The Oromo Call for Convergence against Abiy and its Bottleneck

Messay Kebede

Through write-ups and interviews, many Ethiopians have reacted to the call for unity against Abiy and his ruling Prosperity Party by a group of Oromo scholars and representatives of political parties. The reactions can be grosso modo classified under two categories: those who welcome the initiative as a significant step in the right direction and expect further steps clarifying the goal and the subsequent course of action, and those who are less supportive because the initiative does not include a roadmap dealing with the transitional phase of post-Abiy’s Ethiopia. The first group emphasizes the unprecedented nature of the initiative and insists that it is an opportunity that must not be squandered. The second group maintains that it is not wise to support the initiative without a clear understanding of the goal of the proposed alliance and the plan to achieve it. The purpose of this article is to review the two positions, and based on their respective strengths and shortcomings, to suggest my take on the matter.

In support of the Call

Outside the circles of Oromo supporters, interviews or posted articles reflecting unreserved approval for the resolutions are hard to come by. Even articles that are closest to providing support have serious reservations, for instance, Worku Aberra’s article titled “The Oromo Call for Unity” ( (https://borkena.com/2025/08/05/ethiopia-the-oromo-call-for-unity-worku-aberra/). The article offers an excellent analysis of the reasons behind the call for unity: it thus notes that opposition groups that face a highly repressive government have no other choice than to set aside their ideological differences and join forces “in response to oppression,” thereby molding “a plausible collective strategy.” Unless they coordinate their resistance through coalition and political compromise, they cannot mount an “effective opposition.” As the saying goes, “united we stand, divided we fall.”

Moreover, in a situation where no one opposition group has the upper hand over the other opposing groups and all come to realize that they face defeat in their divided state, the only option is “convergence,” which “arises not only from shared conviction but also from shared exposure to risk.” According to Work, despite the growth of Amhara resistance alongside the Oromo rebellion, neither shows “any realistic prospect of unilateral victory.” This fact diminishes the prospect of domination by one opposition group in Ethiopia and underscores the need for coordinating resistance to achieve victory.

The Oromo initiative deserves support because it denotes, as Worku puts it, “an important shift in Oromo politics”. The proof is that the resolutions no longer blame collectively the Amhara people for Oromo grievances, nor does it brandish the threat of Oromo secession. Instead, it calls for cooperation with other ethnic groups to solve the existing problems within a united Ethiopia. The call emanates from the realization that the fanning of ideological divisions does no more than increase the threat of defeat in the hands of the dictatorial regime. The longer the divisions continue, the easier it becomes for Abiy to crush each opposing group separately.

Another evidence for the shift is that the call “rejects the regime’s claim to legitimacy based on the Prime Minister’s Oromo identity.” In making the call, the signatories of the resolutions break up the expected association with the ruling clique in the name of ethnic solidarity. The breakup puts aside the long-standing ethnonationalist exclusivity of Oromo politics and sets the path for an alliance, based on “solidarity, coexistence, and mutual respect,” with other ethnic groups against Abiy and his ruling party. The appeal to a coordinated response to the ruling regime promises “the prospect of a negotiated transition.”

Despite the well-argued reasons for supporting the group’s declaration, Worku cannot dismiss his doubts and hesitations. Thus, while characterizing the declaration as “a constructive political turning point,” he alludes to its “internal contradictions and strategic silences.” He also wonders whether the appeal “reflects a durable shift or a temporary tactical alignment.” An unambiguous commitment to Ethiopian unity and an objective firmly opting for the democratic resolutions of Oromo grievances and other unresolved problems of the country are the two points most missing from the declaration. Unless these two points are clarified, it is unreasonable to expect a full endorsement from Ethiopians. In sum, the declaration constitutes a step in the right direction that needs to be completed by filling its gaps and breaking its silences.

 Skeptical Contentions

With Worku’s article, support for the declaration outweighs resistance; not so with the Habesha News Desk’s article titled “Beyond Condemnation: Evaluating the Oromo Political Consensus in Seattle, 2025” posted on the Habesha website(https://zehabesha.com/beyond-condemnation-evaluating-the-oromo-political-consensus-in-seattle-2025/). Even though the article cautions against outright rejection of the call and invites the reader to go beyond condemnation, it warns that it “suffers from notable weaknesses in strategic clarity, inclusivity, and practical implementation.”

The positive aspect is that the call “reflects a welcome maturity in political thinking, recognizing that liberation and justice cannot be achieved in isolation.”  However, the negative aspects are that it contains “no roadmap for the ‘transition’ repeatedly referenced,” so that it does not provide answers to important questions, such as “Who will lead the transition? How will power be shared? What mechanisms will prevent the rise of a new authoritarian regime post-Abiy?”

According to the author, these basic shortcomings block both the process of “coalition-building across ethnic and ideological lines” and the formulation of “detailed governance frameworks.”  A successful transition is not reachable unless the shortcomings are removed.  In short, in distinction to Worku’s article, the author makes acceptance of the call conditional on a revised version that will give satisfactory answers to the questions sparked by the shortcomings.

Semahegn Gashu’s interview with Anchor Media reflects a similar position. (https://www.youtube.com/live/X7CAC7DAy1E). Semahegn commends the Oromo intellectuals and politicians for taking the initiative; he also refrains from going so far as to reject the call for unity. Even so, Semahegn demands answers for the many crucial questions that the declaration raises. For instance, he asks:  Have Oromo intellectuals abandoned their previous anti-Amhara and secessionist stands? Assuming that they did, is their change real? Are they ready to follow a new course? If they have indeed changed, what is the new vision that they are proposing to the country? For being against Abiy is not enough; it is equally, if not more, essential that they tell us about their vision for a post-Abiy Ethiopia. In particular, do they still maintain that ethnic federalism, which proved to be so disastrous for Ethiopia, is untouchable, or are they ready to accept some drastic changes?

Unless a clear vision of Ethiopia’s future is laid out, any unconditional endorsement of the call is highly imprudent. Past transitions failed because Ethiopians followed political leadership without properly reflecting on the proposed goals and the plan to materialize them. They looked for saviors from the preceding regime, whose leadership they trusted without either participating in the formulation of the goals and strategies or retaining some oversight over the direction of the government. Unsurprisingly, the outcomes of this political naivete were repeated failures because the political leaders used their discontent to grab absolute power and advance their own agenda. In light of these deceptions, it is high time that Ethiopians adopt the adage: “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.”

Interestingly, Semahegn refuses to endorse the Oromo group statement, according to which the government of Abiy does not represent the Oromo people. The group argues that the Oromo are repressed, exploited, and unsafe. But then, why are the same group and other Oromo intellectuals defining Haile Selassie’s government or that of the Derg as Amhara rule, even though the Amhara people were no better off compared to other ethnic groups? The same can be said of the Tigrayan people under the TPLF rule. The definition should either be revised, or the focus must be on the dictatorial nature of the rule, which rule sustains itself by recruiting loyal sell-outs selected from all ethnic groups, or predominantly from one ethnic group. In the case of the Abiy regime, it is evident that the balance of power distribution among his associates largely favors Oromo elites. The truth is that, so long as dictatorship is the defining attribute of the regime, nothing of what is called improvement of ordinary people’s lives is likely to occur.

Another interview of Anchor Media, this time with Mesfin Aman, raises questions akin to those of Semahegn (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_p73cwCFPs). However, the tone is different in that Mesfin displays a higher degree of disbelief. He does so by underlining that most members of the group are known for their extremist stands. Yet, the call for unity contains nothing that could be reassuring, since its apparent goal is the mere removal of Abiy. As such, it provides no answers to crucial questions, like the nature of the change the group has in mind and how it will be implemented. Nor does the call critically review the harm inflicted in the past by the group’s extremist views. In fact, some of the members of the group have openly declared that they have no regrets about what they said and did. Under this condition, it is hard to accept at face value the implicit promise of change contained in the call.

The point is that the removal of Abiy does not bring change so long as the divisive ethnic federalism remains in place. Who forgets that Abiy, too, promised change? Yet, other than dismissing TPLF’s high officials, he continued to operate within the same system that brought so much havoc to the Ethiopian society. If Abiy’s betrayal has taught one thing, it is the importance of trust. To the extent that trust has been erased from Ethiopian politics, it is imperative that we make sure that calls for cooperation are based on a detailed examination of the goals and means of what is proposed. They must also be fully discussed and negotiated to the last detail so that there will be no surprises, misunderstandings, or a unilateral shift from the agreed roadmap.

Complete trust is all the more necessary now that the presence of numerous armed groups, notably of Fano’s game-changing rise and consolidation, has radically changed the Ethiopian political situation. Without consensus and mutual trust, the chance for these groups to lay down their arms and come together to form a viable transitional government is nonexistent. Rule by imposition is no longer possible in Ethiopia: everything must be negotiated and based on verifiable trust. The Oromo call, obscure and detailless as it is, is nowhere near fulfilling these requirements.

 The Extremist Blockage

All that is said above compels us to admit that, on balance, skepticism largely prevails among Ethiopians who commented on the call. Since the main reason for the skepticism is the lack of a clear and elaborated path to post-Abiy Ethiopia, we cannot avoid the question of knowing why the Oromo group did not come up with a clear plan and a truly changing proposal. To be sure, most of its members must have been aware that, without a clear political agenda, other opposition groups would be reluctant to respond positively to the call for unity.

In an interview with “Cyber power Tigray Media,” Tsegaye Ararssa suggests that the group deliberately avoided providing a detailed political program for fear that it would be divisive. (https://www.youtube.com/live/LXmN90px5M4). Seeing the substantial ideological and political differences dividing Ethiopian opposition groups, it would be naïve to expect, at this stage, any narrowing of differences, much less a rallying around an expanded political agenda. According to Tsegaye, the achievable minimum is for opposing groups not to harm or hamper one another. It is to diffuse divisions so as to avert war and establish the possibility of dialogue, thereby laying ground for the formation of a transitional government. He adds that Abiy has ruled and continues to rule by fomenting divisions so that he will prevail as long as opposing groups do not minimize divisions by focusing on a reachable common goal, which is his removal. Moreover, since none of the divisive issues can be resolved while Abiy is in control, the attempt to forge an agreement on a political program will only delay his eviction from power.

What else is Tsegaye’s suggested postponement of discussions on the divisive issues but an implicit admission that the Oromo group is still far away from a moderate and inclusive proposal? Does it not confirm that the appeal to coalesce to overthrow Abiy has not reached the required level, that is, a conversion from the previous extremist stand of most members of the group to a moderate and democratic one?  Yet, conversion alone could pave the way for the framing of agreed-upon principles supervising the transition process.

Here, we encounter a question that we can no longer avoid, namely, the deep reason for the group’s reluctance to break with extremism. Seeing the harm done by extremist beliefs, one would expect a change towards moderation. By the group’s own admission, damages were and continue to be inflicted not only on other ethnic groups but also on the Oromo people. Indeed, the first resolution of the group reads thus:

Recognizing that the current ruling group in Ethiopia has subjected the Oromo people to unprecedented agony and oppression, we have unanimously agreed that this regime must be replaced. We strongly denounce its anti-Oromo actions and policies, and its deceptive attempts to hide behind the Oromo identity. We also reject categorically the misleading narrative promoted by some factions that erroneously designates this regime as the ‘Oromo government.’ The characterization is far removed from the truth and is unacceptable.

The statement reflects an enigma left in the dark. Indeed, how comes it that the Oromo uprising against the TPLF ended up enthroning an anti-Oromo regime? Recognizing that the regime abuses all ethnic groups, including the Oromo, the group concludes that it does not represent any particular ethnic group, thereby insinuating that the most appropriate definition is to say that the regime is authoritarian, dictatorial, or even fascistic. Yet, facts indicate that the attacks on the Oromo people are more selective and subdued compared to the indiscriminate and extended assaults on the Tigrayan or Amhara peoples. This suggests that the aggressions against the Oromo do not have the same motivation as the attacks on Amhara or Tigrayans. As concerns the latter, the purpose of the attacks is to induce submission, while the former are punished for being ungrateful.

The difference can be deduced from a recent Mikdessa Midega’s interview (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8S5PmsEbsY0). Speaking for himself and on Taye Denda’s behalf, Mikdessa says that every time he asks why Oromia is in such troubled and messy condition, Abiy responds that he is doing what both wanted him to do, namely, undermining and crushing the Amhara people. In other words, Abiy expects recognition from Oromo elites for fulfilling their wish and, in return, he demands allegiance from them. In other words, Abiy expects recognition from Oromo elites for fulfilling their wish and, in return, he demands allegiance from them.

If we pursue our inquiry into the reason why Oromia does not enjoy preferential treatment, the answer is evident. To marginalize other ethnic groups and institute the hegemony of his regime over Ethiopia, Abiy needs dictatorial powers, as it is obvious that he cannot accomplish the tasks through democratic procedures. So that, the rebellion of Oromo groups against his power is an obstacle that he must remove, even if his constituency is in Oromia. The task is most unfortunate, since it provokes a state of war in Oromia with its inevitable dire consequences on the Oromo people. It can only be one of two things: either Abiy gives up his dictatorial ambition, or he does all that is required to fulfill it.

Given that the Amhara are by far the main threat to the projected supremacy, they inevitably become the primary target, all the more so because Oromo elites have a long-standing aspiration to settle a score with Amhara elites for the wrongs done in the past to the Oromo people. Accordingly, the mentioned enigma uncovers itself as none other than the Oromo elites’ resentment against the Amhara people. Nurtured by a narrative drawn from distorted and exaggerated historical facts, the resentment has become one of the defining factors of the psyche of Oromo elites. Abiy and his Oromo followers partake of the same psyche, and this explains why he tried to bring Taye and Mikdessa on his side by telling them that he is doing what they expected him to do, that is, enact revenge on the Amhara people for past treatments.

What Oromo elites must understand is that the pursuit of revenge, which can only inspire extremist beliefs and undemocratic methods, is the stumbling block against the nurture of moderation and the democratic spirit. Oromo elites must realize that the chains by which they want to shackle a given people are also their chains. Put differently, when Oromo elites complain about Abiy’s regime and swear that it does not represent the Oromo people, they are only reaping what they have sown.

Moreover, as already said, it should be dawning on the elites by now that the quest for supremacy is no longer in the cards. As a result of the rise and consolidation of Fano in the Amhara region and the reluctance to disarm the Tigrayan army, both the handiwork of Abiy’s leadership, the condition by which one ethnonationalist group could dominate other ethnic groups is no longer a possibility. All Oromo extremists, including Amhara and Tigrayan extremists, must swallow this new fact about Ethiopia. The choice is between secession, with all the dire consequences it is likely to have, and negotiations aiming at democratic integration in which no one is superior and where equality and mutual respect govern ethnic relations.

It is therefore incumbent on Oromo elites to first admit the source of their extremism and then liberate themselves from it by conducting a thorough critical examination of their political views. Only then can the call for unity find the moderate ground it needs to design a comprehensive political program that will earn the trust of other Ethiopians and pave the way for a democratic and inclusive transitional phase.