By Sophonias A. Kassa
In Ethiopia today, the state is not fighting one war — it is fighting many. The conflict with the Fano militia in the Amhara region is just one front. Elsewhere, the federal government has faced off with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), remains engaged with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and has only recently signed a fragile peace with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Meanwhile, smaller armed groups are surfacing in other regions, driven by grievances rooted in exclusion, marginalization, and mistrust.
Two years ago, government officials confidently announced that the operation against Fano would end in weeks. That promise has long since faded. Not only does the conflict remain unresolved, but similar violence has spread, persisted, and deepened across the country. The reality facing Ethiopia — and much of the region — is this: modern wars can no longer be won in the conventional sense. They only recycle, metastasize, and erode the foundations of statehood.
Wars That Spread, Not Stop
David Kampf’s compelling paper How Do Civil Wars Multiply? (Kampf, 2019) sheds light on this dynamic. He identifies civil wars as inherently contagious. Armed conflicts rarely remain confined to their original boundaries. Instead, they spill over into neighboring states through three key mechanisms: refugee flows, cross-border rebel movements, and the proliferation of illicit arms and trade.
Ethiopia is both a victim and participant in this cycle.
The Horn of Africa is engulfed in instability. Sudan is imploding into civil war. South Sudan remains fragile, with competing armed groups and unresolved ethnic divisions. Somalia continues to face the threat of al-Shabaab, while Eritrea, despite its tight security apparatus, simmers under political repression and unresolved border grievances. None of Ethiopia’s neighbors are truly at peace.
Ethiopia, far from being a neutral bystander, is deeply enmeshed in these dynamics. It has historically hosted armed opposition groups from Sudan and Eritrea. It has supported factions in Somalia and South Sudan at various points. Eritrea, for its part, supported Ethiopian government forces during the Tigray war and is alleged to harbor anti-government elements within Ethiopia. In such a region, the lines between national defense, foreign policy, and proxy warfare blur easily.
In this context, armed groups like the OLA, Fano, and even the remnants of the TPLF operate not only as domestic insurgents but as actors in a larger regional chess game. Arms, ideology, and fighters cross porous borders. Refugees and displaced populations — victims of these wars — are often viewed with suspicion or weaponized by opposing sides.
This environment also reflects what Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl (2020), in Quagmire in Civil War, identifies as the entrapment effect of foreign support. His theory explains how external actors, by subsidizing the costs of war, enable local militias to continue fighting wars they might otherwise abandon. When even one actor in a conflict receives this kind of support, it creates a ripple effect: others refuse to disengage, fearing disadvantage- dragging everyone into a long, bloody stalemate (Calculli, 2021).
As Kampf (2019) notes, civil war becomes self-reinforcing in such environments. Military action alone cannot contain it. In fact, it often fuels further instability by creating power vacuums, provoking retaliation, or hardening group identities. Schulhofer-Wohl (2020) adds that in these contexts, fighters may shift away from territorial battles toward non-territorial but still violent engagements, prolonging war without clear strategic purpose- just violence for its own sake.
Military Victories That Solve Nothing
The assumption that wars can be decisively “won” is a fantasy of the past. As outlined in How Wars End: Theory and Practice (Iron & Kingsbury, 2012), edited by Richard Iron and Damien Kingsbury, most modern wars- especially civil wars- do not end through battlefield victories. They end through negotiation, mutual exhaustion, or third-party pressure. Sometimes, they don’t end at all.
Even where peace deals exist — such as the Pretoria Agreement with the TPLF — they remain fragile, incomplete, and politically contested. The OLA continues to fight. In the Somali region, occasional flare-ups show that peace is still conditional. New rebel groups have emerged in previously quiet areas like the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR).
Here again, Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2020) concept of “quagmire” is useful. He argues that even failed or anticipated foreign support can embolden actors to reject peace deals, believing outside help will eventually tilt the balance. In Lebanon, his case study, such dynamics prolonged a war far beyond its strategic usefulness. Ethiopia risks repeating that pattern.
In each case, the deeper issues — structural inequality, exclusionary governance, historical grievances — remain unresolved. Military operations may suppress visible resistance, but they cannot extinguish the underlying fire.
What Are We Really Trying to Win?
What does victory mean when displacement continues to grow, livelihoods are destroyed, and trust in government institutions is collapsing? If Ethiopia defines success by crushing every armed group militarily, then it is pursuing a goal it cannot reach. In fact, trying to do so may only multiply the very threats it seeks to eliminate.
Each new offensive gives rise to another generation of fighters. Each neglected grievance opens the door to more resistance. Even where groups are defeated temporarily, the conditions that birthed them remain. Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2020) theory helps us understand why: the strategic logic of war breaks down when groups stop responding to rational incentives and continue fighting out of fear, inertia, or ideological absolutism — all sustained by external patrons.
From War to Political Courage
Ethiopia stands at a crossroads — not just politically, but conceptually. It must abandon the outdated belief that state power equals military power. In today’s Ethiopia, true strength lies in political courage: the courage to negotiate, to decentralize, to include voices long silenced.
That doesn’t mean ignoring security threats. But it does mean recognizing that security cannot come through force alone. It must be built on legitimacy, justice, and dialogue. Both Iron and Kingsbury (2012) and Schulhofer-Wohl (2020) show us that wars don’t just stop with ceasefires — they end when the incentives to keep fighting disappear and new political arrangements take root.
If there is one lesson Ethiopia and the region must learn, it is this: wars may begin with bullets, but they end with ideas. And unless those ideas include dignity, equity, and inclusion for all peoples and regions, the cycle of war will only continue.
A Moment for Reflection
This month marks seven years since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power, ushered in by a wave of nationwide protests that compelled the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), including its dominant faction the TPLF, to pursue long-overdue reforms. Those protests were a cry for justice, dignity, and a more inclusive state a demand for change that resonated across ethnic, regional, and generational lines. Abiy’s rise initially symbolized hope: for reconciliation, national healing, and a departure from authoritarian rule.
But seven years later, Ethiopia stands at a crossroads more perilous than before. The hopes that once bloomed have been clouded by protracted conflicts, rising authoritarian tendencies, deepening ethnic polarization, and a growing disillusionment with the political process. The wars that continue to rage across different regions are not just military confrontations — they are manifestations of long-suppressed grievances, mistrust, and unresolved questions of belonging and governance.
In this context, honest dialogue is no longer optional — it is essential. The government must recognize that sustainable peace cannot be imposed through force, nor can unity be achieved through coercion. Instead, peace must be negotiated, and unity must be built — through trust, inclusion, and a willingness to reckon with uncomfortable truths.
As Ethiopia marks this milestone, it is imperative that Abiy Ahmed and his administration demonstrate the political courage to engage in genuine negotiations with rebel groups and opposition movements, not merely as a tactic of containment, but as a path toward national salvation. This means creating space for political pluralism, decentralization where needed, and a redefinition of the social contract that binds Ethiopia’s diverse peoples together.
Without such a shift, Ethiopia risks sliding further into fragmentation, state weakening, and humanitarian catastrophe. But with such a shift, the country has a chance — however fragile — to heal its wounds and reimagine its future as a shared home for all its citizens.
References
Calculli, M. (2021). How civil wars turn into quagmires [Review of the book Quagmire in Civil War, by J. Schulhofer-Wohl]. The International Spectator, 56(3), 162–164. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2021.1930365
Iron, R., & Kingsbury, D. (Eds.). (2012). How wars end: Theory and practice. Routledge.
Kampf, D. (2019). How do civil wars multiply? In T. Carayannis & L. W. Roop (Eds.), Making sense of the Central African Republic (pp. 197–220). Zed Books.
Schulhofer-Wohl, J. (2020). Quagmire in civil war. Cambridge University Press.