Messay Kebede
Despite repeated promises, a successful merger of Fano groups is continuously postponed to a later date. My purpose is not to throw cold water on the attempt at unification: I sincerely hope that it will occur, and with the least delay. Nor do I intend to underestimate the progress so far accomplished towards unity through the formation of the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNA). However, although the latter undoubtedly represents a step forward, it is neither inclusive (for instance, it does not include the other rival force, the Amhara Fano People’s Force) nor unifying enough to bring all Fano groups under one military and political command.
Witness, the recent successful counterattacks and liberation of many areas in the Wollo region did not seem, according to the information I have, like a centrally planned and coordinated move. Instead, facts on the ground suggest that the Fano Wollo leadership took the initiative, planned, and executed the attacks by itself. So that, taking into account the steps already taken, this paper emphasizes as strongly as possible why the issue of unity stands out as the factor determining Ethiopia’s future. To do so, the nature of the main blockage causing the stalemate in the progress towards the completion of unification must first be exposed.
The Many Arguments for Unity
We are already familiar with arguments substantiating the importance of unification for military outcomes and political direction. By unity, we all mean the formation of a representative and elected body that will unite all Fano groups, direct and plan common military operations, and provide collective political and ideological leadership. For obvious reasons, a unified military command is necessary to shorten the war, which, in turn, reduces damage, both human and material, to the Amhara region. Likewise, the emergence of a unified political direction has, among other benefits, the advantage of introducing Fano’s official political program to the Ethiopian people. The introduction will allow other political groups or parties to take a position for or against the program, thereby laying the ground for discussions and the formation of alliances in view of transitioning Ethiopia to a different, hopefully better, future. It is further maintained that international recognition and diplomatic support hinge on Fano being able to speak with one voice on an agreed roadmap defining its political goal for the country.
As important as all these reasons are, they lose much of their weight without the presence of another factor. The factor springs to mind as soon as we ask the main reason why achieving unity proved so difficult. Sure enough, we can cite many reasons for the difficulty, such as the stubborn impact of provincialism, the lack of a unifying organization when the insurrection started, and the emergence of different leaders before the hatching of a common agenda. No doubt, these reasons have had their impact, since it is always more arduous to assemble under one command already independently grown armed groups than to branch out into complementary parts an organization that already has a recognized nucleus.
We can even put a positive spin on the lack of initial unity by arguing that the localized and decentralized nature of Fano’s armed uprising explains its military successes. Not only has the dispersed and localized nature of the rebellion facilitated recruitment, but it has also disoriented government counterattacks: it was akin to fighting an adversary with multiple heads, like the mythological Hydra. Be that as it may, the fact that initial conditions rendered the formation of unity difficult does not imply the pursuit of the same trajectory when conditions change; on the contrary, the change dictates the adoption of a different strategy.
And indeed, things have changed now that the war is more than two years old and that Fano fighting forces have grown in great numbers, in addition to being better trained, armed, and organized. The time of small guerrilla attacks has passed, since, according to Fano leaders, some 70% of the Amhara territory is now under their control. Without any possible doubt, Fano has emerged as one of the main, if not the main, political and military forces in the country. Clearly, what remains is the complete liberation of the Amhara territory, which is itself a prelude to the march towards Addis Ababa and the toppling of the existing government.
What is less clear, however, is how these two objectives can be attained without political and military unity. If one Fano unit cannot enter the territory controlled by another Fano faction, how could it operate outside its own territory? Assuming that by some miracle all the factions march towards Addis Ababa, which one will take control of the city, or are they expected to fight against each other until a winner emerges? Moreover, without a common political agenda, how are the residents of Addis Ababa and other regions expected to react? More exactly, which Fano faction are they supposed to support? And by what miracle could there be a new government unless Fano groups have an agreed common political manifesto and other political parties know and give consent, after due discussions, to its contents?
All these questions point to a frightening possibility, namely, the eruption of civil war. Examples from other countries that coped with a similar situation show the likelihood of divisions and power struggles among elites fostering entrenched regional warlords. Within Ethiopia itself, a similar development occurred during the era known as Zemene Mesafint, following the weakening of the central government. Once warlordism establishes itself, the country enters a period of instability, lack of peace, and declining national unity from which it is difficult to recover. There is no other way of avoiding this kind of political direction than to end confrontations through compromise and power sharing.
The Core Problem
The inability of Fano groups to combine under one central command reflects, unfortunately, the difficulty of taking the path of compromise. The difficulty is not easy to understand when we note that all Fano groups not only admit that they have no differences in terms of ideology and political goals, but they are also convinced that unity is a sine qua non for the realization of said goals. If they have the same goals and all know that unity is a must to fulfill them, then what is stopping them from going all the way and finalizing the union? What is more, Fanon groups and everybody else supporting their struggle know what is required to enact the last crucial step, namely, the formation of a representative political and military command invested with powers transcending the factions. So, since everything seems to be in place, again, what is preventing the finalization of the union?
Whichever way you examine the problem, it has only one answer that many refuse to recognize, even though they suspect it. What else could it be but the pervasive power struggle among Fano groups, more exactly, among the leaders of the groups? Their behavior sufficiently indicates that there is a deep distrust among them as to the possibility of sharing power, which distrust most probably combines with the aspiration to unchallenged power. We should not underestimate the mistrust and the aspiration, all the more so as they have deep roots in the Ethiopian past, as well as recent history. It is no exaggeration to say that they are part of the Ethiopian cultural legacy.
We all know that emperors, as well as powerful regional governments, seized power by defeating their rivals or those perceived to be so militarily. As an astute student of Ethiopian history, Margerit Perham wrote: “The power of the monarchy may be visualized as a magnificent and lofty throne which was always standing ready for the dynast who had the military power and ability to climb up into it.” If there is one country where Mao’s slogan, to wit, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” is true, that country is Ethiopia. The notion that power is up for grabs comes close to equating the legitimacy to rule with the force of arms, especially as the winner in the open and often violent contest can easily claim to be divinely chosen. Accordingly, Ethiopian history has recorded instances where characteristics, such as military leadership, cruelty, and the ability to deceive and divide, enabled individuals to rise to absolute power.
There is, however, one major difference between the traditional power competition and the modern one, which properly began after the Italian invasion. In the traditional system, victorious emperors and princes knew how to treat the vanquished. Through the art of concessions and compromises, they were able to reinstate peace by agreeing to share power, an arrangement supported by the then-existing institution of regional autonomy and the sovereignty of the church, which often arbitrated power conflicts. Once the confrontation was over, it was time for reconciliation. Not so with the emergence of the modern system of rigid centralization and the transfer of power from regions to the center, including the dissolution of regional armies. With the institution of autocracy, the traditional system of power sharing was terminated, with the consequence that power struggles turned into a game where the victor grabbed all and the vanquished lost everything, often even their lives.
Take our recent history, notably the case of the two Leninist organizations in Ethiopia, namely, the MEISON and the EPRP. Although they espoused the same ideology, they did not hesitate to take the road of violent confrontation against each other instead of coming together. The tragic consequence of their failure to team up led to the Derg’s seizure of power with all its catastrophic results. Unsurprisingly, the Derg exhibited the same urge to eliminate those perceived as rivals, whether from within or outside its ranks. The result was the institution of a one-man dictatorship. A similar process took place in the Eritrean opposition to the Derg: through violent confrontations, the EPLF eliminated its rival, the EPF. The same applies to the TPLF: rival groups from Tigray were eradicated, just as other opposition groups in the country were hunted, like the OLF and the All-Amhara People’s Organization led by Prof. Asrat Woldeyes.
The one thing that all these eliminations and persecutions have in common is the ingrained notion that, in Ethiopia, power is not only up for grabs but also that the winner of the violent confrontation takes all, so that politics is nothing other than a zero-sum game. We are aware of the severe consequences of this conception of power: they range from continuous wars to economic stagnation, the suppression of democracy, and the erosion of national unity. While advanced societies embrace the principle that power belongs to the people and build democratic systems protecting the rights of citizens, we, Ethiopians, wallow in the belief that the best use of power is to erect absolute systems that relegate people to a subservient status.
After all that Ethiopia has gone through over the last fifty years, we would like to see a form of government that tolerates dissent and accommodates diversity democratically. Nothing more is needed to guarantee peace and the formation of a truly diverse and representative government. Accordingly, what is expected from Fano is not that one of its factions grabs absolute power by eliminating its rivals: assuming it is still possible, nothing good can come out of this development, except perhaps some temporary benefits for the winners. Rather, we want all Fano groups to reach unity through democratic procedures and the accommodation of dissenting voices. Such political and military unification of Fanon will set an exemplary precedent for other political groups; it will also be a practical demonstration of Fano’s political maturation. A union emanating, not from the feat of arms, but from concessions and a power-sharing agreement will inaugurate a completely new path for Ethiopia. The deceiving habit of talking about democracy while being unable to deliver it practically, even within one’s own party, as we witnessed time after time, will thus come to an end and, with it, the dictatorial chapters of Ethiopian history.