Yonas Biru, PhD
Ethiopia is grappling with increasingly intense regional wars in the Amhara and Oromo regions, ethnic conflicts, armed skirmishes, deteriorating law and order, and worsening economic conditions. The urgency of the moment demands an open and candid discussion to curb the spiraling crisis and chart a path forward. In light of this, I revisited some of my past articles, including “Oromummaa is a Low-Grade Nazification Movement” (2023).
Why this article and why now? The Oromo political landscape is facing deepening divisions. Asafa Jalata, the theorist of Oromummaa’s divisive ideology, and Jawar Mohammed, its former activist leader, are at odds after Jawar embraced a path of compromise. Ethiopianist Oromo voices are also increasingly vocal in their objections to ethno-nationalism, which has turned the Oromo region into a hotbed for ethno-nationalist groups and a ransom-driven kidnapping enterprise.
The most dangerous and destructive group, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), also known as Oromo Shene, is supported and internationally represented by one of Oromummaa’s most influential intellectuals, Mohammed Hassen. This article exposes the danger Oromummaa’s extremism poses to Ethiopian unity, debunks its distorted and romanticized foundational inspiration (Gadaa), and joins the chorus of voices calling for transparency, accountability, and reconciliation.
I begin with five essential caveats, followed by background notes to frame this discussion within Ethiopia’s complex socio-political context. I ask for your indulgence, as the subject demands detailed treatment.
First, I was torn between focusing on reconciliation or transparency and accountability. The decision to emphasize transparency and accountability prevailed. This is because the false narrative about Oromummaa has poisoned the political waters, making a section of society a pariah another section a victim. Detoxing the body politics is critical to giving budding compromise and reconciliation efforts a chance to succeed.
Second, traditionally, Oromummaa embodies a sociocultural identity cherished by Oromos as their essence. Regrettably, extremist ethno-nationalist intellectuals, led by Asafa Jalata, have co-opted this heritage, using divisive supremacist tactics to advance an anti-Ethiopia agenda. This article critiques this extremist version, not the broader Oromo identity.
Third, I deliberately avoided using historical books and articles by Ethiopianist authors, including those of Oromo origin, such as Ato Yilma Deressa. My references and supporting quotations come from ethno-nationalist Oromos (e.g., Mohammed Hassen, Asafa Jalata, Jawar Mohammed, and Endalkachew Lelisa Duressa) and non-Ethiopian authors praised by the Oromummaa establishment (e.g., Asmarom Legesse). This preempts accusations of bias from “Ethiopianist” or “neo-nafxanya” perspectives.
Fourth, the Oromo community is diverse, ranging from ethno-nationalists aiming to free Oromia from Ethiopia to champions of democracy and the rule of law within Ethiopia. Diversity of thought also exists within the Oromummaa camp, manifesting in varying shades of extremism. My focus on ethno-nationalists does not undermine dissenting voices within Oromo society or even among Oromummaa advocates but reflects the fact that extremist ethno-nationalists constitute the most dangerous political force, warranting this focus.
Fifth, political Oromummaa, while significant, is not the sole driver of Ethiopia’s political crisis. Ethiopia’s protracted crisis stems from multiple structural factors, including economic inequality, governance failures, and external influences. The Amhara political space is equally problematic, viewing itself as the custodian of Ethiopia’s mythologized identity, often aligned with Amhara identity. This fuels, and is fueled by, Oromummaa’s agenda, as each amplifies the other’s extremist fervor. These dynamics exacerbate other structural issues, such as persistent economic challenges and governance failures, which in turn intensify tribal tensions.
Why focus on Oromummaa? While acknowledging the need for a holistic approach to the entire system, my focus remains on Oromummaa. As an economist, I am drawn to analyzing extreme cases to illuminate broader dynamics, as they offer stark variables for analytical models. I believe political Oromummaa holds the central thread that, if successfully addressed, could begin to untie Ethiopia’s tangled political knot.
Sociocultural Oromummaa
Oromummaa has two dimensions: sociocultural and political. Traditionally, Oromummaa is a sociocultural construct and manifestation of “being Oromo” or “Oromoness,” drawing its ideological and cultural principles from the Gadaa system.
When placed in the appropriate context and timeframe, the Gadaa system is the Oromo’s indigenous framework of democratic governance and social organization, anchored in egalitarian principles—merit-based leadership with time limits, consensus-driven assemblies, and communal resource sharing. It reflects the Oromo ethos and principles of ethical conduct and moral accountability (Safuu), serving as a framework for a peaceful social order (nagaa) through a deliberative conflict resolution mechanism. Safuu is deeply rooted in the Oromo traditional belief system, Waaqeffanna. Any effort to revive Gadaa as a blueprint for 21st-century Ethiopian governance must acknowledge its 16th-century limitations and the conflict-driven context of 2025.
Political Oromummaa
Political Oromummaa is a recent construct aimed at fostering Oromo self-determination, up to and including secession. Chief among its proponents is Asafa Jalata, who describes its evolution as follows:
“During the 1960s, Oromummaa expanded into the ideological and political arena with the Macha Tulama Self-Help Association and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).”
“Since the 1980s, by replacing the OLF’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, Oromummaa emerged as its central political ideology” (2009).
Two points warrant emphasis. First, the Gadaa system, central to sociocultural Oromummaa, entrusts Aba Gadaa with custodial roles under Waaqeffanna’s spiritual guidance. Since the OLF’s rise, this role has been co-opted by ethno-nationalists, many former Marxist-Leninists, whose agenda contradicts Gadaa’s principles of safuu and nagaa.
Second, the OLF’s military wing, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), has engaged in violent acts that violate Gadaa’s principles of morality and peaceful social order. The OLA’s atrocities, including mass murders, mass evictions, and kidnapping for ransom, are widely documented by international human rights organizations, including the UN, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention. Its violent history has also been reported by reputable media outlets such as The New York Times, The Guardian, and the BBC.
The Adulteration of Gadaa to Bolster Oromummaa’s Political Legitimacy
Asmarom Legesse’s book is considered the foundational text for studying the Gadaa system. He describes Gadaa as an egalitarian, indigenous, democratic socio-political system of the Oromo. In 2016, UNESCO registered Gadaa on its list of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, noting:
“The Gadaa system regulates political, economic, social, and religious activities of the community, addressing issues such as conflict resolution, reparation, and protecting women’s rights. It serves as a mechanism for enforcing moral conduct [Safuu], building peaceful social cohesion [nagaa], and expressing forms of community culture. Gadaa is organized into five classes, with one functioning as the ruling class, consisting of a chairperson, officials, and an assembly. Each class progresses through a series of grades before assuming authority, with leadership changing on a rotational basis every eight years.”
When discussing centuries-old systems like Gadaa, historical context is essential. Treating Gadaa as an egalitarian, democratic socio-political system requires qualification, acknowledging its 16th-century constraints. Oromummaa’s romanticization—claiming Gadaa as a democratic pinnacle, as Asafa Jalata does—is misleading.
In 2010, Jalata urged Oromos to “politically and financially support the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA),” while in 2023, Mohammed Hassen represented the OLA in peace talks, endorsing its agenda despite documented mass murders and displacement of non-Oromos.
Advocating Gadaa’s revival for Oromo primacy distorts Oromo heritage, ignoring exclusions like barring women and Gabbaro (defeated and forcibly assimilated tribes), which are unfit for 2025’s governance needs. This fuels Oromo-Amhara conflicts, threatening Ethiopian unity and contributing to 1.8 million displaced persons. Debunking Oromummaa’s divisive agenda begins with dismantling this false narrative.
Legesse’s acclaimed book clarifies that the Gadaa system was centered on the Borana’s core institutions, with non-pure Oromos (Gabbaro) integrated but relegated to a lower status. The main Borana councils were reserved exclusively for pure, indigenous Oromos, not those forcibly assimilated into the Oromo clan structure. The Gabbaro were allowed to establish their own parallel councils, subservient to the Borana councils. The saying “Salgan Borana, sagaltamman Garba” underscores a two-class society classified as “nine Borana” and “ninety Gabbaro,” where the majority of assimilated Oromos were relegated to second-class citizenship. The concepts of Safuu and nagaa were segregated values, reserved luxuries for pure Oromos.
Mohammed Hassen clarifies this with a succinct description: “The Oromization of the conquered did not exclude their subjection to extractive and exploitative relations despite their incorporation into the Gadaa system. Indeed, the rights of the Gabbaro were trampled upon, their women and children sold into slavery by their Oromo masters.”
Mohammed further states: “The conquered people, whose pride was humbled in the dust of slavery and whose numbers were reduced through sale, realized that the only hope of safety was open rebellion against their arrogant masters.” He attributes Gadaa’s collapse to its warriors’ “16th-century capacity to terrorize, second only to their inexhaustible talent for self-mutilation during the seventeenth and subsequent centuries.”
It is this system that Asafa Jalata and his extremist ethno-nationalist Oromos romanticize and glorify as “the Fountain of Oromummaa and the theoretical base of Oromo liberation.” It is the same Gadaa that President Shimeles Abdissa of the Oromo government declared “the future of Ethiopia is Gadaa,” and to ensure this eventuality, the government is “spending billions and erecting Oromummaa markers in Addis Ababa.”
The Whole Truth About Gadaa: A Minority Rule
In its time (16th century), Gadaa was a brilliant system with a dual purpose: creating a democratic-like, egalitarian system of accountability and governance by consent and consensus for native Oromos, while enforcing military domination, subjugation, and enslavement of non-Oromos, including those assimilated under duress. Mohammed Hassen’s and Asmarom Legesse’s seminal books paint a nuanced picture that challenges romanticized views of Gadaa as an inclusive, egalitarian system. Unfortunately, Asafa Jalata’s nearly 100 articles and numerous books overshadow them, inundating the internet with a romanticized narrative of Gadaa.
For assimilated Oromos, Gadaa was far from egalitarian or democratic, even by 16th-century standards. The Borana region, the birthplace of Gadaa, is widely regarded as the nucleus of native Oromos. The Borana Gadaa system is centered on the segregation principle of “Salgan ya’ii Borana, sagaltamman Garba,” meaning “nine Borana” (pure Oromo) and “ninety Garba” (assimilated Oromos). This principle enforces strict patrilineal descent, excluding assimilated Oromos from top roles like Abaa Gadaa, as documented in Mohammed Hassen’s and Asmarom Legesse’s books.
Legesse notes that Borana clans viewed themselves as custodians of Gadaa traditions and gatekeepers of top leadership roles. The strict hierarchy limited assimilated non-Borana groups to a subordinate Gadaa-like system, excluding them from the main Abaa Gadaa selection in the Gumi Gayo assembly.
Two factors distinguish Gadaa from other ancient democracies: (1) a small minority group (Salgan ya’ii Borana) governed an overwhelmingly large majority (sagaltamman Garba); and (2) Gadaa organized warriors into age-sets for ritual wars (butta) every eight years, mobilizing expansion. It was a militaristic system led by individuals appointed based on their track record of terrorizing, invading, and subjugating others.
Asmarom Legesse portrays the butta wars as ritualized warfare required before assuming leadership roles in the Gadaa class. This was part of the generational transition, where young warriors (the incoming lubba class) were required to prove their valor. These wars, conducted at eight-year intervals, were instrumental in showcasing their leadership in territorial expansion and conquest.
Mohammed Hassen documented in detail how Gadaa warriors were “the devils who attack in the evening.” They “terrorized the entire region during their epoch-making migration… The vanquished people were subjected to slavery and servitude… People who had earlier submitted with little or no resistance found that they were no longer equal members of a clan within which they were incorporated, but slaves who were used as gifts and commodities for sale.”
It was for exposing this that I became a target of Oromummaa-touting Oromo intellectuals. Asafa Jalata labeled me an “Ethio-Amhara elite” and a promoter of a “neo-nafxanya project.” Leenjiso Horo called me an “Oromo-phobic leader of the Amhara supremacist Nafxanyaa, an Amhara version of the American Ku Klux Klan (KKK).” Mirgissa Kaba and Girma Gutema regarded my previous articles as “pervasive propaganda of disgruntled Amhara elite, weaponizing lies and distortions.” They all intentionally disregarded my identity as 50% Oromo.
The Nazification of Oromummaa Revisited
Let us examine two books that illuminate the structural and tactical similarities between the extremist version of Oromummaa and Nazism. The True Believer by Eric Hoffer (1951) explores the human psychology behind how otherwise normal and intelligent people joined the Nazi movement. The book became a classic but unintentionally served as a handbook for creating blind followers ready to sacrifice themselves for a movement they were indoctrinated to support.
The second book, The Logic of Collective Action by Mancur Olson (1965), develops a theory to build an effective organizational system that overcomes the free-rider problem, where people desire change but expect others to bear the cost.
Hoffer’s book serves as a guide to brainwash and prime individuals to join a movement, while Olson’s book provides an administrative manual to organize them effectively. Understanding these two books reveals the structure, mechanisms, and tactics Hitler used to galvanize, mobilize, and organize blind followers, unleashing the Nazi rage that culminated in the genocide of 6 million Jews.
Upon close examination, it becomes clear that the extremist Oromummaa narrative, as articulated by Asafa Jalata, employs similar structural and tactical strategies, following Nazi indoctrination modules and organizational practices as described in the two books. One key distinction is that Oromummaa is confined to a regional, ethno-tribal context rather than a state-sponsored, industrialized regime like Nazism. As a result, its scale of destruction is limited.
Technical Parallels Between Nazism and Oromummaa
From a technical perspective, Hoffer’s The True Believer identifies two key strategies in Hitler’s indoctrination blueprint for his genocidal campaign. First, his romanticized narrative of the Aryan race was critical to excite, unify, galvanize, and create a sense of national pride, inculcating an army of true believers impervious to facts. Hitler promoted this as creating a “high German consciousness” and an “affinity with the spirit of the new Germany.” He conceived and propagated the Nazi movement as a “spiritual movement,” giving followers a sense of divine mission and turning them into what he called “divine creations.”
Hitler’s focus on creating and perpetuating hatred toward Jews was the second key element in his indoctrination process. He rallied his followers to avenge Jews, accusing them of being internal enemies responsible for Germany’s humiliation and defeat during World War I. A delusional motivation toward making the Aryan race supreme and a seething animus toward Jews as national enemies engendered a cult following.
Parallel to Nazi indoctrination tactics, Jalata engineered Oromummaa to serve as a unifying mass movement to restore Oromo society to its glorious 16th-century Gadaa era. Creating a romanticized narrative of Oromo as the founders of the world’s first democratic governance became the crown jewel of the Oromummaa narrative and central to its mission of reinventing and idolizing the Gadaa system as a “dynamic global project.” Just as Nazism turned racial supremacy into a global project of domination and extermination, Jalata aspired to make Oromummaa a global liberation leader. He elaborated:
“As globalization and transnational capitalism intensify their barbarism and terrorism through looting and destroying indigenous population groups, such as the Oromo, the choice of establishing regional and global mutual solidarity of the oppressed and exploited human groups on the principles of popular democracy and egalitarian world order will become absolutely necessary. The Oromo classical civilization can immensely contribute to such alternative liberation projects.”
Making Oromo great again as a global leader became the higher purpose and divine obsession of Oromummaa’s true believers. This required creating a high “Oromo consciousness,” akin to Hitler’s high German consciousness. Jalata’s blueprint for Oromummaa’s indoctrination process included creating a high-level “Oromo consciousness” that requires “emancipating Oromo individuals and groups from an inferiority complex,” which he associated with “low-level consciousness.”
Creating Oromo high-level consciousness required elevating Oromo identity to a near-mythical status, as a “way of being” and achieving “collective consciousness.” This is a near-exact replica of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft, a central concept of Nazi ideology that elevated ethnicity above all else, including faith, citizenship, or broader humanity. This was critical to creating a racially unified Germany through a shared national consciousness.
Oromummaa followed this ideology closely, elevating Oromoness to a near-mythical status. Abino Nini Habtamu, Oromummaa’s equivalent of a Gauleiter for Oromos in Canada, stated:
“Oromummaa, at its core, is the spirit, essence, and identity of the Oromo people. It is not merely a political slogan or an ideological construct; it is a way of being, a worldview, and a collective consciousness that defines what it means to live as Oromo in all aspects of life.”
Jawar Mohammed’s statement, “I am Oromo first before I am Muslim or Ethiopian,” was a testament that ethnic identity overrides religion, citizenship, and socioeconomic association, guiding political and social choices. This mirrors Nazism precisely. The difference between Nazism and Oromummaa lies only in scope and context: Nazism turned racial supremacy into a global project of domination and extermination, while Oromummaa is primarily a nationalist movement within Ethiopia, shaped by historical grievances and tribal liberation.
Simultaneously, creating enemies was central to the Oromummaa enterprise. Ethiopia in general and “nafxanyas” (a derogatory term for Amhara) became designated targets. A careful reading of Jalata’s work reveals language designed to enrage his followers and prime them for revenge. He identified “the mental enslavement of most Oromo elites” as the ultimate crime against Oromos and emphasized the need to create a high-level consciousness.
Furthermore, he constantly accuses Ethiopia of “terrorizing and committing genocide on the Oromo people” to demonize Menelik and the Amhara as the two most hated enemies. According to him, “between 1868 and 1900, half of all Oromo were killed, around 5 million people,” and “the Ethiopian colonial terrorism and genocide that started during the last decades of the 19th century still continue in the 21st century.”
According to Statista, in 1900, the population of Ethiopia was estimated at 8 million. The Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency estimates the 1900 total population at 10,742,000. The Wilson Center provides a higher estimate of 11.2 million. Given that the highest estimate for the Oromo population is 35% of Ethiopia’s total, the Oromo population in 1900 would range between 2.8 million and 3.92 million. Yet, Oromummaa literature continues to cite the 5 million genocide figure.
Jalata portrays Oromia as a “colony of Ethiopia.” His disdain for Ethiopia is evident in his apparent yearning for Oromia to have been a colony of Italy. In Oromia and Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict 1868-1992, he wrote: “The Italians attempted to win the Oromo to their side by abolishing slavery and the nafxanya-gabbar system, restoring some rights to their lands, and introducing the wage system and an Oromo-language radio station.” He lamented: “but all these were eliminated when Ethiopian colonialism was restored.”
Structural Parallels Between Nazism and Oromummaa
The incentive structure and constraint matrix Jalata laid out for Oromummaa mirror Nazi strategies, following Olson’s organizational principles. Jalata’s in-depth study of Nazism and his disdain for Ethiopia include labeling them as “Semitic” and accusing them of “ruthlessly suppressing the history and culture of non-Semitic Africans, such as Oromos.”
The Semitic angle is a subtle strategy to link Ethiopia with Israel, intensifying the resentment of the majority Muslim Oromo population against Ethiopia. This is a brilliant (though devilishly evil) strategy to elevate the already nurtured resentment against Ethiopia in general and the Amhara in particular. When political poison is laced with religious fervor, it has what economists call a multiplier effect, pushing the needle up on the Hate Richter scale. This is essential to overcoming the free-rider inertia in group actions that Olson describes. The amplification factor strengthens as propaganda percolates from the intellectual class to activists and finally to true-believer foot soldiers.
Another signature Nazi strategy is using intimidation and harassment to ensure Oromos do not oppose or act against Oromummaa’s objectives, paralleling Nazi tactics of mobilizing through Volk community pressures and rewards for party loyalty.
Jalata’s venomous attacks are particularly reserved for Oromos who cross the party line. Speaking of Abiy Ahmed, who became Ethiopia’s Prime Minister in 2018, Jalata wrote:
“The children of nafxanyas hijacked the Oromo national movement in 1991 and 2018 by capturing the Ethiopian colonial state. Then Ethiopian colonial forces and their Oromo mercenaries terrorized and humiliated Oromo families and communities by killing, raping, butchering, cutting throats, shooting, or lynching young Oromos in front of parents and communities, and leaving their corpses on streets for dogs or in forests for hyenas by preventing their burials at gunpoint.”
His attacks are not limited to political figures. Anyone who fails to submit to his “with us or against us” litmus test is ostracized and labeled as “Oromos who, like their Habasha masters, have been the defenders of Habasha culture, religion, and the Amharic language and haters of Oromo history, culture, and institutions.”
No part of German society was spared from Hitler’s drive to silence centers of potential dissent. The Kirchenkampf (church struggle) saw the Nazi government subordinate religious institutions to the state. Jehovah’s Witnesses were branded “enemies of the state” and subjected to systematic persecution for refusing to take the oath of loyalty to Adolf Hitler and for not serving in the German army. Historical records estimate that as many as 1,700 Jehovah’s Witnesses were killed by the Nazi regime. The Catholic Church was targeted because Hitler saw it as fundamentally incompatible with Nazi ideology, which demanded subordination to the state.
Oromummaa’s targets are Islam and Christianity. Jalata labels these two institutions as Ethiopian “Empire Builders” and “Colonial Institutions” with a genocidal record against the Oromo. Together, these religions account for 95% of Oromos, while Waaqeffanna, the official religion of Oromummaa, accounts for only 3%. Jalata has no choice but to accept Christianity and Islam as a fait accompli. However, he insists that these religions “need to adapt to national Oromummaa” because “the concept of Waaqa [Oromo God] lies at the heart of Oromo tradition and culture, which shapes the basis of Oromummaa.”
The structural enforcement of the last resort is building a military force. Initially, Hitler’s strategy was to create a spiritual movement that generated “spiritual energy.” He saw this as a prerequisite to building a dedicated army of fanatical followers. The process of activating, evangelizing, and mobilizing faithful followers was a critical part of the Nazification process. Jalata followed the same process, viewing the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) as a key factor in achieving Oromia’s national self-determination.
In conclusion
the extremist incarnation of Oromummaa, as engineered by figures like Asafa Jalata, represents a profound threat not only to the authentic heritage of the Oromo people but also to the fragile fabric of Ethiopian unity. By distorting the Gadaa system into a tool for supremacist ideology and ethnic mobilization, it perpetuates a cycle of division, violence, and mutual distrust that echoes historical precedents of mass indoctrination and exclusionary politics.
This low-grade Nazification, while limited in scale compared to its infamous counterpart, has nonetheless fueled escalating conflicts between Oromo and Amhara communities, displaced millions, and contributed to a broader erosion of law and order, social cohesion, and economic stability across Ethiopia.
Yet, amid these darkening shadows, glimmers of hope emerge from within the Oromo community itself. Moderating voices, including those like Jawar Mohammed who have pivoted toward compromise, and Ethiopianist Oromos who reject ethno-nationalism’s zero-sum logic, signal a potential path forward. The deepening fissures within the Oromummaa camp underscore that this ideology is not monolithic or inevitable; it can be challenged and reformed through informed dialogue and a return to Gadaa’s true principles of safuu and nagaa—adapted for a modern, inclusive Ethiopia.
The urgency of our time demands that all Ethiopians transcend tribal entrenchments to prioritize shared prosperity and democratic governance. By debunking romanticized narratives and confronting extremist tactics head-on, we can foster reconciliation.