A Strategic Reflection on ‘The Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia’– (Part One)

By Sirak Zena
August 31, 2025

Author’s Preface

1. Introduction
2. Ethiopia’s Cycles of Failed Transitions

III. Critical Barriers and Strategic Considerations for a Caretaker Government

1. Strategic Framework for Democratic Transition: Prerequisites and Preparatory Measures
2. Global Experiences and Lessons in Transitional Governance
3. The Caretaker Model as a Safeguard Against Ethiopia’s Transitional Pitfalls

VII. Bridging Ethnic Identity and National Unity: A Call for Elite Reorientation

VIII. Implementation Challenges of the Caretaker Model

1. Scenario Matrix: Pathways to a Caretaker Government
2. Counterarguments and Rebuttals to the Caretaker Model
3. Conclusion: From Theory to Political Will

Author’s Note

References

Author’s Preface:

This reflection does not arise from abstract theorizing, but from a deep concern for Ethiopia’s precarious future. The wars in Amhara and Oromia, the fragile peace in Tigray, and the suffocating weight of authoritarian governance reveal a nation caught between fragmentation and survival.

The intention here is not to proliferate the numerous critiques already available, but to distill them into a structured proposal that can serve as a compass in times of disorientation. What follows is written as a reminder to those who already know the gravity of Ethiopia’s condition yet remain hesitant to act.

This piece is fueled not by pessimism but by a profound sense of urgency, inspired by the visionary insights of Professor Messay regarding Ethiopia’s transitional path forward. It is a call to action, urging the establishment of a strong, people-oriented transition framework to capture the attention of and resonate with the conscience of our political elites, who possess the capacity to either safeguard or jeopardize the nation’s future.Ultimately, we must pay heed to the fact that it is the people of Ethiopia, the faithful stewards of this land, who must have the decisive voice in shaping our collective destiny.

The author invites critical engagement with these ideas, understanding that the journey toward a democratic Ethiopia demands our collective wisdom and thoughtful consideration of all available options. Acknowledging the complexity of this endeavor, the author presents these concepts as just one of many potential pathways for implementing a caretaker government during this crucial transition. Together, through open dialogue and collaboration, we can explore the best avenues for advancing a brighter, more democratic future for Ethiopia.

I. Introduction:

Over a year ago, I became acquainted with Professor Messay Kebede’s article “Shifting from Moralization of Power to Containment: The Idea of Caretaker Government in Ethiopia.” While I initially considered critiquing the viability of the caretaker government model proposed by Professor Messay, which argues that its implementation “…presupposes that the existing “elected” government resigns at the end of its term.”, I did not proceed for various reasons. Recently, during the ABRONET forum, Professor Messay reiterated his proposal as a viable solution to Ethiopia’s escalating political crisis, prompting me to re-engage with his work.

The central thesis of this reflection is stark but straightforward: Ethiopia’s present regime will not relinquish power voluntarily, and yet the nation cannot endure indefinitely under authoritarian rule. The resulting impasse necessitates a neutral transitional mechanism, such as a caretaker government. Unlike transitional governments that carry partisan or military baggage, a caretaker government is, by design, temporary, non-partisan, and limited in scope.

Its mandate is not to resolve Ethiopia’s historic grievances or adjudicate contested identities but to stabilize the political space long enough for a democratic process to take root. Such an approach requires four commitments: first, that political elites embrace transparency rather than ambiguity; second, that history be interpreted truthfully, not as a weapon to divide but as a teacher to guide; third, discontinuing extremist tactics motivated by anger, which are destined for failure, is an unrealistic approach for attaining political consensus and triumph and fourth, to establish a shared forum on mutual agendas and formulate a roadmap. The reflections that follow seek to demonstrate why this model is indispensable and to explore the conditions under which it might emerge.

This piece is not a critique of Professor Messay; instead, it presents a practical roadmap for how a caretaker government could function in Ethiopia. At its core is a two-tier framework option: one tier manages the electoral transition, and the other focuses on conflict stabilization, adapted from Messay’s concept to address Ethiopia’s current realities. While grounded in his philosophical framework, this exploration seeks to transform his vision into a viable strategy. This piece primarily discusses the transition from concept to reality by adapting the Caretaker Government Model to address Ethiopia’s unique challenges.

The emphasis is on overcoming key barriers, including authoritarian resistance, elite disunity, ongoing conflict, institutional limitations, and the need for civic and international coordination. Through this analysis, we will evaluate both the theoretical robustness and practical feasibility of the caretaker government model within Ethiopia’s unique context.

II. Ethiopia’s Cycles of Failed Transitions

Ethiopia’s political history presents a sobering account of transitions that have not led to democracy but resulted in new authoritarian consolidations. The Derg rose to power with promises of justice and redistribution, only to establish one of the most repressive regimes in the nation’s modern history. Similarly, the TPLF-led EPRDF took power via a transitional charter in 1991, pledging commitments to democracy and federal equality; yet, it soon centralized authority and curtailed dissent.

In both cases, transitional governments gave way to regimes of exclusion, violence, and entrenched authoritarianism. History shows that without strict limits and careful design, transitions quickly turn into new forms of absolutism. Referring to Messay’s article will provide a detailed and more analytical perspective on the subject.

This context makes Messay’s proposal for a nonpartisan, time-bound caretaker government particularly relevant, not as a theoretical construct, but as a mechanism designed to disrupt Ethiopia’s recurring cycle of unfulfilled transitions. However, approaching its implementation in the Ethiopian context requires critical prerequisites, including elite coordination, conflict de-escalation, public participation, and broad legitimacy, which this reflection will examine in depth.

The following reflection engages with Professor Messay’s thesis by exploring five essential areas that require further elaboration for the proposal to achieve both normative strength and practical feasibility.

III. Critical Barriers and Strategic Considerations for a Caretaker Government

Ethiopia’s history of failed transitions highlights the systemic barriers that hinder democratic progress. Understanding these barriers is crucial for designing a caretaker government model that can break the cycle of authoritarian consolidation. This section examines the political and institutional challenges that must be addressed to make such a transition feasible.

1. Confronting an Unyielding Regime

Professor Messay proposes a scenario in which the existing ‘elected’ government resigns at the end of its term, allowing for the implementation of the caretaker model. However, this assumes a level of voluntary restraint that Ethiopia’s ruling elites, past and present, have consistently failed to exhibit. Power in Ethiopia, as Messay observes, is pathologically absolutist and never relinquished voluntarily. Abiy Ahmed’s current regime exemplifies this pattern, demonstrating centralized authority, employing violence to suppress opposition, and manipulating institutions to ensure regime survival.

The central challenge is clear: how can political, civic, or international forces compel an unwilling regime to step aside, or at least permit the creation of a neutral electoral body? Without such a trigger, the caretaker model cannot move beyond theory. Any path toward democratic transition must start by answering this question.

2. Overcoming Elite Polarization and Establishing a Political Forum

Messay rightly identifies the absence of “prior rules” and referees as fundamental to Ethiopia’s zero-sum political competition. However, this condition, marked by a lack of trust, coordination, and a shared political lexicon among elites, renders the establishment of a neutral body nearly impossible under current circumstances. Ethiopia’s ethnicized federal structure exacerbates divisions, making consensus-building across political factions exceedingly difficult.

Before any caretaker government can take shape, Ethiopia’s elites need a common political forum. This space would allow democratic forces to agree on the basic rules for a post-authoritarian order. Without it, a “nonpartisan caretaker body” is only an aspiration. Mobilizing the political class, whether through internal pressure or external mediation, is essential to reaching even this minimal agreement.

3. Planning for Sudden Collapse: A Post-Fall Strategy

One plausible scenario, briefly noted in Messay’s article, is the regime’s voluntary resignation at the end of its term. In Ethiopia’s political reality, however, such a step is highly improbable. Far more likely is a forced departure, driven by mounting pressures: an escalating economic crisis, rampant inflation, growing discontent among civil servants and security forces, and the protracted conflicts in Amhara and Oromia. These conditions could spark a popular uprising or trigger the regime’s internal disintegration, leading to its involuntary removal from power. If this occurs, there is a significant risk that a new authoritarian entity may emerge to fill the resulting vacuum, reminiscent of the Derg and TPLF during previous transitions. If this occurs, there is a significant risk that a new authoritarian entity may emerge to fill the resulting vacuum, reminiscent of the Derg and TPLF during previous transitions.

In this scenario, the caretaker model becomes urgent, not as a precondition, but as a safeguard in the event of collapse. The priority would be to stop another centralizing authority from taking power. This means quickly establishing a neutral, temporary electoral body, backed by advanced coordination among opposition factions, the diaspora, and international partners, ready to act the moment the regime falls.

4. Conflict and the Limitations of the Caretaker Mandate

While expanding Messay’s framework to address a crucial operational gap, the need for simultaneous conflict stabilization alongside electoral neutrality is acknowledged, as free elections cannot occur in isolation. They necessitate not only a neutral arbiter for the election but also concurrent efforts to stabilize the environment.

Any caretaker plan for Ethiopia must confront complex realities, including ongoing conflicts, weak institutions, and deep-seated divisions. The answer is a two-tier approach—pairing a neutral caretaker government with a stabilization body to handle urgent security and humanitarian needs. Together, these roles can make a democratic transition both credible and peaceful. This section outlines the two-tier model and its distinct yet coordinated roles in facilitating a credible and peaceful democratic transition.

The Two-Tier model:

A significant limitation of the caretaker government model is its narrowly defined mandate. The caretaker government (Tier One) would focus only on organizing free and fair elections within six months, avoiding legislative or executive functions. However, Ethiopia’s current political reality, marked by widespread conflict, humanitarian crises, and institutional fragility, poses challenges that cannot be ignored. A caretaker government that fails to address these urgent issues risks becoming irrelevant or, worse, a tool for manipulation by competing factions.

To address this gap, introducing a two-tier model that balances the neutrality of the caretaker government with the need for conflict stabilization and transitional support is essential. This structure ensures that the caretaker government remains focused on its electoral mandate while a complementary body (Tier Two) addresses Ethiopia’s immediate security and humanitarian challenges within the same timeframe.

In Part Two, we will conduct a detailed analysis of the triggers for a caretaker government and the various conditions that facilitate a transition. This analysis will explore how these scenarios might unfold, including the associated risks, constraints, and the roles of Tier One and Tier Two entities. A scenario matrix will be included to facilitate structured comparisons and analysis.

Tier One: The Caretaker Government (Core Body)

The caretaker government would serve as the neutral arbiter of Ethiopia’s democratic transition. Its sole mandate is to oversee the preparation, supervision, and execution of free and fair elections. Members of this body would be selected from nonpartisan sectors of society, including academia, religious institutions, civil society, and professional associations. To safeguard neutrality:

• Members must not be affiliated with any political party.
• They must be ineligible to run for office in the elections they oversee.
• Their powers would be strictly limited to administrative and procedural functions related to the electoral process.

This strict focus ensures that Tier One remains impartial and avoids the pitfalls of politicization or overreach that have plagued past transitional arrangements in Ethiopia.

Tier One Selection Process

Ensuring the impartiality and legitimacy of Tier One begins long before its members are sworn in. The process of who chooses them and how is just as important as the duties they will later perform. Without a credible and widely trusted mechanism for their selection, even the most carefully designed caretaker model risks losing public confidence before it even begins. For this reason, the pathway to forming Tier One must be divided into two deliberate phases: first, the creation of an Independent Selection & Vetting Commission (ISVC) during the preparation period, and second, the activation of that commission to choose Tier One once a political transition is underway.

Phase One – Creation of the Independent Selection & Vetting Commission (ISVC)

The ISVC will be a temporary, non-partisan body composed entirely of Ethiopians, formed as a top priority during the preparation period for a caretaker government. This phase must begin well in advance of any political transition, ensuring the commission is ready to act when needed.

ISVC Membership Criteria:

• Proven integrity and public trust.
• No current political party membership.
• No involvement in the outgoing regime.
• No candidacy in the upcoming elections.
• Recognized expertise in law, governance, civil society leadership, and professional organizations or services.

 

Composition:

• Respected retired or active judges and constitutional lawyers.
• Senior leaders from Ethiopia’s major religious councils.
• Heads of professional associations (lawyers, doctors, teachers, and engineers).
• Eminent scholars from universities.
• Representatives from trade unions, farmers, women, and youth.

Political parties and major civic groups will nominate ISVC members, ensuring diversity across regions, ethnicities, gender, and professions. An appointment requires a two-thirds consensus among nominating bodies.

Phase Two – Selection of Tier One

Once the regime is toppled, removed, or otherwise unable to govern, the ISVC will immediately begin the Tier One selection process:

1. Request nominations from approved civic, professional, religious, and academic bodies.
2. Vet nominees against Tier One eligibility criteria:
3. No current party membership or candidacy.
4. No outgoing regime or the defense force.
5. clean record on corruption and human rights.
6. Publish names for public scrutiny and consider documented objections.
7. Select final members through a two-thirds majority voteof the ISVC.
8. Balanced representation across regions, ethnic groups, gender, and professions is mandatory.
9. Minutes of all proceedings will be recorded and issued to the public. If credible bias or misconduct is established, a removal mechanism will be implemented to facilitate replacement.

 

This two-phase approach ensures that the caretaker government’s electoral leadership is rooted in broad consensus and public trust from the outset.

Once selected, Tier One will immediately assume its mandate of organizing and overseeing the electoral process, operating within the agreed-upon six-month timeframe, unless the timescale is extended under exceptional, pre-defined conditions.

Tier Two: The Conflict Stabilization and Transition Council (Complementary Body)

Tier Two, also referred to as the Conflict Stabilization and Transition Council (CSTC), would address Ethiopia’s pressing security and humanitarian challenges. Throughout this article, these terms will be used interchangeably to refer to this complementary body of the caretaker government model.

 

Operating alongside the caretaker government, Tier Two would address Ethiopia’s pressing security and humanitarian challenges. This body would include representatives from opposition parties, civil society, armed groups in Amhara and Oromia, regional leaders, and potentially the military, with oversight from international observers. Its primary responsibilities would include:

• Negotiating ceasefires and facilitating peace agreements.
• Coordinating humanitarian aid and ensuring access to conflict-affected regions.
• Laying the groundwork for transitional justice by documenting evidence, promoting dialogue, and establishing the groundwork for the post-election government.
• Supporting the reintegration of displaced populations into the political process.

Interim Authority: Tier Two’s Immediate Role After Regime Change

The moment an autocratic regime is removed, the country enters its most fragile period. Without a legitimate, pre-agreed authority, the resulting power vacuum can lead to chaos, armed competition, or even the rise of another authoritarian force. In the two-tier caretaker model, Tier Two is positioned to immediately fill this gap.

Tier Two’s composition, representatives from opposition parties, regional administrations, armed groups committed to peace, and civic actors, gives it the political breadth to act as an interim authority. Its mandate includes stabilizing security, overseeing ceasefire arrangements, facilitating humanitarian access, and maintaining essential administrative functions until Tier One is in place.

To fulfill this role, Tier Two must be prepared in advance, just as the Independent Selection and Vetting Commission (ISVC) for Tier One must be ready ahead of time. The preparatory period should therefore include:

• Agreement among political and civic actors on the composition and decision-making rules of Tier Two.
• Public communication of Tier Two’s role to build trust and deter rival claims to authority.
• Coordination plans between Tier Two and the ISVC to ensure a smooth and immediate handover of electoral functions to Tier One once it is installed.

By preparing Tier Two in advance, the caretaker model ensures that Ethiopia’s transitional moment will begin with order and legitimacy rather than instability and contestation.

Ensuring Tier Two Does Not Evolve into a Transitional Government

The two-tier model introduces a critical risk: Tier Two, with its broader mandate, could inadvertently transform into a de facto transitional government, undermining the neutrality and limited scope of the caretaker framework. To prevent this, we must implement several structural safeguards:

1. Strictly Limited Mandate:
   Tier Two would hold no legislative or executive power. Its sole purpose would be to stabilize conflicts and coordinate humanitarian aid, acting as a facilitator rather than a governing body or political negotiator.
2. Prohibition on Political Candidacy:
   Members of Tier Two affiliated with political parties, the military, or other elite groups must be prohibited from running for office in the forthcoming elections. This ensures that Tier Two remains impartial and does not become a platform for political ambition.
3. Neutral Oversight Mechanism:
   Tier Two’s activities should be monitored by a neutral technical secretariat, ideally under the auspices of trusted domestic institutions and international guarantors such as the African Union or the United Nations. This oversight would ensure that Tier Two adheres to its mandate and does not overstep its boundaries.
4. Time-Limited Operation:
   Tier Two must operate under an explicit sunset clause, concluding its activities once elections are conducted or its stabilization objectives are fulfilled. This prevents it from becoming a permanent fixture in Ethiopia’s political landscape.
5. Transparency and Accountability:
   All deliberations, decisions, and operations of Tier Two must be documented and made publicly accessible. Civil society and the media should play an active role in monitoring its activities to ensure accountability.

By implementing these safeguards, Tier Two can fulfill its role as a transitional stabilizer without undermining the neutrality and limited mandate of the caretaker government.

Operationalizing the Two-Tier Caretaker Framework

The two-tier model is uniquely suited to Ethiopia’s fractured political and security landscape. It addresses the dual imperatives of electoral neutrality and conflict stabilization, ensuring that the caretaker government remains credible and compelling. However, its success depends on several additional factors:

• Elite Buy-In: Both tiers must be supported by a broad coalition of political actors, civil society, and regional leaders. Without elite consensus, the model risks being dismissed as illegitimate or unworkable.
• International Support:The involvement of international guarantors, such as the African Union, IGAD, or the United Nations, is essential to provide technical assistance, monitor compliance, and deter power grabs.
• Public Engagement:The Ethiopian public must be actively involved in the transition process. Grassroots mobilization, civic education, and media campaigns can build public trust in the caretaker framework and ensure its legitimacy.

The two-tier model provides a practical approach. Separating elections from stabilization allows the caretaker government to remain neutral while ensuring that urgent crises are addressed. With strong safeguards and broad support, it could help Ethiopia break its cycle of authoritarianism and lay the groundwork for a democratic future.

 

While this flowchart does not capture every nuance of the two-tier caretaker model, it is intended to visually represent the core ideas and relationships between Tier One and Tier Two. For a complete understanding, please refer to the accompanying text.

Deferring Transitional Justice to the Elected Government:

Transitional justice is a complex process that requires public consultation, institutional capacity, and legitimacy. Assigning this task to Tier Two within the six-month mandate of the caretaker government risks overburdening it and diluting its focus on conflict stabilization and electoral preparation. Addressing atrocities and implementing justice mechanisms during this brief period could undermine Tier Two’s neutrality and trigger a political backlash, potentially leading to accusations of bias.

Instead, it is more pragmatic to defer transitional justice to the elected government, which will have the time and mandate to lead this process comprehensively. In the interim, Tier Two can focus on documenting evidence, encouraging dialogue, and establishing independent institutions for the elected government to activate post-transition.

Tier Two would function independently of Tier One but in close coordination to ensure that both the political and security dimensions of the transition are addressed simultaneously. This division of labor prevents the caretaker government from being overwhelmed by tasks outside its electoral mandate while ensuring that Ethiopia’s complex crisis landscape is not ignored.

5. The Role of the People and the International Community

Messay rightly places the burden of change on the Ethiopian people. However, with authoritarianism entrenched and elites mistrusting one another, outside actors will be essential. The African Union, IGAD, the UN, and key partners, such as the EU and the U.S., could help by convening a peace and reform conference, providing technical and political backing for a caretaker administration, and offering security guarantees to prevent any power grabs during the transition.

The Bangladeshi caretaker model, referenced by Messay, functioned effectively only under intense public protest and military pressure (International Crisis Group, 2008). Tunisia’s peaceful transfer of power followed years of civic resistance, bolstered by the Nobel Prize-winning National Dialogue Quartet (Ginsburg & Mustafa, S., 2014). Ethiopia’s trajectory will likely require a similar combination of domestic uprising and external facilitation.

The obstacles to a caretaker government are significant, but not insurmountable. The answer is a strategic framework built on three pillars: elite coordination, security stabilization, and active public engagement.

While the moral and political case for a caretaker government is clear, the strategic question remains: how can such a mechanism be triggered in Ethiopia’s current political climate? Historically, authoritarian regimes have yielded only under a combination of internal fracture, sustained civic mobilization, and calibrated external pressure.

In Ethiopia, this could take the form of a sequenced strategy: (1) forging an elite alliance capable of presenting a unified transitional roadmap; (2) mobilizing broad-based civic protest to erode the regime’s domestic legitimacy; (3) leveraging targeted sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and regional mediation to raise the costs of intransigence; and (4) cultivating quiet channels with mid-level security and bureaucratic actors to encourage defection at critical moments. Without such a pressure architecture, the caretaker model risks remaining a well-argued proposal without a viable path to power.

Having identified the systemic and political barriers that stand in the way of a caretaker government, the next step is to outline how these challenges can be met. Section IV presents a strategic framework, rooted in Ethiopia’s realities and informed by global lessons, that outlines the prerequisites and preparatory measures necessary to operationalize the model.

Public Communication Strategy

Once the regime is removed, the public space will open to competing visions for the country’s immediate future. Chief among these will be two proposals: a transitional government with broad but politically contested powers and a caretaker government with a narrow, time-bound mandate to conduct elections.

The caretaker model’s legitimacy will depend on how quickly and clearly it is understood by the public, armed actors, and civic leaders as the safer, more democratic option. The preparatory phase must therefore include a proactive education effort, well before the regime falls, so that once the transition moment arrives, the population is already familiar with its principles, structure, and safeguards.

Messaging should explain why the caretaker model avoids the pitfalls of past transitional governments, how Tier One and Tier Two operate, and how strict time limits protect against power consolidation. This outreach should leverage diaspora media, trusted civic and religious leaders, grassroots networks, and respected professionals to ensure the concept reaches diverse audiences. By making the caretaker model the best-known and most trusted plan on the table, its adoption in the post-regime moment becomes far more likely.

IV. Strategic Framework for Democratic Transition: Prerequisites and Preparatory Measures

1. Foundational Prerequisites

To implement the caretaker model in Ethiopia, the following prerequisites must be addressed or seriously considered:

1. Initiate an Elite Forum: Opposition parties, civic associations, diaspora actors, and influential leaders should establish a coordination platform, even informally, before a regime change occurs.
2. Develop a Draft Framework:A transitional roadmap outlining the caretaker structure, selection criteria, timeline, and safeguards should be pre-agreed upon and publicly available.
3. Creating Broad Civic Consensus: Grassroots mobilization, media campaigns, and diaspora activism are crucial for generating public support for the caretaker model as a viable alternative to autocracy. These efforts empower citizens to advocate for fair and free elections, ensuring that the government reflects the will of the people.
4. Engage International Partners: Seek diplomatic alignment and support from influential stakeholders to apply pressure at critical moments.
5. Prepare for Sudden Collapse:Be ready to implement a caretaker mechanism in the event of regime disintegration, economic crisis, or elite fragmentation.

For a genuine transition, opposition parties and armed groups must be involved in the process, despite their divisions. Excluding them would undermine reconciliation and stability.  Inside Ethiopia, repression makes this coordination hard, so much of the groundwork falls to the diaspora. Free from those constraints, the diaspora can mobilize resources, stimulate dialogue, and help opposition factions agree on a foundation for democratic transition.

2. Strategic Preparation Measures

Given the regime’s reluctance to consider a peaceful transition, it is crucial to explore post-regime planning that emphasizes strategic readiness rather than reactive improvisation.

Ethiopia’s political actors, opposition groups, the diaspora, civil society, and armed movements must move from talk to readiness. Key steps include:

1. Draft the caretaker framework now, with clear rules, membership criteria, and a mandate ready to use if the regime falls.
2. Establish a provisional forum—either within or outside the country—to serve as the moral and political nucleus for post-regime governance.
3. Build quiet ties with mid- and lower-level security and bureaucratic officialswho could tip the balance in a crisis.
4. Push for international pressureaimed at managing the aftermath of regime collapse, not just reforms.
5. Educate the publicso they understand the caretaker process and are not swayed by confusion or new authoritarian figures.

3. Flexible Timeline and Conflict Management: Balancing Urgency with Stability

A six-month caretaker limit helps preserve neutrality and avoid overreach, but it should not be rigid. Conditions on the ground should decide the length. Tunisia’s post-revolution caretaker phase lasted one to ten months; Bangladesh’s 90–120-day model was stretched to two years during the crisis.

In Ethiopia, a flexible yet bounded approach is essential. The two-tier model proposed here, where Tier 1 (the Caretaker Government) focuses on electoral transition and Tier 2 (the Conflict Stabilization and Transition Council) addresses conflict resolution and ceasefire stabilization, provides a modular structure that is well-suited to Ethiopia’s fragmented landscape.

Extensions without broad agreement or oversight risk losing legitimacy and inviting manipulation. Any change in timing must rest on a shared commitment to a democratic, inclusive, and lawful handover.

Flexible Timeline – Triggers for Extension

While the six-month limit is essential for neutrality and preventing mandate abuse, it should not be rigid in the face of exceptional circumstances. An extension, strictly limited in duration, should only be considered if one or more of the following conditions apply:

1. Security Disruption to Elections– Large-scale violence, armed offensives, or breakdowns in ceasefires in key regions that would prevent voters from safely participating.
2. Natural or Humanitarian Emergencies– Severe disasters (e.g., famine escalation, epidemic, major flooding) that make nationwide voting logistically impossible within the original timeframe.
3. Incomplete Electoral Preparations– Documented evidence from a caretaker government, Tier One, or international monitors that voter registration, ballot distribution, or election staffing cannot be completed in time.
4. Unforeseen Political Disruptions– Assassinations, mass resignations of key electoral administrators, or verified sabotage of election infrastructure that would compromise integrity if rushed.

 

Any extension should:

1. Be approved by a supermajority of the caretaker’s oversight council and endorsed by international guarantors.
2. Be time-limited (e.g., a maximum of 90 additional days).
3. Be publicly justified with a detailed explanation and timeline.
4. Be accompanied by weekly progress reports to maintain public trust.

Prolonged transitions may also open the door for non-elected actors, such as the military or entrenched bureaucrats. An uncertain or open-ended caretaker period may generate public anxiety and disrupt economic decision-making, as stakeholders await direction from a fully mandated government.

A prompt, well-calibrated handover to an elected government remains ideal in functioning democracies. However, in fragile or contested contexts, such as Ethiopia, it must be paired with conflict-sensitive planning and trust-building efforts.

4. Comparative Analysis: Transitional vs. Caretaker Governance Models

Recent discussions on the ABRONET forum and positions of various opposing political factions in Ethiopia highlight two competing options: a transitional government and a caretaker government. While many favor the transitional government, we must critically assess our commitment to genuinely empowering the people. This includes ensuring free and fair elections, something Ethiopia has yet to achieve, and advancing truly inclusive democratic processes.

Our actions define us. In the past, they have failed, fueling violence, weakening democracy, and alienating the very people meant to shape their own future. This failure has left fertile ground for autocracy.

The following table compares the Transitional Government and Caretaker Government, outlining their differences across essential parameters. This illustrates why the caretaker model may be more suitable for Ethiopia’s current circumstances.

Criteria	Transitional Government	Caretaker Government
Source of Authority	Typically negotiated among political factions, often including armed groups or former regime actors.	Established through constitutional provisions or elite agreement, ideally post-regime or during breakdown.
Mandate Duration	Undefined or loosely set; often extended beyond the initial timeline.	Strictly time-bound (e.g., 90–180 days, or 6-10 months), with possible context-specific flexibility.
Scope of Power	Broad – may include constitutional reform, institution-building, and transitional justice.	Narrow – focused on maintaining basic order and organizing free and fair elections.
Neutrality	Often compromised, especially if factions from previous regimes are involved.	High: members barred from contesting upcoming elections; often technocratic.
Involvement of the Current Ruling Party	Commonly included, sometimes even dominant within the structure.	Excluded – ruling elites are removed or sidelined by necessity or collapse.
Risk of Politicization	High – due to competing political agendas within the transitional body.	Low: depoliticized, with a strict mandate and limited timeframe.
Conflict Management Role	Varie s; can exacerbate conflict if not well-designed.	Handled separately via a complementary body (e.g., Conflict Stabilization Council).
Examples (Global)	Sudan, Libya, Derg-era Ethiopia, TPLF’s post-Derg transition.	Bangladesh (1990s–2000s), Tunisia (post-2011)
Applicability to Ethiopia’s Current Context	Low: Deep elite division, autocratic regime still in power, no consensus on neutral authority.	High: Suited for post-collapse or forced transition, avoids power-sharing deadlocks.
Democracy & People’s Empowerment	Often elite-driven, with limited or symbolic public participation, power is negotiated rather than chosen. In some cases, transitional governments delay elections or suppress dissent in the name of stability.	Anchored in restoring the people’s sovereignty through free and fair elections. The public chooses its next government without manipulation from the incumbent power or political factions. It re-centers the transition around democratic legitimacy.

A Friend’s Perspective

While drafting this reflection, I spoke with a friend who had already read Professor Messay’s article. When I explained my approach in my expanded reflection, he replied with a wry smile:

“A transitional government is like hosting a surprise party for democracy, everyone shows up, but the birthday cake is just a collection of politicians grabbing slices, leaving the guests wondering when they will get their turn.”

His lighthearted analogy captured, in one sentence, the chaos and self-interest that too often define Ethiopia’s political transitions, and why a narrowly focused, neutral caretaker model might be the only way to ensure the people finally get their share.

This humorous remark may oversimplify the issue, but it highlights a fundamental truth evident in Ethiopia’s political history. Without a neutral, time-bound mechanism in place, transitions frequently devolve into prolonged political feasts for a select few.

V. Global Experiences and Lessons in Transitional Governance

While the proposed framework is tailored to Ethiopia’s unique challenges, it is not developed in isolation. Examining how other countries have navigated transitional periods—both successfully and unsuccessfully- offers practical insights and cautionary lessons that can sharpen the Ethiopian model.

While the theoretical foundations of a caretaker government model are compelling, its practical implementation necessitates a thorough examination of analogous experiences worldwide. As Ethiopia considers this approach, it is imperative to analyze both the successes and failures of transitional governance in various contexts.

Although no two countries share identical circumstances, comparative analysis provides valuable insights into the conditions that either facilitate or hinder successful democratic transitions. Bangladesh and Tunisia, in particular, offer instructive examples of how caretaker arrangements can operate under diverse political pressures and institutional constraints. These cases, although distinct from Ethiopia’s complex reality, highlight both the possibilities and pitfalls that must be considered when adapting the caretaker model to Ethiopia’s unique context.

The implementation of a caretaker government in Ethiopia requires careful consideration of global experiences with transitional governance. While Ethiopia’s context is singular, examining cases such as Bangladesh and Tunisia offers valuable insights into both the opportunities and limitations inherent in such frameworks.

The Bangladesh Experience: Promises and Pitfalls

Bangladesh’s experience with caretaker governments provides particularly relevant lessons for Ethiopia. In the 1990s, Bangladesh institutionalized a neutral caretaker system in response to widespread civil unrest and concerns regarding electoral legitimacy. The initial success of this model depended on several critical factors: sustained mass mobilization by opposition parties and civil society organizations, the presence of a politically influential yet notably neutral military, and a judiciary that played a crucial mediating role in ensuring compliance with constitutional mandates.

However, Bangladesh’s experience also reveals the inherent vulnerabilities of caretaker arrangements. The military-backed caretaker government of 2007-2008 illustrated how such mechanisms could be manipulated. By extending its mandate beyond the constitutionally permitted period and suppressing civil liberties, it ultimately contributed to the model’s abandonment in 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2008). Even well-run caretaker systems are fragile without institutional trust and elite consensus.

Tunisia’s Transition: Civil Society Leadership:

Tunisia’s post-2011 transition presents a different yet equally instructive case. Following President Ben Ali’s resignation, Tunisia established a negotiated caretaker arrangement that successfully facilitated a democratic transition. The success hinged on several distinctive features: the presence of the Nobel-winning National Dialogue Quartet, which exemplified a cohesive civil society; a weakened authoritarian regime that had lost support from both elite and military factions; and a relatively homogeneous political culture with fewer existential ethnic or religious divisions (Ginsburg & Mustafa, 2014).

Broader Global Patterns and Implications:

Looking beyond these specific cases, successful transitions globally, whether in South Africa, Benin, or elsewhere, share common characteristics: strong elite consensus, neutral institutions, and clear mandates. Conversely, failed transitions in countries such as Sudan and Libya demonstrate how power grabs, military dominance, or institutional decay can rapidly derail even promising arrangements (International Crisis Group, 2021).

Ethiopia’s Unique Challenges:

Ethiopia’s context presents distinct challenges that differentiate it from these comparative cases:

First, unlike Tunisia’s relatively cohesive civil society or Bangladesh’s functioning judiciary, Ethiopia lacks a coordinated opposition or trusted civic institutions capable of mediating a transition. The ongoing conflicts in the Amhara and Oromia regions further complicate any efforts to establish a neutral national administration, unless prior communication and understanding are reached.

Second, Ethiopia’s entrenched ethnic federalism and political polarization create additional hurdles. While Tunisia benefited from relative cultural homogeneity, Ethiopia’s ethnonationalist structure exacerbates identity-based claims to power, rendering consensus on neutral governance increasingly elusive.

Third, unlike Ben Ali’s weakened regime in Tunisia, Ethiopia’s current government maintains relatively robust control over key state institutions, particularly the military and security apparatus, facing no unified opposition threat.

Adapting the Model for Ethiopia:

These distinctions do not negate the caretaker proposal but necessitate significant adaptation. Ethiopia’s implementation must include:

• Establishing a minimum elite consensus before regime transition
• Implementing parallel conflict resolution mechanisms
• Involving respected nonpartisan figures from the religious, academic, and civic sectors
• Securing international guarantees against power grabs

The caretaker model emerges not merely as one option among many but as a necessary innovation to address Ethiopia’s unique challenges while upholding the core principles of successful transitions. Its viability depends on recognizing and actively addressing these contextual differences rather than importing models from other countries.

These international experiences reveal patterns of both success and failure in transitional governance. The question, then, is how to adapt these lessons to Ethiopia’s complex and fragmented political and security landscape. Section VI argues that the caretaker model, designed with Ethiopia’s specific risks in mind, offers a safeguard against the country’s recurring transitional pitfalls.

Key Takeaways:

A caretaker government represents the neutral pathway for Ethiopia to navigate between authoritarian collapse and democratic renewal.

The legitimacy of such a government is predicated on principles of inclusivity, a limited duration, and a mandate confined to facilitating political space and preparing for elections.

The conditions that would necessitate its establishment are unlikely to arise voluntarily; instead, factors such as collapse, fragmentation, or coercive actions will likely shape the transition.

Proactive preparation, particularly the establishment of an Independent Selection and Verification Committee (ISVC), is critical to prevent disorder during the regime’s decline.

The pertinent inquiry extends beyond the mere necessity of a caretaker government; it encompasses the manner in which such a government could realistically emerge from Ethiopia’s fragmented political landscape. This challenge is examined in Part Two through specific scenarios and an analysis of the associated risks.