and industry.

Between 1983 and 1985 there was drought and widespread famine in Ethiopia, particularly in northern regions of the country including Tigray and in Eritrea, the latter of which was at that time still part of Ethiopian territory. Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the famine range from 400,000 to 1 million.^[4]

It has been claimed that the policies of the Ethiopian government contributed to the scale of the famine. Dr Miriam Bradley, senior lecturer in humanitarian studies at the University of Manchester, has argued that:

[…] by the early 1980s, several government policies combined to cause, rather than prevent, a famine which lasted from 1983 to 1985. Mengistu’s government imposed Stalinist-model agricultural policies involving forced collectivization and villagization [relocation of communities into planned villages].^[5]

The famine came to the attention of many in the west through a series of BBC News reports presented by journalist Michael Buerk, which aired in October 1984. The reports described a “biblical famine” and contained graphic images of thousands of Ethiopians, including children, facing acute malnutrition and starvation.^[6]

In the UK, the musician Bob Geldof responded to the broadcasts by forming Band Aid, a group of musicians committed to raising money for famine relief in Ethiopia. Mr Geldof, together with Midge Ure from the band Ultravox, wrote the charity single ‘Do they know it’s Christmas?’, which was released in December 1984 and became the Christmas number one single that year. It is estimated that sales from the single raised £8mn for Ethiopian famine relief.^[7]

In 1985, Band Aid continued to raise money for Ethiopia, notably by staging the Live Aid concerts in July 1985. The concerts took place simultaneously at Wembley Stadium in London, John F Kennedy Stadium in Philadelphia, USA, and at various other venues across the world. The concerts were broadcast to a worldwide audience. It has been estimated that 1.5 billion people watched the events.^[8]

The fundraising response to the Ethiopian famine has been credited with raising global awareness of poverty and development issues. Subsequently, celebrity-endorsed fundraising has become commonplace.^[9] It is estimated that the Band Aid/Live Aid events raised over £150mn.^[10] However, the long-term effectiveness of the Band Aid appeal has been questioned and it has been criticised for portraying the Ethiopian famine as a natural disaster and for depoliticising the causes of the famine.^[11]

Alex de Waal, an expert on the history of humanitarian issues in the Horn of Africa and executive director of the World Peace Foundation, has described the complex causes of the famine as follows:

The 1983 to 1985 famine […] was the occasion for an outpouring of western charity spurred by Bob Geldof’s Band Aid. That famine, which killed between 600,000 and 1 million people, was caused by a combination of poverty, drought, poor agricultural policies, and, above all, the use of hunger as a weapon in counterinsurgency.^[12]

During the famine, the Ethiopian government initiated a forced resettlement programme that “moved people from the rebel-controlled northern regions to the government-controlled central and southern regions of the country”.^[13] This exacerbated long-running resentments among various armed groups advocating for regional autonomy. Chief among the groups were the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

In response to these groups, the Ethiopian government implemented various counter-insurgency policies. Dr Bradley has argued that these policies led to famine both directly and indirectly:

Crops, livestock, and food stores were systematically destroyed by military offensives as part of a scorched earth policy aimed at denying cover and a regular food supply to the armed opposition […] The counter-insurgency strategies also contributed indirectly to famine as they implied enormous military expenditure, requiring resources that could otherwise have been used to prevent or alleviate famine.^[14]

Dr Bradley has explained that although drought contributed to the 1983 to 1985 famine, in her view its causes were mainly political:

Drought played a role, but it was not the only—or even the primary—cause of famine in Ethiopia in the early 1980s. The causes were overwhelmingly political, and the government used famine as part of its strategy to combat the secessionist movements in the north of the country. However, the way the famine was covered by mainstream media in the west served to obscure the political nature of the famine, presenting it instead as a largely natural occurrence.^[15]

2.2 1991 to 2018

In the late 1980s, various regional armed groups in Ethiopia, including the EPLF and the TPLF, challenged the rule of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.^[16] In 1991, these groups marched on the capital, Addis Ababa, and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition dominated by the TPLF, seized power from Colonel Mengistu. The EPRDF remained in power until 2019.

In 1993, Ethiopia officially granted independence to Eritrea. However, in 1998 war broke out between the two countries over a border dispute. According to estimates from the time, the war left “tens of thousands dead or injured” before a peace agreement was signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000.^[17]

In the 2000s, the ruling EPRDF faced allegations of human rights abuses, including a lack of free and fair elections and limits on freedom of expression.^[18] Ethiopia also engaged in conflict in its eastern border area with Somalia, in response to tensions over Somalia’s Islamist government and security threats from the militant group Al-Shabaab, which has links to Al-Qaeda.

From 2014, increasingly repressive government measures in Ethiopia led to widespread protests against the ruling coalition. There were also a series of droughts in Ethiopia between 2015 and 2017. The 2015 drought was particularly severe, affecting over 10 million people, mainly in eastern regions of the country.^[19]

However, there was no return to the famine conditions experienced in Ethiopia in the 1980s during this period. Alex de Waal has claimed that this was due to a specific political strategy adopted by the ruling EPRDF:

An “antifamine political contract” was in force in Ethiopia from 1991 to 2018. Having emerged from a human-made war famine, the leaders of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front adopted a national security strategy with famine prevention and poverty reduction at its heart. This was remarkably effective: most of Ethiopia, despite being recurrently subject to drought, suffered no famine during that period […] However, famine prevention was a technocratic party doctrine, not a popular contract enforced by democratic process, and it did not survive the dissolution of the group in 2019.^[20]

2.3 2018 to 2019: Government of Abiy Ahmed Ali, and background to the Tigray conflict

Abiy Ahmed Ali took office as Ethiopia’s current prime minister in 2018. He came to power following anti-government protests against the ruling coalition, the EPRDF. He promised political reform and a transition to democratic rule. Originally elected as a member of the EPRDF, Mr Abiy merged the EPRDF into a new Prosperity Party in 2019. However, the TPLF refused to join the new party.^[21]

Also in 2019, Mr Abiy was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for his efforts on attaining peace and international cooperation, particularly for his work to end his country’s long-running border dispute with neighbouring Eritrea.^[22]

Relations between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF had soured since Mr Abiy came to power. The TPLF opposed the peace settlement with Eritrea in 2018, viewing it as a major threat. The TPLF was also critical of the federal government’s decision not to go ahead with elections planned for August 2020 because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Tensions increased further when the TPLF held elections in September 2020, in defiance of the federal government’s decision.

2.4 Tigray conflict, 2020 to 2022

In November 2020, Mr Abiy, the Ethiopian prime minister, declared a state of emergency in the Tigray region, following an attack by Tigrayan forces on a federal military base in the region.^[23] The TPLF government in Tigray asserted that its forces were acting in self-defence against a planned federal assault, although Ethiopian federal forces described it as an unprovoked attack.^[24]

The two-year conflict resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the internal displacement of millions of Ethiopians.^[25] It also exacerbated the impact of a serious drought and the resulting food shortages in Ethiopia and across the Horn of Africa between 2020 and 2022. The UN’s World Food Programme stated in 2022:

Conflict in northern Ethiopia has almost exhausted the coping mechanisms of millions and displaced hundreds of thousands from their homes. More than 13 million people require humanitarian food assistance mainly in conflict affected zones of Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions.^[26]

Academics Ellen Messer and Marc Cohen have argued that food insecurity was used as a military tactic by both sides in the Tigray conflict:

In the case of the Ethiopian government’s (2020–2022) war against Tigrayan political opponents, belligerent parties on all sides employed food as a weapon, actions that included destroying local food supplies, dismantling capacities to produce food and market infrastructure, and diverting humanitarian aid toward supporters and away from adversaries.^[27]

The Ethiopian government and regional forces from Tigray signed an agreement on a permanent cessation of hostilities in November 2022. Further information on the background to the Tigray conflict and its impact can be found in the House of Lords Library briefing ‘Conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia’ (11 November 2022).

3. Current humanitarian situation in Ethiopia

Ethiopia currently faces a range of food insecurity issues caused by weather events and continued conflict. The World Food Programme’s 2023 report on Ethiopia stated:

Throughout 2023, Ethiopia faced a range of complex challenges, which led to an increase in humanitarian needs. By the end of the year, an estimated 15.4 million people required humanitarian assistance. The primary drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition were active conflict in several areas, the impact of the 2020–2022 northern conflict, prolonged macroeconomic challenges, and climate shocks such as the historic 2020–2022 drought in Afar, Amhara, and Tigray, and the floods caused by El Niño in the south. Although economic growth is projected to improve, inflation is expected to continue to erode people’s purchasing power and ability to meet their basic needs.^[28]

The Global Network Against Food Crises, which includes a number of UN and development agencies as members, stated that in 2023 Ethiopia faced one of its “most severe food crises due to the persistence of drought conditions, macroeconomic challenges and internal conflict”.^[29] The report stated that, in 2023, 19.7 million people in Ethiopia faced high levels of food insecurity, including over 4 million children and 1 million pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition.

According to the WFP’s assessment of Ethiopia in August 2024, the country “continued to face conflict, drought, flooding, and inflation, leading to increasing food insecurity”.^[30] It estimated that 15.8 million people needed food assistance across the country. The WFP also noted that Ethiopia was hosting more than 1 million refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan.

The WFP report stated that, despite the peace agreement in the Tigray region, intense armed conflict had erupted in other regions, primarily in Amhara in the north and Oromia in central and southern Ethiopia.^[31] Conflict in Amhara started in 2023, when Ethiopian government forces attempted the disarmament of regional guerilla forces, but this was opposed by Amhara’s Fano militia group.^[32] In Oromia, the Ethiopian government has been in a long-running conflict with a rebel group known as the Oromia Liberation Army.

The WFP report said that below-average rainfall was forecast for the October to December 2024 rainy season. It said that if this materialised the results could be severe:

Regions in the south and southeast will move to emergency levels of food insecurity during the dry period from January to March 2025. An estimated 8.6 million people are projected to be at risk of ‘severe’ drought conditions because of this situation. Many households have yet to recover from the extended drought from 2020–23, which was the worst in recent history in the Horn of Africa.^[33]

The USAID-supported Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) has estimated that large parts of northern and eastern Ethiopia experienced ‘crisis’ levels of food insecurity from August to September 2024, and parts of Afar, Tigray and Amhara in the north were in the ‘emergency’ category.^[34] The network uses the International Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) categories:^[35]

• None/Minimal: Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.
• Stressed: Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.
• Crisis: Households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.
• Emergency: Households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.
• Catastrophe/Famine: Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident.

FEWS NET has forecast that food insecurity will ease for some areas but worsen in others in the forthcoming October 2024 to January 2025 period. It has forecast that fewer areas of central and eastern Ethiopia will be in the ‘crisis’ category and those in the ‘emergency’ category will be concentrated in a region of Afar in the north. Figure 2 shows maps produced by FEWS NET.

International Food Security Phase Classification for Ethiopia by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network

The FEWS NET summary of the situation in Ethiopia as of August 2024 stated:

In August [2024], millions of households across western, northern, central, and southern Ethiopia are experiencing acute food insecurity at the peak of the lean season, as low purchasing capacity is limiting their access to food following conflict, weather, and economic shocks.

Regarding the impact of conflict on food insecurity, FEWS NET stated:

The armed conflict between the Ethiopian National Defense Force and Fano militia in Amhara region continued in August [2024]. Transportation is disrupted due to Fano’s road restrictions, hampering trade into and out of the region and affecting the supply of food and non-food commodities on local markets. In Tigray, disputes between TPLF members over the regional administrative directives and management increased fears of insecurity.^[36]

4. UK government policy and aid spending

4.1 Previous Conservative government

In 2020, the previous Conservative government announced that official development assistance (ODA) would be reduced from 0.7% of UK gross national income (GNI) to 0.5% of GNI.^[37] It said this was a “temporary measure” in response to pressures on the UK’s national finances caused by the coronavirus pandemic, and would return to 0.7% “when the fiscal situation permits”.

Figure 3 shows the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) bilateral ODA to Ethiopia between 2019 and 2023. It reduced from £299mn in 2019 to £90mn in 2022, then increased to £164mn in 2023. The FCDO said the context for the increase in ODA was increased levels of need in Ethiopia:

In 2023, Ethiopia experienced multiple crises. This further increased levels of humanitarian need from already high levels associated with conflict in the Tigray region […] and widespread drought following a series of failed rainy seasons from 2020. During 2023, conflict erupted in Amhara region, El Niño caused extreme flooding in the south and drought in the north. Cholera, measles and malaria outbreaks proliferated nationwide, famine risk was raised in north Ethiopia and refugee influx arrived from war-torn Sudan.^[38]

Figure 3. FCDO bilateral official development assistance to Ethiopia, 2019 to 2023 (£mn)

In July 2023, the FCDO published a summary of UK aid spending in Ethiopia.^[39] It said that the UK had “historically been one of the largest and most significant development partners in Ethiopia”. It continued:

Ethiopia’s development path matters for a huge number of people across the wider region. It also has significant importance for the UK’s geopolitical, economic, humanitarian and security interests in East Africa and beyond.^[40]

The report stated that the UK’s projected ODA budget for Ethiopia in 2024/25 was £214mn. It summarised the challenges facing Ethiopia as follows:

Conflict, droughts and floods are driving significant humanitarian needs. 4.6 million people are estimated to be internally displaced across Ethiopia. Over 20 million people are severely food insecure, including 11 million in drought-affected areas. Multiple disease outbreaks are ongoing, including cholera, malaria and measles. Nutrition trends are deteriorating, elevating mortality and morbidity risks.

However, it also stated:

Ethiopia is a huge and complex country in a challenging neighbourhood. At the same time as experiencing a major humanitarian crisis, political and ethnic tensions, it is also driving forward an ambitious reform agenda, investing in clean energy, aviation, roads, finance, basic services and telecoms. Its reform plans will open major opportunities for investment partnerships and Ethiopia is well placed to play a leading role on the international stage in the areas of climate and development.

The report summarised the impact of UK development projects in Ethiopia in recent years:^[41]

• In 2022 to 2023, the UK humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia delivered results including reaching over 950,000 with critical medical supplies, provided treatment for 80,000 malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women, supported over 200,000 people with cash assistance, and supported education for 10,000 girls and boys.
• Since 2015, the UK has directly supported 1.2 million children to gain a decent education; helped to increase the percentage of births with a skilled healthcare professional from 28% to 50%, giving over 3 million people access to clean water or sanitation facilities and provided more than 2,000 schools and health facilities with access to water supply and improved latrine facilities.

In February 2024, the then minister for development and Africa, Andrew Mitchell, visited Ethiopia. He announced an additional £100mn of UK development aid to the country, focused on reducing preventable deaths. The FCDO said the funding would aid 3 million Ethiopians and would be “targeted on children, particularly children under the age of 5, and also on pregnant and post-natal women”.^[42] After the visit, Mr Mitchell announced that the UK would convene a “pledging conference”, in collaboration with the United Nations, to encourage funding commitments from other nations for aid relief in Ethiopia.^[43]

The conference took place in April 2024 in Geneva, co-hosted by the UK, the government of Ethiopia and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.^[44] The UN reported that $630mn had been pledged at the conference, which included the UK’s commitment of £100mn.^[45] The UN welcomed the pledges, but it noted that “immediate funding of $1bn is required to sustain aid delivery for the next five months” and that the UN-backed “$3.24bn humanitarian response plan for 2024 is only five percent funded”.

4.2 Current Labour government

Since the new Labour government took office, Anneliese Dodds, minister for development, made an official visit to Ethiopia in August 2024. She met Ethiopia’s foreign minister, Taye Atske-Selassie, and they discussed “UK support for peace and security across Ethiopia and the wider region, as well as economic growth and development priorities”.^[46] The FCDO press release stated that Ms Dodds:

[…] raised concern about the devasting impact of conflict in Amhara and Oromia on civilians. The UK continues to urge all parties to the conflicts to de-escalate and engage in peaceful and inclusive dialogue.^[47]

Also in August 2024, the government responded to a written parliamentary question on what assessment it had made of the humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. FCDO minister Lord Collins of Highbury gave the following assessment:

We remain concerned about high levels of humanitarian need across many parts of Ethiopia, including in the north. Climate shocks, conflict, disease outbreaks and high inflation are driving humanitarian need in Ethiopia, including in Tigray. The humanitarian community is targeting 3.8 million people in Tigray with food assistance over the July-September [2024] lean season to stave off hunger. A UK co-led pledging conference in April [2024] helped increase humanitarian funding by securing $610mn from international development partners. This includes £100mn from the UK, which will provide lifesaving support for hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians, including over 435,000 children and mothers suffering from malnutrition, and more than 230,000 needing access to emergency healthcare. This includes UK support to the government of Ethiopia’s productive safety net programme which is strengthening food security and resilience for 8 million people living in extreme poverty across Ethiopia.^[48]

5. Read more

• Oral question on ‘Ethiopia and Somalia’, HL Hansard, 7 October 2024, cols 1824–8
• House of Commons Library, ‘The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea’, 18 April 2024; and ‘Hunger in the East and Horn of Africa’, 20 April 2023
• Debate on ‘Hunger: East Africa and the Horn of Africa’, HC Hansard, 25 April 2023, cols 279–303WH
• House of Lords Library, ‘Horn of Africa: Projections of a famine in 2023’, 18 January 2023
• QSD on ‘Horn of Africa: Famine’, HL Hansard, 7 February 2023, cols 1168–81