By Sirak Zena
September 1, 2025
As outlined in Part One, a caretaker government represents not merely a theoretical construct but serves as Ethiopia’s neutral intermediary between the disintegration of authoritarianism and the resurgence of democratic governance. The critical challenge, however, resides in the mechanisms through which such a government could feasibly arise from Ethiopia’s fragmented political context. This second part addresses this inquiry by scrutinizing the specific scenarios that could facilitate the establishment of a caretaker arrangement, assessing the inherent risks associated with each scenario, and outlining the obligations of political elites to avert fragmentation or regression into authoritarianism.
VI. The Caretaker Model as a Safeguard Against Ethiopia’s Transitional Pitfalls
The comparative analysis highlights the limitations of traditional transitional models in addressing Ethiopia’s unique challenges. In contrast, the caretaker government model offers a tailored solution that avoids the pitfalls of past transitions. This section explores how the caretaker model can serve as a firewall against Ethiopia’s historical cycle of authoritarian rule.
In Ethiopia’s contemporary political history, nearly every transitional government has resulted not in democracy but in the establishment of a new authoritarian regime. From the Derg to the TPLF, transitional frameworks have frequently been co-opted by dominant actors who ascended to power under the guise of reform, only to solidify their control and suppress dissent.
The caretaker government model is particularly suited to Ethiopia due to its limited mandate and inherent neutrality. This structure is not intended to govern, legislate, or compete; rather, it serves as a mechanism designed exclusively to return power to the people through fair electoral processes. Members of this body are prohibited from participating in the elections they oversee, eliminating any incentives for manipulation.
In contrast to transitional governments, which often devolve into instruments of factional bargaining or elite dominance, a caretaker government functions as a temporary referee rather than a new contender.
My friend mentioned in section IV that he added a colorful analogy that captures the appeal of transitional governments for political elites.
“Transitional governments are like an open invitation to political elites. With gleeful enthusiasm, they exclaim, ‘Hurrah!’ or ‘Hoo!’ (in Amharic). ‘The gates to power are wide open.’ It’s an all-too-easy path that allows them to seize control immediately.”
This vivid imagery illustrates why transitional governments can be problematic, often serving as a tempting shortcut to power rather than a genuine path to democratic transformation. It reinforces the argument for a more neutral caretaker approach that prioritizes fair elections over immediate power-sharing arrangements.
In an environment as polarized and volatile as Ethiopia’s, where trust in political actors is alarmingly low, only an entity with no vested interest in the outcome can provide a credible path forward. This highlights that the caretaker model is not merely an alternative; it represents a necessary departure from a cycle of betrayal that has characterized Ethiopian transitions for decades.
This is not a utopian solution; it is a pragmatic blueprint, patiently awaiting the moment when courage, consensus, and crisis converge.
VII. Bridging Ethnic Identity and National Unity: A Call for Elite Reorientation in Ethiopia’s Political Landscape
From Ethnic Particularism to Shared Nationhood
Ethiopia’s survival depends on institutional reform and a shift in political consciousness. Structural innovations, such as the caretaker government, can provide the foundation for a democratic transition, but that foundation requires the will to build upon it. This must come from Ethiopia’s political elites, whose ability to rise above narrow ethnic agendas will determine the success of any transitional framework.
In times of national crisis, when the state is fractured and institutions falter, political actors often retreat into the safety of ethnic identity. This instinct is rooted in historical grievances and survival strategies. However, when ethnic loyalty becomes the sole compass, it overshadows the broader national interest, reducing the state to a patchwork of competing claims. Ethiopia stands perilously close to this condition.
The danger lies not in affirming one’s ethnic identity but in placing it above the shared enterprise of nationhood. Particularism seeks justice for one’s group and has moral legitimacy when injustice is real. However, if it becomes the exclusive organizing principle of political life, it traps the nation in a self-reinforcing cycle of fragmentation. Universalism necessitates a shift in moral perspective: to pursue justice for all while safeguarding one’s own interests. This is not moral idealism; it is a political necessity in a multi-ethnic state.
For the caretaker model to succeed, elites must shift from being custodians of ethnic entitlement to architects of a pluralistic democratic state. Without this reorientation, even the most carefully designed neutral institutions will be undermined by competing ethno-nationalist agendas. The neutrality of a caretaker government cannot be sustained if the political class refuses to operate within a shared national framework.
The operational success of the two-tier caretaker model relies on this reorientation.
- Tier One: The neutral electoral body will gain legitimacy only if all major political and ethnic factions accept its authority, even when outcomes are uncertain.
- Tier Two: The Conflict Stabilization Council can negotiate meaningful ceasefires only if elites prioritize collective stability over tactical advantage for their group.
A caretaker government offers a rare opportunity: a neutral, time-limited space where Ethiopia’s diverse communities can begin to shape their future on equal footing. However, this opportunity is conditional. Elites must commit to resolving ethnic grievances within a democratic framework rather than through armed struggle or unilateral power grabs.
If Ethiopia’s political class fails to embrace both group rights and national responsibilities, no institutional arrangement will endure. The first test of the caretaker model is not its legal design but whether Ethiopia’s leaders are willing to use it as a bridge toward a civic order where ethnic justice and national survival reinforce each other.
This reorientation of political consciousness is not a moral luxury; it is the first operational prerequisite for any caretaker framework to function. A two-tier model, no matter how well designed on paper, will fail if elites view it as another arena for ethnic competition rather than a neutral platform for national recovery. However, translating this moral shift into practice will clash with Ethiopia’s entrenched patterns of distrust, institutional fragility, and fragmented security environment. It is at this intersection of moral readiness and structural reality that the true implementation challenges of the caretaker model emerge.
Anecdote from a Discussion Among Friends
During a discussion among friends a few years ago, one friend from a particular ethnic group listened attentively as another expressed his community’s grievances with great passion. When the speaker finished, the first friend quietly responded, “If we only focus on fixing our own houses, who will take care of the shared roof?”
His words stayed with me. They capture the heart of Ethiopia’s challenge: ethnic identity is real and valuable, but if it becomes the only lens for political action, the whole house – the nation – remains vulnerable to the storm.
The objective reality of Ethiopian politics dictates a hard truth: no single political actor, armed group, or ethnic constituency can achieve enduring success by monopolizing power.
History as a Weapon and a Teacher
A critical aspect of elite reorientation lies in how political leaders engage with and interpret Ethiopia’s complex history. Often, the past becomes a stage where some elites perform embellished narratives filled with distortions and extremist views that ignite inter-ethnic animosity. This manipulation of collective memory fosters extremism and jeopardizes community cohesion and national unity.
Certain political elites have long understood that it is easier to fracture a people with memories than to unite them with possibilities. They summon the ghosts of history, draping old wounds with sacred banners, causing ethnic groups to view each other as perpetual enemies. In this narrative, ancient battles reemerge in new forms, and the past becomes a fog through which no horizon is visible, a theater where yesterday endlessly repeats itself while tomorrow remains unheard.
Breaking this spell requires a profound shift in how elites approach history. They must recognize that the past is not a prison but a teacher. Only when we free the dead from the service of division, allowing memory to heal rather than command, can we envision a shared future.
What is expected of political and ethnic elites is not the embellishment or denial of history but a truthful engagement with it. Even denial confirms that the past is real, for one cannot argue against what one does not first recognize. By confronting history in its unvarnished form, without dramatization or distortion, elites create the possibility of a shared understanding—a common ground from which reconciliation may grow.
The responsibility of leadership is twofold: to illuminate the past so it may guide rather than imprison and to articulate a vision of the future that compels people to look forward rather than backward. As Søren Kierkegaard observed, borrowing his words, “Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom… Life can only be understood backward, but it must be lived forward.”
This reorientation in how elites engage with history is not merely a conceptual exercise; it is a fundamental prerequisite for the success of any transitional framework, including the proposed caretaker government model. Without a commitment to honest historical reckoning and a focus on collective national interests, even the most meticulously crafted caretaker system is susceptible to devolving into ethnic rivalry rather than serving as an impartial foundation for democratic revitalization.
By embracing this approach to history, political elites can transform historical knowledge from a divisive weapon into a unifying teacher. This transformation is essential for building the trust and shared vision necessary for the caretaker model to succeed in guiding Ethiopia toward a truly democratic future.
As George Santayana stated in his book The Life of Reason (1905), ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’ However, let us use history as a guide for the future, rather than a blueprint that could lead us to recreate past problems.
Extremism, whether in denying or exploiting historical wounds, will divide people instead of fostering unity and trust.
Ethiopia’s political elites must shift from being manipulators of history to stewards of a shared future for any transitional framework, including the proposed caretaker government, to ensure its success. The effectiveness of Tier One and Tier Two structures depends on this change in elite mindset. Without a commitment to honest historical reckoning and a focus on national interests, the caretaker system may devolve into another arena for ethnic competition rather than a platform for democratic renewal. This understanding is crucial as we consider the role of elite responsibility in shaping Ethiopia’s political future.
Forging a Shared Future: The Imperative of Elite Responsibility
Ultimately, Ethiopia’s future hinges not solely on institutional blueprints but on how its elites learn from history and assume responsibility for the nation. The path forward requires political leaders to:
- Cease exploiting historical memory as a tool for division.
- Abandon the use of ambiguity to conceal political ambitions
- Approach history truthfully, transforming it from a prison into a teacher.
- Engage responsibly with institutions, viewing them as scaffolds for renewal rather than arenas of conquest.
This call for elite reorientation is not merely a plea for virtue; it is a condition for national survival. Only by translating history’s lessons into a foundation for shared nationhood can Ethiopia construct a political order that avoids a relapse into authoritarianism. The convergence of ethnic justice and national responsibility forms the essential bridge upon which the caretaker model must stand. This bridge, if built with integrity and foresight, can lead Ethiopia not back into division but forward into genuine democratic renewal.
Yet even if Ethiopia’s political elites embrace a broader sense of national responsibility, the work is far from over. The next hurdle is turning principle into practice—navigating the structural, political, and security challenges that could derail the caretaker model before it takes root.
VIII. Implementation Challenges of the Caretaker Model
While the caretaker government model offers a promising framework for Ethiopia’s democratic transition, its implementation faces significant challenges rooted in the country’s complex political landscape. This section examines these challenges in light of Ethiopia’s current realities and explores potential strategies to overcome them.
1. Catalyzing Regime Change
The primary challenge is creating the conditions for a caretaker government to take root. In Ethiopia’s political culture, no ruling elite has ever voluntarily surrendered power, and the current regime shows no indication of breaking this pattern. The prospect of a negotiated, peaceful handover at the end of its term is, therefore, not a realistic scenario. The more probable path to change is through the regime’s involuntary removal- whether by internal collapse, elite fragmentation, or a combination of popular uprising and sustained pressure from armed and civic forces. This reality underscores the urgency of preparing a caretaker mechanism in advance, so it can be activated immediately when the regime’s hold on power breaks.
Strategy: A multi-pronged approach is necessary: a) Intensify diplomatic pressure from regional, financial donor institutions, and international actors. b) Strengthen and unify opposition forces to present a credible alternative. c) Mobilize civil society and diaspora groups to increase internal pressure. d) Cultivate reformist elements within the regime to be part of the transition.
For a detailed breakdown of potential trigger scenarios and the caretaker model’s role in each, see the scenario table in “Scenario Matrix: Pathways to a Caretaker Government.
2. Establishing Legitimacy in a Fractured Polity
In Ethiopia’s deeply divided political landscape, establishing the legitimacy of a caretaker body poses a significant challenge. Ethnic tensions, regional disputes, and a history of exclusionary politics have eroded trust in centralized institutions.
Strategy: To build legitimacy, a) Ensure broad representation in both tiers of the caretaker structure, reflecting Ethiopia’s diversity. b) Implement transparent selection processes for caretaker officials, possibly involving respected neutral bodies like religious institutions or professional associations. c) Engage in extensive public outreach and education about the caretaker model’s purpose and limitations. d) Secure endorsements from a wide range of political actors, including opposition parties, armed groups, and regional leaders.
3. Navigating the Security Landscape
Ethiopia’s fragmented security situation, characterized by multiple armed groups and ongoing conflicts in regions such as Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray, presents a formidable challenge to any transitional framework.
Strategy: The two-tier model addresses this by a) empowering Tier Two to negotiate ceasefires and security arrangements without compromising Tier One’s electoral focus. b) Involving armed groups in Tier Two discussions while keeping them separate from electoral processes. c) Considering regional security councils under Tier Two to address localized conflicts. d) Exploring the possibility of neutral peacekeeping forces, potentially from the African Union, to monitor ceasefires and protect civilians.
4. Overcoming Institutional Weakness
Years of authoritarian rule have weakened Ethiopia’s institutions, potentially hampering the ability to organize free and fair elections.
Strategy: To address this:
- a)Empower Tier One of the caretaker model to serve as the temporary, independent electoral body during the transition period.b) Staff Tier One with vetted professionals, academics, and civil society leaders with proven integrity and no ties to political parties or the current regime. c) Prioritize capacity building for Tier One members in electoral management, focusing on technical expertise, logistical capabilities, and ensuring impartiality. d) Leverage international expertise and resources for technical support, possibly through partnerships with reputable international electoral organizations. e) Implement rigorous transparency measures, including real-time reporting of electoral preparations and international observation at all stages. f) Develop a comprehensive voter education program to familiarize the public with the transitional electoral process and the role of Tier One.
This approach ensures that the electoral process during the transition is managed by a neutral, purpose-built body (Tier One). It also sets the stage for establishing a permanent, independent National Election Board by the democratically elected government, ensuring long-term electoral integrity beyond the transition period.
5. Balancing Urgency with Stability
The proposed six-month timeframe for the caretaker government may prove challenging, given Ethiopia’s complex issues and challenges. There’s a risk of rushing the process and further destabilizing the country.
Strategy: To balance these concerns, a) Build flexibility into the timeline while maintaining clear endpoints to prevent indefinite extensions. b) Establish clear, achievable milestones for the transition process. c) Empower Tier Two to address immediate humanitarian and security concerns in parallel with electoral preparations. d)Develop contingency plans for potential disruptions to the electoral timeline.
6. Securing International Support and Resources
Implementing the caretaker model will require significant resources and international backing, which may be challenging to secure given competing global priorities.
Strategy: To garner support, a) Engage in proactive diplomacy with key international partners, emphasizing the model’s potential to stabilize the Horn of Africa. b) Develop a clear, costed transition plan to present to potential donors. c) Leverage Ethiopia’s strategic importance to attract support from multiple international actors. d) Explore innovative funding mechanisms, including diaspora bonds or regionally backed transition funds.
On the final note, while these challenges are significant, they are not insurmountable. The strength of the two-tier caretaker model lies in its ability to address Ethiopia’s unique complexities while focusing on democratic transition. Success will require unprecedented cooperation among Ethiopia’s political class, robust international support, and a collective commitment to breaking the cycle of authoritarian rule.
Implementing this model represents a new experience for Ethiopia, requiring multifaceted preparation and the involvement of multiple groups. Establishing and running a caretaker government, especially with the proposed two-tier system, will demand close monitoring and continuous adjustment. This endeavor is complex, given Ethiopia’s political landscape and history of troubled transitions.
However, the potential rewards of this approach are significant. By providing a neutral platform for genuine democratic transition, the caretaker model offers Ethiopia an opportunity to reset its political trajectory. The challenges of implementation, which include managing regional security concerns and securing elite buy-in, should be viewed as essential stages in establishing a stable and inclusive democracy.
The effort required to overcome these implementation challenges is a worthwhile investment in Ethiopia’s future. Each obstacle addressed and each milestone achieved in this process brings the nation closer to a political system that reflects the will of its diverse populace. As we move forward, this vision of a democratic, stable, and prosperous Ethiopia should guide us through the complexities of implementation.
By anticipating and strategically addressing these implementation challenges and other unlisted challenges, the caretaker model offers a viable path toward a more democratic and stable Ethiopia, one that is worth the effort it demands.
IX. Scenario Matrix: Pathways to a Caretaker Government
The scenarios outlined in the preceding matrix make one truth unmistakably clear: no pathway to transition in Ethiopia can be understood without accounting for the military. Whether the regime collapses from internal fractures, whether popular uprisings force change, or whether armed groups push the state to its limits, the decisive factor in every case remains the stance of Ethiopia’s defense forces.
Unlike militaries in states where neutrality is expected, Ethiopia’s armed forces are deeply enmeshed in party politics, shaping not only the survival of the current regime but also the feasibility of a caretaker government. Recognizing these dynamics is essential before considering how Tier One and Tier Two might function in practice realistically.
For this reason, the prior work of political elites is paramount ; coordinating with regional armed groups, low-ranking military officers, and reform-minded insiders within the ruling party cannot be delayed. Without such preparation, any rupture in the regime risks leading not to transition but to chaos and renewed authoritarian consolidation.
To transition from abstract triggers to practical possibilities, the following scenario matrix outlines the primary pathways through which the Tier One selection process can be activated. It also outlines the risks associated with each scenario and clarifies the realistic functions that Tier One and Tier Two could perform in these situations.
Mapping Pathways to a Caretaker Government
Trying to outline scenarios without an organized roadmap is a bit like asking a taxi driver to take you “anywhere but here” with no specific destination in mind; you will end up circling the same block, wasting fuel, and still paying the fare. In Ethiopia’s political context, the stakes are much higher than a taxi ride. However, the principle is the same: without an organization and a clear plan, even the best scenarios remain mirages.
With that in mind, the following scenario matrix translates these abstract triggers into structured possibilities, outlining risks, functions, and implications.
| Trigger Scenario | Immediate Risks | Role of Tier One (Caretaker Gov.) | Role of Tier Two (Conflict Stabilization Council) | Long-term Implications |
| Regime Internal Collapse & Elite Fragmentation | Competing factions seek control. A civilian handover is possible with military support, but military opposition could lead to regime consolidation or prolonged civil unrest.
|
If the military accepts civilian transition, the Tier One Selection Process will be activated. If blocked, remain in an advocacy role only.
|
If permitted, Tier Two activates to broker ceasefires and maintain continuity. If blocked, focus on humanitarian coordination and external coalition-building.
|
Low-Moderate- success potential. It could break old power networks, but rival elite interests risk prolonging instability.
Elites concealing separatist objectives beneath transitional rhetoric may emerge.
|
| Popular Uprising | Chaotic street mobilization, breakdown of public order, and security force defections. Some political Leaders are withholding positions to exploit uncertainty.
|
Establish legitimacy quickly through public endorsement and visible neutrality-Activation of Tier One Selection Process.
|
Restore basic services, coordinate humanitarian relief, and negotiate local security arrangements.
|
High success potential. Broad public support gives legitimacy, but unmet expectations may spark new unrest. Fragmentation, unless tied quickly to a unifying caretaker structure.
|
| Low-Rank Military Coup Against the Regime- Coordinated [1] | Reform-minded officers coordinate with political elites beforehand.
|
Activation of Tier One Selection Process. | Tier Two oversees stabilization, ceasefire arrangements, and regional dialogues. | Moderate success potential. Coordination aids the transition, but military influence may delay the full establishment of civilian authority. |
| High & Low-Rank Military Sudden Coup Against the Regime Uncoordinated [2] | Risk of military dominance, suspension of the political process, and civil unrest. Political Leaders are withholding positions to exploit uncertainty—potentially leading to an authoritarian relapse.
|
If the military cedes power under pressure, activate the Tier One Selection Process; otherwise, act externally to advocate for civilian transition. *
|
Attempt to negotiate military withdrawal from governance; if rebuffed, focus on rallying domestic and international opposition to permanent military rule. * | Low–Moderate success potential. The risk of prolonged military rule undermines the chances for genuine civilian governance. Leads to authoritarian relapse, as militaries often revert to command-and-control logic.
|
| Regional-Armed Groups Topple the Regime | Risk of armed group dominance, retaliatory violence, and fragmentation.
Both fragmentation and authoritarian relapse.
|
Activation of Tier One Selection Process—only if armed groups honor the pre-agreed caretaker framework; otherwise, operate from outside as an advocacy body for elections. *
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Where possible, negotiate temporary arrangements to facilitate humanitarian access and the civilian political process; if blocked, focus on external lobbying and coalition-building efforts. *
|
High success potential if pre-coordinated. Without coordination, there is a high risk of fragmentation and rival claims to power.
|
| Combination of Regional Armed Groups Pressure, Popular Protest, and Internal Defection | Fluid power vacuum, multiple claimants to authority | Activation of Tier One Selection Process. Present the pre-agreed caretaker as a neutral authority recognized by all sides. | Coordinate immediate ceasefire agreements and secure key infrastructure. | Moderate–High success potential. Broad coalition strengthens legitimacy, but balancing diverse interests may strain neutrality.
|
* In scenarios marked with an asterisk, the operational capacity of Tier One and Tier Two may be suspended if the power-holding force (military or armed groups) refuses to cede authority. In such cases, both tiers may be limited to advocacy, coalition-building, and securing international pressure until conditions allow activation. This reflects the creation process outlined in the article, which requires pre-agreement and readiness for both tiers.
[1] Coordinated: A coup preceded by communication between reformist military officers and political elites; it opens the path for the caretaker civilian authority and stabilization council to function.
[2] Uncoordinated: A coup carried out without dialogue or negotiation with political elites; the military retains power directly, sidelining civilian structures.
Implementation Ratings:
Low: Unlikely to yield a stable caretaker government. High risks of authoritarian relapse, military dominance, or national fragmentation.
Moderate: Some possibility of a caretaker government if backed by elite compromise, armed group restraint, or prior coordination. Outcomes remain fragile and reversible.
High: Strong prospects for a caretaker government with broad legitimacy (public, military, and elite alignment). Risks are lower, though implementation challenges persist.
Clarification on Implementation Ratings : The “Low,” “Moderate,” and “High” labels in the scenario matrix are not intended as absolute predictions but as interpretive assessments. They reflect the relative likelihood of successful implementation based on Ethiopia’s current political realities, the actors involved, and comparable historical experiences. Inevitably, such judgments carry an element of subjectivity; however, they are grounded in observable dynamics, such as the regime’s authoritarian resilience, the loyalty structure of the defense forces, and the fragmentation of opposition actors. These ratings should therefore be read as informed estimations, designed to guide strategic reflection rather than provide certainty.
Transparency as the Antidote to Authoritarian Relapse and Fragmentation
The scenario matrix presented elucidates the risks associated with opacity in political intentions, which may manifest through concealed secessionist ambitions or strategic silence and highlights the long-term dangers of fragmentation and regression into authoritarianism. These risks underscore the necessity for transparency from political leaders and ethnic actors, rendering it indispensable for any viable transition to succeed.
A significant risk in Ethiopia’s transition lies not merely in the overthrow of the regime but in the uncertainty regarding subsequent developments. Historical precedents suggest that the removal of an authoritarian regime, absent a clear purpose, often precedes another cycle of domination. In this context, transparency emerges as both a moral and political imperative rather than a mere luxury.
The scenario matrix highlights this danger, particularly in the “Long-term Implications” column, which illustrates how opaque strategies employed by elites, whether through hidden secessionist ambitions, vague promises of democracy, or tactical silence, entail a high risk of fragmentation and authoritarian relapse. Conversely, scenarios in which elites engage in open dialogue, coordinate transparently, and commit to democratic accountability present moderate to low risks while offering a more stable pathway forward. Thus, the matrix concretely illustrates a philosophical principle: opacity breeds suspicion, suspicion undermines trust, and the absence of trust reopens avenues to authoritarianism.
Political leaders and ethnic elites, some of whom have historically supported secessionist ambitions while others now more openly advocate for separation in response to conflict and repression, must move beyond mere tactical appeals for unity. They must articulate their short-term plans for the transitional period and their long-term vision for the Ethiopian state with clarity and precision. Silence on these matters invites skepticism, as Ethiopians have previously endured the consequences of misplaced trust in leaders who concealed their intentions until they attained power. The uncertainty surrounding the long-term goals of political actors is itself destabilizing. When leaders speak in vague terms, promising democracy without clarifying their vision of the state, they invite suspicion and erode trust. In fragile transitions, opacity is not a neutral stance; it is a breeding ground for authoritarian relapse.
In addition to those recently advocating for secession, Ethiopia continues to grapple with longstanding “liberation fronts” in Oromia, Tigray, and the Somali regions. These organizations have retained their original designations since the fall of the Derg regime. Whether this retention serves as mere symbolism, a tactical bargaining maneuver, or a strategic refusal to abandon separatist aspirations remains unknown to the general public, as it is known only to their leaders and political elites.
Nevertheless, the inherent ambiguity is corrosive; it fosters mistrust, cultivates suspicion, and exacerbates fears that current promises of collaboration may conceal future fragmentation. During the forthcoming transition, these actors must communicate transparently, clearly stating whether their future lies in secession or not. Absent such clarity, the caretaker framework or any form of transition risks becoming not a bridge to democracy but instead another phase in the cycle of authoritarianism or fragmentation.
In times of war and its aftermath, communities like the Tigray people face targeted oppression, are deprived of essentials, fuel, and budget, people are displaced and suffer in makeshift shelters. When the regime’s high-ranking officials suggest secession for Tigray without government refutation, it can be seen as tacit approval. Under these circumstances, if there is a desire for secession, it is understandable.
However, similar challenges affect other regions, such as Oromia and Amhara, to varying degrees. Advocating for secession instead of pursuing united efforts for systemic change risks further fragmenting our nation and plays into the hands of the regime, ultimately undermining the country’s interests across all areas.
This fragmentation benefits those who thrive on division. We should channel our grievances into a unified movement for democratic governance that respects all of Ethiopia’s diverse communities. In adversity, our strongest path forward lies in unity, not separation.
In this context, the concept of a caretaker government becomes essential. By design, a non-partisan, time-limited, and power-restricted caretaker government serves as a safeguard against a relapse into authoritarianism. It compels political actors to subject their visions to scrutiny within an open, democratic framework, rather than utilizing the transitional period to consolidate power. Philosophically, it embodies the principle that sovereignty in a post-authoritarian context belongs not to those who dismantle the regime but to the people, as expressed through an accountable and transparent process.
In a nutshell, the measure of Ethiopia’s democratic future will not rest on the success of opposition forces in displacing the current regime but rather on their ability to eradicate the culture of opacity and domination that underpins authoritarianism. A politics of candor, where elites unequivocally declare their short- and long-term commitments, represents the only pathway to ensure that the transition does not become another betrayal masquerading as liberation.
“Without transparency, every scenario leads back to authoritarianism; with transparency, even fragile transitions can create trust and stability.”
The Role of the Military in Ethiopia’s Transition
In autocratic regimes, particularly those fractured by ethnic divisions, the military serves as the ultimate power broker. Ethiopia is no exception. No matter how strong popular uprisings, elite splits, or regional armed resistance may be, none of these triggers can lead to a lasting transition unless the armed forces either actively support the change or, at a minimum, refrain from violently suppressing it.
Unlike professional militaries in some nations, Ethiopia’s defense forces have long been deeply politicized and tied to the ruling party (PP), functioning less as a neutral national institution and more as an extension of the regime’s survival machinery. This has created two structural problems: first, a chain of command heavily invested in preserving the current order, and second, a rank-and-file predominantly composed of middle and lower officers, who are alienated, underpaid, and often resentful of elite privilege. The result is a volatile imbalance: while the top command resists change, the lower ranks are increasingly susceptible to discontent-driven defections or pressure from popular movements.
Historical patterns and comparative lessons demonstrate that even when regimes collapse due to economic breakdown or mass mobilization, transitions fail if the military remains cohesive and hostile to reform.
In such cases, the vacuum is often filled by new authoritarian rulers backed by the security establishment. Conversely, when the armed forces split or significant factions of officers support civilian-led change, the likelihood of a genuine caretaker arrangement increases significantly.
For Ethiopia, the task before political elites is urgent and clear: to cultivate ties quietly and systematically with sympathetic actors within the defense establishment, particularly middle- and lower-ranking officers. These officers, deprived of privileges enjoyed by the top brass, are more likely to prioritize survival, fairness, and a viable future for the country. If properly engaged, they could serve as crucial bridges between civilian opposition and state security institutions.
Equally vital is building coordination with regional armed groups and reform-minded insiders within the ruling party. Without prior groundwork, a sudden regime collapse could lead to the emergence of another militarized order. However, with careful preparation, inclusive dialogue, and guarantees of security and recognition, Ethiopia’s military—long viewed as an obstacle—could become a reluctant yet indispensable ally in the democratic transition.
X. Counterarguments and Rebuttals to the Caretaker Model
Debates surrounding Ethiopia’s political transition frequently feature sharp disagreements over the viability of a caretaker government compared to other models, particularly transitional governments. While the caretaker model offers a narrowly defined, nonpartisan path to elections, critics may raise both theoretical and practical concerns about its legitimacy, mandate, neutrality, and operational capacity. Below are seven major counterarguments that may be presented against the caretaker model, each followed by a rebuttal grounded in Ethiopia’s proposed two-tier design and informed by lessons from the country’s history and global experiences.
Legitimacy and Democratic Mandate
Counterargument: Caretaker governments face a legitimacy gap: they are unelected and therefore lack a direct mandate from the people. In Ethiopia, where political mistrust is deep, this absence of electoral endorsement may undermine public confidence. Supporters of a transitional government argue that it offers greater legitimacy because it is formed through negotiations among prominent political and armed actors, giving each a stake in the process. In contrast, a caretaker government may be perceived as imposed, especially if international actors play a significant role in its establishment.
Rebuttal: While transitional governments may appear more legitimate on the surface, they often derive their mandate from elite bargains rather than the people’s vote. Ethiopia’s history is replete with examples, from the Derg to the TPLF’s post-1991 transitional charter, where such arrangements quickly consolidated authoritarian rule instead of paving the way to democracy.
The caretaker government’s legitimacy comes from its non-governing role. It acts as a neutral referee, barred from policymaking and from competing in the elections it organizes. Its sole mission is to ensure a level playing field and return power to the electorate. In Ethiopia’s divided landscape, this impartiality is far more likely to inspire public trust than a transitional government, where factions are both referees and players.
Restricted Remit and Policy Inertia
Counterargument: Caretaker governments traditionally maintain the status quo, avoiding new policies. In a crisis-ridden Ethiopia, marked by armed conflict, humanitarian disaster, and institutional collapse, this limited scope could lead to dangerous paralysis. Transitional governments, with their broader powers, can implement reforms, negotiate settlements, and begin reconstruction immediately.
Rebuttal: The Ethiopian two-tier caretaker model resolves the inertia problem without sacrificing neutrality. Tier One manages only the elections, ensuring fairness and avoiding partisan capture. Tier Two addresses urgent security and humanitarian needs in parallel, involving representatives of the opposition, regional leaders, civil society, and international observers. This preserves electoral neutrality while enabling a swift crisis response.
Transitional governments may act faster on policy, but they often do so as political contestants, using their position to tilt the post-transition landscape in their favor. That is how past Ethiopian transitional arrangements turned into new authoritarian regimes. The caretaker model avoids this trap by separating urgent action from political competition.
Ambiguity in Decision-Making Authority
Counterargument: Caretaker governments often lack clearly defined powers, leading to disputes about what actions are urgent or permissible. Transitional governments, by contrast, typically have a negotiated mandate that spells out their powers, which can reduce uncertainty.
Rebuttal: The Ethiopian caretaker framework explicitly codifies the mandates of both tiers, outlining what they can and cannot do and barring all members from running in the elections. This reduces interpretive ambiguity and prevents political actors from redefining the caretaker’s role midstream. Oversight by civil society and international guarantors ensures compliance.
While transitional governments may seem more apparent on paper, their broad powers make them more prone to mandate creep, expanding their authority under the pretext of stability or reform. In Ethiopia’s political culture, this expansion has repeatedly resulted in the dominance of one-party or armed groups.
Accountability Gaps
Counterargument: Caretaker governments operate without parliamentary or electoral oversight. This can weaken transparency and allow missteps to go unchallenged. Transitional governments often include opposition factions, which can check each other’s actions and maintain a measure of mutual accountability.
Rebuttal: The Ethiopian caretaker model incorporates accountability into its design:
- A fixed time limit and a sunset clause to prevent indefinite tenure.
- Civil society and media oversight for public scrutiny.
- International monitors who publish compliance reports.
- Full public disclosure of decisions and spending.
While transitional governments may offer internal checks through power-sharing, those checks are often illusory. Once dominant factions secure the upper hand, they sideline rivals and consolidate authority, shutting down meaningful scrutiny.
The “Zombie Government” Risk
Counterargument: Caretaker governments can be perceived as passive placeholders, unable to act decisively when urgent crises demand attention. Transitional governments, being fully empowered, can respond robustly to political, economic, and security emergencies.
Rebuttal: The Ethiopian two-tier system proposed in this piece promotes active engagement. While Tier One focuses solely on elections, Tier Two actively negotiates ceasefires, facilitates humanitarian aid, and coordinates transitional security arrangements. This ensures that urgent crises are addressed without politicizing the election process.
A transitional government may act faster, but its actions are seldom neutral; the goal of securing post-transition dominance often shapes them. In Ethiopia’s fractured political field, such moves deepen mistrust and can reignite conflict.
Preference for Transitional Government
Counterargument: A large number of political parties favor a transitional government over a caretaker model. Transitional arrangements are often viewed as more politically inclusive, as they bring together various factions, including armed movements, civic groups, and opposition parties, to negotiate the country’s future. This broad representation can foster a sense of ownership, mitigate feelings of exclusion, and create space for political settlements before elections.
Rebuttal: While many political actors favor transitional governments for their perceived comprehensiveness, evidence from Ethiopia’s history and global experiences suggests significant risks:
1. Prolonged Power and Delayed Transitions: Regimes formed as provisional, interim, or transitional authorities often extend their mandates beyond the intended period, delaying elections and manipulating frameworks to maintain power. This pattern is evident in Ethiopia’s past transitions and mirrors global trends in post-conflict scenarios.
2. Abuse of Emergency Powers: Emergency powers, initially granted to maintain stability, can become tools for executive entrenchment and the rollback of democratic gains. In Ethiopia, where ethnic tensions justify extraordinary measures, this risk is particularly acute.
3. Systematic Undermining of Accountability: Transitional systems designed to ensure accountability are vulnerable to abuse. The failure to relinquish authority, as seen in Ethiopia’s previous transitions, is a recurring risk in transitional governments globally.
4. Institutional Manipulation: Transitional governments frequently restructure institutions and laws to their own advantage. This was evident in the Derg and TPLF-led EPRDF transitions, where promises of inclusivity gave way to new forms of autocracy.
5. Ethnic Polarization in Power-Sharing: Transitional power-sharing arrangements in Ethiopia have often exacerbated tensions, as factions seek to maximize their positions.
The caretaker government model addresses these vulnerabilities:
1. Limited Mandate and Fixed Timeline: By focusing solely on organizing free and fair elections within a strict timeframe, the caretaker model minimizes opportunities for power entrenchment.
2. Structural Safeguards: The two-tier system, with clear separation of electoral management from conflict stabilization, provides checks against mandate expansion.
3. Neutrality by Design: The caretaker model’s neutrality helps mitigate ethnic polarization in the transition process.
4. International Oversight: The limited mandate of a caretaker government facilitates effective international monitoring and support, crucial for ensuring accountability.
While a transitional government may seem comprehensive, evidence suggests it poses significant risks to genuine democratic transition. The caretaker model, with its focused mandate and structural safeguards against power abuse, offers a pathway that learns from Ethiopia’s past and global experiences in transitional governance.
The Challenge of True Neutrality
Counterargument: Critics argue that true neutrality is a myth in deeply divided societies. Even individuals who present themselves as nonpartisan may carry implicit biases based on ethnicity, region, ideology, or past associations. In Ethiopia’s hyper-polarized environment, the mere perception of bias can undermine confidence in the caretaker’s work. A transitional government, composed of multiple competing factions, may not be perfectly neutral, but it can distribute influence in a way that prevents any one group from dominating the process.
Rebuttal: Transitional governments distribute influence, but they do not eliminate partisanship; they institutionalize it. Every decision becomes a negotiation between actors who are both referees and players, each with a vested interest in the outcome of the elections. While perfect neutrality may be aspirational, the caretaker structure minimizes partisan capture more effectively than past transitional arrangements.
The caretaker model embraces neutrality not as perfection but as structural impartiality. It removes all political contestants from the body running the election, bans members from standing as candidates, and restricts its mandate to the technical organization of the vote. In Ethiopia’s two-tier system, political actors can still influence the peace and stabilization process via Tier Two, but the electoral machinery remains fully insulated from their control.
XI. Conclusion: From Theory to Political Will
The reflections presented across these pages converge on a challenging but necessary truth: Ethiopia’s survival depends less on institutional design than on the moral choices of its elites. A caretaker government offers not a panacea, but a bridge—a way to hold the center open while the nation redefines its future. Yet even the most carefully designed bridge cannot stand if its architects sabotage it from within.
Transparency in commitments, honesty in history, and a willingness to assume responsibility for the nation rather than one’s faction, these are the pillars on which democratic renewal must rest. If elites fail to embody them, Ethiopia will not stumble into another cycle of authoritarianism by accident; it will march there with open eyes. But if they succeed, then history, once a prison, may become a teacher, and the caretaker model may mark not an interlude of despair, but the threshold of a democratic dawn.
However, political will and trust are the linchpins of this vision, and it is here that Ethiopia faces its most significant challenges. Political will in Ethiopia often resembles a group of individuals gathered around a well. Everyone acknowledges the water’s value, yet no one is willing to be the first to draw it, fearing that the rope may break.
Trust operates similarly; while all parties assert its importance, none are willing to extend it until they have received some in return. If we continue to wait for the other party to take the initial step, the rope will rot, the water will evaporate, and we will remain embroiled in discussions regarding whose turn it was. “Trust is like a well: it must be drawn from together, or it will run dry.” Trust necessitates mutual willingness, honesty, and participation from all involved.
Suppose Ethiopia’s political elites can muster the necessary will and cultivate the essential trust. In that case, we may finally break the cycle of failed transitions and restore the nation’s future to its rightful owners: the people.
Author’s Note:
This reflection aims to extend Professor Messay’s intellectual framing. While I do not claim to represent his views, the proposals outlined here seek to advance his vision for Ethiopia’s democratic transition. I would appreciate hearing his perspective on whether these suggestions align with or diverge from the core principles of his original proposal or vision.
Messay’s article offers a penetrating analysis of Ethiopia’s political culture and the dangers of moralizing power; the section on the caretaker government, a key aspect of the article, is relatively brief. I would have appreciated more insights into the implementation of this crucial topic.
Professor Messay poses a pivotal question: “What other alternative is there for Ethiopia to circumvent the main obstacle obstructing the path to genuine democratic prerequisites and procedures?” This question is urgent and profound. After assessing Ethiopia’s political realities and reviewing global transitional models, this reflection finds that the caretaker government is the most credible path forward. However, its success hinges on deliberate adaptation through the proposed two-tier framework, which addresses Ethiopia’s unique political, security, and institutional challenges.
I hope this work serves as a continuation of the conversation and catalyzes deeper discussion initiated by Professor Messay. The challenges ahead are formidable, but with foresight, courage, and collective will, Ethiopia can chart a democratic course that breaks the cycle of failed transitions. I approach this endeavor with intellectual humility, aware of the vast knowledge and experience beyond these pages.
One truth is inescapable: no transition will succeed without political dialogue and coordination among Ethiopia’s elites. Establishing a credible forum around a shared national agenda is essential. Without such unity, even the most carefully designed models will fall prey to fragmentation and distrust.
Establishing a caretaker government, unlike a transitional government, requires significant prior preparation, unwavering trust, transparency, patience, and strong determination from political elites to pave the way for the people to determine their governance. It demands a collective commitment to self-governance, addressing all pressing issues under a democratically elected administration, and prioritizing national unity above all else.
I hope Ethiopian political elites rise to the challenge, embracing the necessary preparation, trust, transparency, and avoidance of unforced errors (such as secession), as well as the commitment required to advance a caretaker government that prioritizes national unity and empowers the Ethiopian people to shape their governance.
For the first time, let us empower people to shape their destiny and construct their future. The political elites, in a moment of goodwill, grant people the opportunity to assume their proper position. By honoring those they profess to protect, let the people’s voices ascend and prevail, enabling history to progress as people recover their unspoken narratives.
Finally, I express my deepest gratitude to Professor Messay for presenting this notion and inspiring me to engage with it.
I encourage everyone to read Prof. Messay’s article. It can be found on https://borkena.com/ and https://zehabesha.com/.
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