Published with Permission from Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis Journal
By Gregory Copley
Analysis. From Washington, DC, and regional GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs correspondents.
Washington had, by late August 2025, finally begun to focus on the strategic importance of the Red Sea-Suez sea lane and the essential element of control of the littorals which dominate the trade passage. But it is late in joining the party.
Among other things, Türkiye had become one of the most aggressive players in the Red Sea and lower Mediterranean regions, and Ankara is now able to shape US actions in the region. This was, perhaps, largely based on the belief that it was helping restrain the influence there of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Iran.
Part of Türkiye’s leverage was because of Ankara’s now strong hold over Somalia, and Ankara’s buildup of influence in Ethiopia and Sudan. This in turn has had a strong impact on the US’ position regarding Israel, Iran, and the Mediterranean generally, possibly also including the creation of a new national government for Libya.
In other words, the US by mid-August 2025 seemed to believe that it needed Türkiye to open the door for the US to achieve or regain some of its broader ambitions in the region. US Ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, appointed by US Pres. Donald Trump, appears to have bought the Turkish line on the entire region, much to the shock of many in the Trump Administration who have been aware of Türkiye’s growing anti-US and virulently anti-Israeli attitudes and actions.
Ankara, then, may influence US attitudes toward the interim Government in Syria. But at the very least, Türkiye is already impacting the US appreciation of the situation in the Horn of Africa. In August 2052, the US was considering recognition of the Republic of Somaliland in the Horn, with its strategic harbor and airfield at Berbera. But Türkiye, which now essentially controls the Somalia Government — which occupies the rest of “Somalia” (as the unified region became known after the 1960-91 union of what had been British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland) — has pushed Washington to step back from diplomatic recognition of Somaliland’s independence, which has a very different culture and background to the former Italian Somaliland (Somalia). Indeed, strategically, Somaliland is per- haps more strategically important to the US than Somalia.
As well, Washington has reversed its Obama-era policy of support for the rebel Tigré Popular Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia and is now supporting the Ethiopian Government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali. This could be construed as a positive reinforcement of the concept of Ethiopian unity by the US, but it is more complex than that.
US support for Prime Minister Abiy may be important, but perhaps not sufficient to stop a possible overthrow of his Government. Once before, Dr Abiy had faced such a threat from the TPLF forces, which came within a few hours’ march of toppling the capital, Addis Ababa. And that was at a time when the Ethiopian Defense Force still had a loyal and competent cadre of officers and men. Today, the Ethiopian Defense Forces are without their best officers, and the entire force is demoralized in the extreme.
There is nothing stopping Fano from marching into Addis Ababa at present from their positions in Debre Berhan.
Entire military units have defected to the four Fano opposition forces which control much of the Amhara region. Indeed, Fano units control the city of Debre Berhan, in the Semien Shewa Zone of Amhara Region, about 120km northeast of Addis, and there is little in their way should they decide to strike the capital. Fortunately for Prime Minister Abiy, his Fano opponents — now, surprisingly, backed by their old opponents, the TPLF, as well as the Government of Eritrea — have not decided on the political outcome they want. As well, they have gained significant support from Oromo ethnic groups, supposedly (and formerly) loyal to Dr Abiy, whose political power base was supposed to be among the majority Oromo population.
Dr Abiy has made great strides in modernizing the capital city, Addis Ababa, and, through that, attracting new foreign investment, particularly from the Saudis and Emirates. But even that is the result of extreme competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for domination of the Horn and Red Sea. And they, too, are competing against Türkiye.
In the meantime, the UAE has been betting heavily on its access to the Red Sea through its port deals with the former Ethiopian state of Eritrea, while Saudi Arabia has stronger influence in Ethiopia because of the residence in Saudi of some 500,000 Ethiopian workers, all of whom send remittances back to Ethiopia. And Ethiopia, like Pakistan, is in a position where some of its major earners of foreign exchange are now being overshadowed in importance by diaspora remittances to the country. The biggest Ethiopian diaspora, however, is in the US.
Meanwhile, the Fano operations indicate that the civil war in Ethiopia has not abated. It is now probably still the largest conflict in the world, in terms of casualties and displaced persons, with as many as two-million dead over the past few years. In all of this, the need to control the Red Sea-Suez sea lines of communications (SLOCs) intrinsically involves Egypt, which is also a player in the Ethiopian civil war, historically an opponent of any Ethiopian control of the Blue Nile (which originates in Lake Tana in Ethiopia’s highlands).
Importantly, Prime Minister Abiy chose Ethiopian New Year’s Day, September 11, 2025 (Meskerem 1, 2018, in the Ethiopian Julian calendar), to officially inaugurate the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the hydro-electric dam on the Blue Nile. This is a propaganda problem for Egypt, because Cairo has opposed the entire GERD program, implying that the dam restricts the flow of Nile waters to Egypt, which, in fact, it does not. But Egypt’s domestic water problems have to be blamed on someone, and Ethiopia is the scapegoat. Egypt needs to be seen to control the Red Sea-Suez SLOC, even if it cannot do so.
It is highly significant that Ethiopia, which has had commercial quantities of gold reserves known for many years, has now discovered very substantial new gold reserves in the Benishangul Gumuz region, adjacent to the Sudan border.
The potential for Ethiopia to return as a Red Sea littoral power is of concern to Egypt, which now is also a “bit player” in Sudan, which it considers subordinate to Cairo. No more. But of overriding importance in this scenario (and we have not yet discussed the issue of Iran) is that the Abiy Government could fall in a sudden move, and there is no coherent plan by any of the Ethiopian opposition to emplace a new national government.