Unravelling Abiy’s Relentless Volte-Faces 

Messay Kebede

Admittedly, among the events that shook Ethiopian politics since the fall of the TPLF’s hegemonic rule, the eruption of the war between government troops and Tigray’s regional army occupies a prominent position. Even if most reviewers of Ethiopian politics agree on the importance of the war, I contend that they do not go far enough in evaluating its game-changing consequences. In particular, they do not see the causal connection between the war and Abiy’s political and ideological volte faces. In my view, Ethiopian current politics makes no sense without a correct insight into the connection.

The Pivotal Role of the Tigrayan War

Let me begin by clarifying the notion of volte-face. It refers to the shift in political direction that occurred immediately after the conclusion of the Tigrayan war. Previously, Prime Minister Abiy had presented a program of change that could be characterized as relatively democratic and unifying under the banner of Ethiopianism. Even though dissenting voices were heard, the overwhelming majority of the Ethiopian people welcomed Abiy’s Ethiopianism and his agenda of change. After the end of the Tigrayan war, his government became less tolerant and more inclined to push the Oromummaa agenda at the expense of Ethiopianism. The shift triggered a significant fall in his popularity. Especially, disappointments in the Amhara region began to surface, and following the unresponsive attitude of Abiy’s government to Amhara’s demands, they expanded rapidly. At the same time, Fano’s armed rebellion kicked off and brought about the sudden collapse of the Amhara regional government.

The million-dollar question is the reason behind Abiy’s political shift. Why would a leader alter the political stand that earned him such wide popularity? Worse yet, why would he exchange his first popular stand for a policy that brought nothing but divisions and violent confrontations in various parts of the country? In addition to causing severe economic downturns, the shift shuttered security and peace, leaving many observers wondering whether the very survival of Ethiopia is not in jeopardy. Since all these negative developments endanger both Abiy’s government and Ethiopia’s survival, attempts to find a rational explanation for this consequential volte-face have been understandably quite challenging.

Many people admit that they do not have a satisfactory explanation for the change of direction. However, some activists and analysts advance various hypotheses to make sense of the change. Before reviewing some of these assumptions, let me explain why a correct account of the war in Tigray is key to understanding four major occurrences in Ethiopian politics.

First, the outburst of the Tigrayan war and its major consequence, namely, the political shift of Abiy, are not intelligible unless one grasps the reason behind the war. Second, the eruption of another war, this time in the Amhara region between Fano and government troops, is even less intelligible if it is not tied to the Tigrayan war. Third, Eritrea’s involvement in the war and its exclusion from the peace talk between the TPLF and the government, which caused a significant cooling of their relationships, is another important fact that is not comprehensible unless the correct reason for the war in Tigray is laid out. Fourth, though not directly caused by the Tigrayan war, the intra-Oromo conflict between the armed group known as Shene and the government is not understandable without an accurate assessment of the reason behind the war.

The dominant assumption attributes the wars and the political shift to one basic factor, namely, the fact that Abiy was a supporter of the Oromummaa ideology long before he became Prime Minister. The belief assumes that he faked Ethiopianism to gain popular support and consolidate his grip on power. Once he had achieved his goal, he naturally reverted to his original Oromummaa ideology. Because of its extremist content, the implementation of the ideology requires the use of violent, divisive, and undemocratic methods of government. The second widely held view contends that the eruption of the wars in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromo regions, as well as the policy change that caused economic disasters and deprived the country of stability and peace, all emanate from Abiy’s utter incompetence as a leader. His incompetence is such that he cannot but spread failures and chaos in the socio-economic life of the country and exasperate hostility between its ethnic groups.

Antecedence of Ideological Commitment

Against the thesis arguing that Abiy was a convert to the Oromummaa ideology long before his rise to premiership, my counterargument is that the assumption does not explain the volte-face from Ethiopianism to Oromummaa. Without going so far as to say that Abiy was a total stranger to the Oromummaa ideology before he became Prime Minister, I venture to affirm that it is the Tigrayan war that triggered and consolidated his ideological volte-face.

The claim that Abiy faked and used Ethiopianism to secure Amhara’s support to consolidate his newfound power does not hold water. For one thing, Abiy did not have to go to the extreme of glorifying Ethiopianism and severely criticizing the previous system to become prime minister as well as to capture popular support. Ethiopians were so disgruntled by the TPLF’s dominated government that Abiy could have gathered enough support for a good start without highly extolling Ethiopianism. He would have obtained enough support if he had pledged to reform some of the glaring defects of ethnic federalism and implement some correcting democratic measures.

His first fiery speech to parliament following his election came as a surprise to many of us because we did not expect such a drastic distancing from the previous regime, still less such a far-reaching rehabilitation of Ethiopianism. While Ethiopians were hoping for reforms, Abiy seemed to go further by promising what appeared to be a peaceful revolution against ethnic federalism and its core ideology. In a nutshell, his speech was unnecessary for the strengthening of his power, all the more so because it did nothing but anger the TPLF and frustrate Oromo elites.

For another, the assumption that Abiy was a fervent adherent of the Oromummaa ideology prior to becoming Prime Minister overlooks what we now know for certain about him. The seven years of his tumultuous rule have provided us with enough evidence to conclude that Abiy is a narcissistic leader who abundantly uses lies, manipulation, and violent methods, including extreme cruelty, to get his way. Knowing what we now know, it is inconsistent to assume that Abiy was ever able to espouse and seriously commit himself to a definite ideology. Instead, we should firmly maintain that so transactional, self-centered, and deceitful a personality is incapable of embracing any ideology for the sake of principle. For him, everything being exchange-based, there is no such thing as an unconditional or pure commitment. Thus, the idea of Medemer (synergy), which, according to Abiy, was to be a foundational principle for the emergence of a united and prosperous Ethiopia, has fallen into disuse because it has lost its currency.

On the other hand, we must keep in mind that Abiy had to fake Oromo ethnonationalist beliefs from the get-go for the simple reason that he could not have risen to any position of authority during the TPLF’s reign without giving the appearance of being a supporter of Oromo nationalism. This nationalism essentially included the espousal of an anti-Amhara conviction, necessary, then as now,  for promotion to any position of responsibility in the political, administrative, military, or bureaucratic field, especially in Oromia. This is what those who believe that Abiy is a proponent of an extreme form of ethnonationalism overlook: as said a little while ago, Abiy is congenitally incapable of commitment that does not serve his personal interests. He neither cares for the Oromo cause nor hates the Amhara people: depending on what he needs, he is always ready to endorse and use any ideology. The best we can say here is that, as many observers suggest, Abiy’s commitment, if at all he is capable of any dedication, may perhaps be to the Prosperity theology. The belief suits his narcissistic personality well because it lends itself to the interpretation that he is God’s elect. The religious impact should be all the more emphasized because it may have contributed to the birth of Abiy’s absolutist ambition, obvious as it is that the feeling of being God’s favored goes hand in hand with being beyond human accountability.

For such a calculating person, unscrupulous deception, lying, and manipulation are indispensable tools, as demonstrated by Abiy’s scheme to gain Amhara support to consolidate his power. To repeat, the purpose of the deception was not to serve the cause of a prior ideological commitment. Deception was always in full play, but it was never for the sake of his Oromummaa commitment, any more than it was for Ethiopianism. Rather, it was necessary to lay the ground for Abiy’s long-term dictatorial craving. To conceal his craving, he presented himself as a supporter of Ethiopianism, a staunch defender of human rights, and a determined advocate of much-needed democratic reforms. All the measures he took in the first weeks and months of his coming to power, like the release of political prisoners, the removal of restrictions on the media, his pledge to unify the country under the banner of Ethiopianism, his appeal to external opposition groups to come and participate in the building of a democratic Ethiopia, etc., were promising starts that sharply contrasted with what we saw later.

When we retroactively reconstruct the main events of the seven years of Abiy’s premiership from the vantage point of the quest for absolute power, everything falls into a logical order illuminating both the reasons behind the events and their sequence. Here, however, an objection could arise, the very one saying that my thesis separates what is not separable. Indeed, does not the project of establishing a dictatorial regime derive from the prior espousal of the Oromummaa ideology?  After all, the institution of dictatorship does seem necessary to implement what many ethnonationalist Oromo elites openly advocate, namely, the establishment of an Oromo hegemony over the country.

To endorse the antecedence of the ideological commitment means that Abiy’s deception was not just a means to absolute power; it also derived from an original commitment to the Oromummaa ideology. One can even say that the objectives of the ideology required the use of deception and manipulation, given that Ethiopian elites in general, Amhara elites, in particular, had to be lured, in the name of a fake national unity and democracy, to support unwarily a pro-Oromo regime. In other words, the Oromummaa ideology posited dictatorship as a matter of course: Abiy did not lie to become a dictator but to facilitate the advent of a domineering Oromo regime. What dictated the erection of dictatorship was not the personal craving for absolute power but the ethnonationalist ideology.

This kind of argument is unable to explain one basic fact, namely, the serious difficulties that Abiy faced in his endeavor to rally on his side Oromo elites and political parties, such as the OLF and the Oromo People’s Congress, not to mention the split within his own party, the ODP, subsequent to the formation of the Prosperity Party. It explains even less the Shene insurgency and the ongoing clashes in Oromia, which are devastating the lives of so many ordinary and peace-loving Oromo. If all these Oromo movements share the same ideology as Abiy, then they should have formed a coalition government. What could be the reason for their inability to coalesce?

I defy anyone to answer the question without positing Abiy’s dictatorial longing. Indeed, despite repeated efforts, attempts to reach an agreement with other Oromo parties failed because Abiy had no intention of sharing power. In his eyes, he had to be the absolute leader of Ethiopia so that the best that defiant Oromo groups could ask for was co-optation under his unquestionable ascendancy. We can even say that Abiy wanted the Amhara support to prevail over his Oromo rivals as much as he needed it to counter the TPLF. That is why he presented himself as the Oromo leader who would temper the Oromummaa ideology by valorizing Ethiopianism. He presented himself as the elixir that Ethiopia needed to counter extremisms wherever they came from.

On Incompetence

As suggested earlier, many political analysts attribute Abiy’s volte-face to incompetence. The thesis has acquired more weight since Taye Denda recently gave an interview on Anchor Media. To the host’s question of why Abiy chose the path of division and confrontation after receiving so much support from Ethiopians, Taye answered that his sheer incompetence created all the chaos. Abiy knows neither how to govern nor how to work with other people; much less does he seek the expertise of those who know. He deliberately surrounds himself with mediocre yes-persons because he wants to be seen as the only person who knows how to solve Ethiopia’s problems. In thus hiding his incompetence from his supporters and the country at large, he alleviates the acute inferiority complex from which he is suffering.

My reaction is that Taye’s interview, no doubt highly heroic and exemplary, in light of the grave risks he is facing, misses the correct sequence of causation. Moreover, his explanation ignores the fact that Abiy outsmarted many people to seize and consolidate power. Granted that he possesses none of the virtues of a good stateman, still, the bare truth remains that he is street-smart, since he outmaneuvered all his opponents, including the well-organized and armed opposition of the TPLF. He has also deceived a large number of Ethiopians into supporting him, just as he was able to persuade Eritrea to join the war against the TPLF. That he received the Nobel Peace Prize by carefully concealing his war-mongering appetite is another example of his deceptive skills.

Taye would have given a more pertinent explanation if he had tied the crises and the chaos that Abiy caused, not simply to his incompetence, but essentially to his mania for absolute power. He would have given the prominent role to the dictatorial longing if he had stuck to his meteoric insight when he pointed out that Abiy hankers to become king. In thus underlining his obsession with absolute power, he would have grasped the reason why Abiy cannot prevent himself from committing blunders and plunging the country into deeper chaotic conditions. Since his passion for absolute power is intense, he is unable to control it, and so cannot help but disrupt the very fabric of Ethiopian society. Moreover, his insecurity and constant fear that power is slipping from his grip further inflate his blunders. To appease his fear, he takes measures to tighten his power.  In doing so, he only expands the crises and the chaos.

In many ways, there is a striking similarity between Abiy and Mengistu Haile Mariam in their reactions to events. The latter ordered the slaughter of the few experienced generals remaining after the massacres of senior officers in the 1989 bloody military coup. The executions did no more than precipitate the final defeat of his army. Mengistu could not stomach rebellion against his power, any more than Abiy could refrain from committing further blinders as challenges to his power accumulate. As a result, his decisions increasingly border on aberrations and a tendency to appeal to magical solutions. Unable to defeat the armed insurrections, especially that of Fano, he reacts, as might be expected, impetuously and irrationally to the feeling that the door is closing on him.

Dictatorship and Warmongering

All that has been said above clearly establishes one fact: neither Abiy’s prior ideological commitment nor his incompetence explains the armed conflicts and the messy socio-economic conditions of Ethiopia. The core explanation must emerge from his dictatorial craving, which accounts for the outbreak of the Tigrayan war and the subsequent cascade of events, including the eruption of another war in the Amhara region.

The defeat of the TPLF, thanks to the help of Fano and the Amhara militia, engendered a major challenge to Abiy’s ambition for absolutism. In calling for Amhara assistance to stop the TPLF advances towards Addis Ababa and allowing, nay, encouraging Fano and Amhara militia to organize and arm themselves, Abiy unintentionally created a force as defiant as the TPLF. Besides reconquering the territories that the TPLF had previously occupied by force, the Amhara defense force played a decisive role in the defeat of the TPLF. Consequently, the defense force, especially its Fano wing, felt so confident that it could no longer accept a subaltern role in the federal system. In short, Abiy’s victory over the TPLF turned into a substitution of one rival for another rival.

Following the collapse of the regional Amhara government, Abiy decided to use force to disarm and disperse the Amhara militia and Fano. Unsurprisingly, the announcement ignited an open war in the Amhara region between Fano forces and the government. For the Amhara insurgents, the fight was about diverse things: 1) the establishment of a new regional government that would defend Amhara interests; 2) the implementation of a political change recognizing the legitimate place of the Amhara nation and putting an end to the pervasive anti-Amhara ideology, both at the federal and state levels ; 3) the definitive inclusion of the regained territories into the Amhara region; 4) the maintenance and consolidation of the Amhara defense force, given that Abiy was reluctant to disarm the TPLF, as prescribed by the Pretoria agreement. The reluctance should not come as a surprise: Abiy wanted the defeat of the TPLF, but not its annihilation, because he intended to use the TPLF as a counterforce to the Amhara regional forces and the Eritrean government.

In his ongoing fight against the Amhara, Abiy had to rely increasingly on the support of Oromo elites. To obtain the support, he had no choice but to make concessions to the Oromo nationalist ideology and its supremacist goal. Hence, the volte-face from Ethiopianism to the Oromummaa ideology, which, however, does not mean that Abiy will govern Oromia democratically or that the Oromo people will be better off than other Ethiopians. It simply means that Abiy will rule in the name of the Oromo people, without, however, respecting their rights and providing them with a better life, just as Haile Selassie did in the name of the Amhara. What is more, repeating the same pattern as in the case of the TPLF or Fano, he will continue to wage war against all his Oromo rivals until they submit to his absolute authority. His devotion to the Oromo ethnonationalist ideology hinges on one condition only: the consolidation of his absolute and undivided power.

The same quest for absolute power explains Abiy’s volte-face regarding Eritrea and its leader, Isaias Afwerki. The spectacular rapprochement between the two countries and their leaders, after years of animosity and a bloody armed conflict, has earned Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize. The rapprochement grew into a military alliance when the Eritrean army intervened on the side of the Ethiopian forces to defeat the TPLF. However, soon after the defeat, the status of their relationships returned to the previous animosity, at the same time as the attacks against the Amhara began. Because Isaias did not turn out to be a compliant or docile ally, Abiy considered him an obstacle to his ambition to become the uncontested strong man of the Horn of Africa.

Another point of friction with the Eritrean government is the issue of Ethiopia’s direct access to the sea. Economic reasons and the need to end complete reliance on neighboring countries’ ports dictate that Ethiopia somehow regains access to a port that it can control. Here, however, a specification is in order: Abiy wants access to the sea for economic reasons, but also to build a naval base, as evidenced by the fact that he has already set up a naval military force. While Eritrea and other neighboring countries are willing to make their ports available under agreed rent conditions, none of them is ready to allow the installation of a naval base on its territory. True, Somaliland would have been the exception if the agreement reached between the two countries had not fallen apart and, with it, Abiy’s pursuit of a naval base.

In any case, since the Eritrean port of Assab provides the most convenient sea access to Ethiopia, it could have been another reason for igniting an armed conflict with Eritrea if Abiy’s army had not bogged down in its fights against internal insurgencies. Still, nothing is sure when it comes to dictatorship: the temptation to provoke a war against Eritrea is too strong, as it offers Abiy the opportunity to boost his personal glory by becoming the leader who ended Ethiopia’s landlocked status. Another incentive to start a war could be to deflect attention from the disastrous domestic situation, including the ongoing internal armed conflicts, and rally Ethiopians to his side by urging them to come to the rescue of the country.