Dr. MeKonnen Birru (birrum@uhd.edu)
In the intricate and volatile geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia finds himself grappling with a series of diplomatic missteps that have jeopardized his credibility both domestically and internationally. These errors reflect a profound lack of strategic foresight and diplomatic acumen, culminating in his mishandling of Ethiopia’s relationships with both Somaliland and Somalia. The collapse of the Somaliland port lease agreement, followed by a pivot to Somalia through a new deal, underscores Abiy’s lack of consistency and deep understanding of regional dynamics.
In January 1, 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-declared but internationally unrecognized state, signed a port lease agreement for Berbera Port, with Ethiopia gaining access to the strategic port for trade purposes. The deal was hailed by Abiy Ahmed’s government as a significant breakthrough in Ethiopia’s economic and trade aspirations, especially given that Ethiopia, a landlocked country, relies heavily on access to ports for trade with the outside world.
Abiy himself declared that the agreement was “a gift from God,” and his Prosperity Party supporters celebrated it as a triumph that would strengthen Ethiopia’s economic footprint in the region. The deal’s success seemed inevitable, given the apparent enthusiasm within Ethiopia’s leadership, and Abiy’s political capital appeared to grow, bolstered by what seemed like a win for Ethiopia’s economic future.
However, the triumph proved short-lived. Ethiopia’s unilateral approach in negotiating the deal with Somaliland, without the prior consultation or approval of Somalia—a neighboring state and a member of the United Nations—quickly led to complications. Somalia strongly opposed the agreement, citing concerns over territorial integrity and sovereignty, considering Somaliland’s status as an unrecognized state. The involvement of Turkey in facilitating talks, which is an important partner for both Somalia and Ethiopia, further complicated the diplomatic equation. In the end, the Turkish mediation between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland effectively led to the collapse of the port deal, exposing Abiy’s overconfidence and lack of consideration for the broader regional ramifications.
The failure to anticipate the response of Somalia—an already fragile state with its own historical tensions with Somaliland—was a critical lapse in judgment. Abiy’s disregard for the geopolitical dynamics and regional sensitivities not only undermined the deal itself but also strained Ethiopia’s relationships with its neighbors, particularly Somalia. In this context, Abiy’s diplomatic handling of the situation can only be seen as ill-advised, demonstrating a lack of strategic depth and a disregard for the complex, delicate nature of the Horn of Africa’s political environment.
In the aftermath of the Somaliland debacle, Abiy’s administration quickly shifted focus to Somalia, seeking to repair the damage caused by the failed agreement and recalibrate its foreign policy. The shift was not just about salvaging Ethiopia’s regional standing but also about embracing a more traditional alignment with the internationally recognized Somali government. This pivot culminated in the signing of a new agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, with significant economic, political, and security implications.
The deal, which focuses on strengthening bilateral cooperation in areas such as trade, infrastructure, and security, marks a significant departure from Abiy’s earlier approach. Ethiopia, once poised to bypass Somalia in its pursuit of access to the Port of Berbera, is now leaning into Somalia as a critical partner. This decision underscores Ethiopia’s geopolitical recalibration, as Abiy seeks to align Ethiopia’s interests with Somalia’s leadership. However, this about-face raises uncomfortable questions about the prime minister’s consistency and reliability in foreign policy.
Ethiopia’s new agreement with Somalia comes amid broader regional shifts. Turkey’s mediation role in the failed Somaliland deal highlights the intricate web of alliances and rivalries in the region. While Turkey has long been an ally of Ethiopia, it has also cultivated strong ties with Somalia, further complicating Abiy’s efforts to maintain a balanced relationship with both countries. The apparent reversal of Abiy’s earlier stance on Somaliland, coupled with the growing rapprochement with Somalia, reveals a lack of diplomatic foresight, as it seems to be more of a reactive rather than proactive strategy.
The initial celebration by Abiy and his supporters after the Somaliland deal was signed now seems premature and ill-considered. Abiy’s enthusiastic endorsement of the agreement, coupled with the jubilant celebrations that followed, painted a picture of Ethiopia’s diplomatic and economic ascendancy. Yet, just months later, the failure of the deal left the government scrambling to find a new direction. The stark contrast between the early euphoria and the subsequent collapse is a clear sign of diplomatic naiveté.
As Abiy now prepares to welcome Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to Ethiopia for a high-profile visit, the political atmosphere has shifted dramatically. The visit is intended to reaffirm the deepening relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia, but it also underscores the contradictions of Abiy’s foreign policy approach. The once-promising deal with Somaliland is now relegated to the past, and Ethiopia’s focus has pivoted to Somalia. The lack of a consistent, long-term strategy has not only eroded Ethiopia’s credibility as a regional power but also exposed Abiy as a leader unable to maintain a coherent diplomatic course.
At the heart of these missteps lies a deep failure of strategic diplomacy. Abiy’s handling of the Somaliland port deal, his subsequent backpedaling, and his shift to Somalia illustrate a profound lack of foresight and an inability to anticipate the regional repercussions of his actions. In diplomacy, consistency, sensitivity to regional dynamics, and a long-term strategic vision are essential qualities that have been sorely lacking in Abiy’s approach.
Furthermore, the lack of coordination and consultation with neighboring states like Somalia reflects diplomatic illiteracy, where decisions are made impulsively, without proper regard for the delicate balance of power and interests in the Horn of Africa. This is not merely an error in foreign policy; it is a failure in understanding the broader geopolitical context in which Ethiopia operates.
Abiy Ahmed’s approach to the diplomatic challenges of the Horn of Africa has been marked by inconsistency, impulsiveness, and a lack of strategic vision. The failed Somaliland port deal and the subsequent shift toward Somalia reveal a leader struggling to maintain coherence in foreign policy. His administration’s diplomatic approach has been more reactive than proactive, with short-sighted decisions that have eroded Ethiopia’s standing in the region.
As Abiy prepares for the Somali leader’s visit, the question remains: Can Ethiopia’s foreign policy recover from these blunders? The situation demands a careful reassessment of strategy, a deeper understanding of regional complexities, and a commitment to long-term diplomatic engagement. Whether Abiy is capable of shifting from diplomatic illiteracy to strategic mastery remains to be seen. But for now, his actions stand as a cautionary tale of the pitfalls of hasty and poorly thought-out diplomatic endeavors.
