Yoas Biru, PhD
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants landlocked countries like Ethiopia rights to transit through neighboring states for commercial purposes, but no entitlement to sovereign coastal territory. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is not claiming Assab as Ethiopia’s sovereign land. Instead, he argues that Assab belongs to Eritrea, but Ethiopia—with over 120 million people—needs a coastline, as the current status quo is politically and economically unsustainable.
Abiy has been steadily raising the temperature. One day, he states Ethiopia will not wage war to capture Assab. The next day, he escalates rhetoric, saying it’s “a matter of time” before Ethiopia “regains” Assab, implying historical ownership to the pre-1993 era. This aligns with statements from Ethiopia’s Field Marshal Berhanu Jula: “While we quarreled among ourselves, we surrendered our access to the sea” and “It is only a matter of time before we become a member of the Red Sea community.”
From the Ethiopian government’s perspective, sea access is existential for economic growth, given reliance on Djibouti for 95% of trade and annual fees of ~$1.5-2 billion. Eritrea, however, views Assab as non-negotiable sovereign territory and has warned of retaliation against any aggression.
Abiy maintains Ethiopia seeks negotiations with Eritrea for sovereign Red Sea access. There is precedent: In 2013, landlocked Bolivia sued Chile at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to compel negotiations for Pacific access. In 2018, the ICJ ruled against Bolivia, stating Chile had no obligation to negotiate. This effectively closes the legal path for Ethiopia.
In theory, three options exist for sovereign access:
- Forceful annexation (e.g., Russia’s seizure of Crimea).
- Purchase of territory (e.g., Alaska from Russia to the U.S.).
- Land swaps (e.g., Austria–Italy in 1919, Poland–Soviet Union in 1951).
The Crimea Strategy Is Not Viable
Ethiopia lacks the capacity to seize and hold Assab by force. The government is engaged in conflicts with Fano militias in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA, aka Shene) in Oromia. Abiy’s bravado to bring Fano to its knees in two months has proven to be a hollow rhetoric. Morale in the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) is low, with widespread desertions. Key reports include:
- The U.S. State Department’s 2024 Human Rights Report (released August 2025) estimates 10,000-15,000 desertions annually in conflict zones, based on Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) data.
- Human Rights Watch’s 2025 World Report notes low morale and troop strains, with up to 30% desertions in specific units during 2024-2025 offensives, derived from aggregated EHRC and ACLED data.
- EHRC’s Quarterly Report (September-December 2024, released January 2025) documents over 150 desertions in Oromia’s East Wollega due to mutinies over civilian targeting orders.
- Amnesty International’s January 2025 briefing reports sporadic morale collapses in Arsi Zone amid OLA ambushes.
- Reuters reported at least 2,000 former Amhara regional troops defecting to Fano in October 2023, citing post-Tigray War betrayals.
Neither Fano nor Shene—the government’s most formidable foes—would suddenly unite behind Abiy to fight Eritrea. They know betrayal is his trademark. Ask Lemma Megersa, Isaias Afwerki, or Gedu Andargachew what happened once Abiy no longer needed them.
Beyond military weakness, seizing sovereign land violates international law and the African Union’s Charter (Article 4) on territorial integrity, risking Ethiopia’s AU hosting status. Russia’s annexation of Crimea offers another cautionary tale: crippling sanctions, near-total diplomatic isolation, and long-term economic pain. Ethiopia, already facing currency collapse and food insecurity, would not survive such punishment.
The Alaska Strategy Is Not an Option
Ethiopia lacks resources to purchase a port. A just-released IMF and World Bank report flags that Ethiopia’s debt structure is “unsustainable” and the country is under “debt distress.” As the result, government spending on key sectors has been declining since the 2020 Tigray War. Four indicators highlight this:
Education: ~4% of GDP in 2021-2022, projected at ~3-4% for 2025—below UNESCO’s 4-6% benchmark.
Health: ~3% of GDP in 2021-2022, projected at ~2.5-3% for 2025—far below the Abuja Declaration’s 15% of budget target (Ethiopia’s ~7-8%).
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (including buildings, machinery, transport, and agricultural assets): ~31% of GDP in 2020, down to 20.5% in 2024, with a similar trend projected for 2025—below the 25-30% aspirational for developing countries.
Social Protection (pro-poor programs): ~1.6% of GDP in 2020-2022, rising to ~2.8% projected for 2025—still below the 3-5% consensus minimum (excluding health).
These low figures reflect fiscal strains from debt and conflict. Even with resources, Eritrea is unwilling to sell, and diplomacy has faltered post-2022 Tigray peace.
Abiy’s suggestion of offering Eritrea a share of Ethiopian Airlines profits is economic nonsense. The airline makes less than $1 billion in annual profit; even a 30% share is a paltry $300 million—compared to the billions Eritrea can expect from simple port service fees without ceding sovereignty suggests the offer was not serious. In any case, Eritrea has made clear it is not selling.
Land Swap Seems the Only Viable Option, Though Politically Fraught
Assab holds limited value for Eritrea. A swap involving disputed areas like Welkait (plus parts of Gondar or Tigray) could boost Eritrea’s agriculture and foreign exchange. However, this risks sparking internal resistance in Ethiopia’s Amhara and Tigray regions due to ethnic claims, and Eritrea may reject it outright as a sovereignty violation.
Geopolitical Factors Weigh Against Ethiopia
As the PM escalates nationalistic rhetoric, Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki builds alliances, including a multi-billion-dollar deal with Saudi Arabia to modernize Assab under Vision 2030—diversifying logistics and countering rivals like the UAE, Turkey, and China. Saudi’s $600 billion US investment over four years and ~$27.5 billion FDI stock in the UK (plus $5 billion recent deals and $39 billion raised via the London Stock Exchange in 2025) provide leverage for international pressure. Recent US/UK-Ethiopian meetings have warned against miscalculations in the Red Sea quest.
The Politics of Distraction
Even assuming legitimacy in pursuing access to sea by any means necessary (including war), requires national unity, military readiness, economic strength for sustained conflict, and diplomatic wins. Currently, support for Assab rhetoric is largely among government allies, while Ethiopians remain war-weary. The ENDF is stretched across fronts, with untrained, unmotivated troops—some reportedly fleeing battles leaving their weapons behind, prompting the government to ration ammo to minimize weapon confiscation by enemy forces. The economy faces debilitating inflation and birr devaluation, raising import costs for weapons and other goods.
So, what explains Abiy’s posturing at this juncture? Stripped away the bluster, Abiy’s campaign is about survival. He faces collapsing law and order, wars in Amhara and Oromia, a broken economy, a spiraling exchange rate, and an exhausted, fragmented army. Whipping up nationalist fervor over Assab is a cynical diversion—a bid to buy time, not to secure Ethiopia’s future.
The tragedy is that Ethiopians, weary from endless wars, are being baited into another quagmire. Chasing fantasies of sovereign access to the Red Sea will bring neither prosperity nor peace. It will accelerate Ethiopia’s isolation, deepen its poverty, and further fracture its social fabric.
Ethiopians must see this for what it is. It is not a greater national cause but a rather cheap political survival tactic. Following Abiy down this path will harm the nation far more than it could ever help