Yonas Biru, PhD
Moges Teshome’s review of Jawar’s book (አልፀፀትም) provides a brief yet insightful summary of what he considered to be key salient points of the book. I have not read Jawar’s book. Therefore, my take is limited to, and relies on, Moges’ bird’s eye view (“ወፍ በረር”) review, titled “ከአልጸጸትም ባሻገር: የጀዋር መንገድ ሲዳሰስ”.
I start my commentary with two caveats. First, Jawar wrote the book during and after his hiatus in prison. Second, as part of his book launch interviews, he indicated he used his prison time to reflect on his past and recalibrate his political outlook. I read Moges’ review with anticipation that it will contrast the narratives in the book with Jawar’s political transformation that is heralded as part of the book launch promotion. My anticipation was evoked by the cynic part of my mind murmuring a dual question whether Jawar is employing his book launch as a political promotion to peddle his political transformation or using a feigned political transformation to sell his book.
Unfortunately, the review is primarily focused on the book. The political transformation part is treated with a broad brush and limited scope. It was of no help to silence the murmur in my mind. I still found it to be insightful. The review methodically lays down key issues in small chunks with perceptive questions and poised refutation that show Moges’s legal training and mannerism in a balanced blend.
Since my interest is the source of Jawar’s political transformation, I took the liberty to extrapolate Moges’ “ወፍ በረር” review to the extent its elasticity allowed me to connect the dots in Jawar’s self-narrated political transformation.
Moges tells us that some of Jawar’s historical narratives in his book are “out of place and unsupported with research evidence.” I have noted in several recent articles, Jawar’s refusal to abandon his unsubstantiated historical narratives shows that his transformation is driven by political calculus rather than by a paradigm shift in his political ideology or by apostasy entailing the abandonment of the Oromummaa theology.
To make sure that Moges’ review is not lost in translation, let me present the language as he stated it in his book review. “… ኦቦ ጀዋርን የምናየው የብሄር ፖለቲካ አስተሳሰብን ሳይለቅ ከግራ ወደ መሃል እየተጠጋና እያዘነበለ በሚሄድ ፖለቲካዊ እሳቤ ይሆናል።” Pay attention to the phrase “እየተጠጋና እያዘነበለ.” Meaning he is not a centrist but ወደ እዛ “እየተጠጋና እያዘነበለ.” Moges is a lawyer, and every phrase in his review is carefully stated not to understate or overstate.
Another area where Moges highlighted is Jawar’s predisposition and preoccupation of Presenting Ethiopia as a new country formed after the alleged Menilik’s invasion of Oromia. Moges wrote: “በዚህ መጽሀፍ ውስጥ ኦቦ ጀዋር ኢትዮጵያ የአጭር ዘመን እድሜ እንዳላት፣ በህዝቦች መካከል የነበረው ግንኙነትም የወረራ እና ጭቆና እንደሆነ፣ መፍትሄውም የብሄሮችን እራሳቸውን በራስ የማስተዳደር መብት በጽኑ አለት ላይ ማንበር እንደሆነ ያስቀምጣል።”
Evidently, what is in Jawar’s book is a consistent narrative that he stressed in a 2013 interview at Howard University, alleging before Menilik’s invasion, Oromia had “a 5000-year history with its own country, government and administration.” If this is indeed the case, why not campaign for a free Oromia. Eritrea claimed it was a colony of Ethiopia, and it is a free country now. There is no society on this side of planet Mars that willfully agrees to be incorporated into the “empire” that allegedly colonized it.
If the colonization crap is true, one wonders if the Oromo elite (including Jawar) is suffering from the Stockholm syndrome – “a condition which causes hostages to develop a psychological alliance with their abductors.” In this case, the Oromo elite colony’s desire to find a means to live within the Ethiopian framework needs to be diagnosed and treated by psychiatrists and psychotherapists. If the colonization crap is a fabricated political crap, then they should cut the crap.
Moges also shows Jawar’s political presentation comes short of planting democratic seeds for Ethiopia or Oromia. Instead, he Jawar propagates elite bargaining between Oromo, Tigray and Amhara elites. As Moges puts it, “… የልሂቃን ድርድር ሀሳብ በጊዜያዊነት የሚወሰድ የኮሶ መድሀኒት ቢሆንም የዘላቂ መፍትሄ አካል ወይም አልፋ እና ኦሜጋ ሊሆን አይችልም። ከሁሉም በላይ ኢትዮጵያ የሶስት አውራ ብሄሮች ሃላፊነቱ የተገደበ የግል ንብረት እንዳልሆነች አጽንኦት መስጠት ያስፈልጋል። በሁሉም፣ ለሁሉም የሆነች ኢትዮጵያን ለመገንባት በጋራ መስራት ግዜ የማይሰጠው የቤት ስራችን ነው።”
I think Moges’ presentation on elite bargaining does not go far enough to look into the motive and essence of the proposal. As I noted on Koki Abesolome’s Facebook on December 29, Jawar’s elite bargaining proposal is worse than what the TPLF used to disenfranchise over 50 nations and nationalities of their constitutional rights. The TPLF at least included Southern Peoples in having a voice in the nation’s business. Jawar understands that if the elite bargaining is limited to Oromo, Tigray and Amhara, Oromo and Tigray will collude to sustain the current constitution. Adding others in the mix comes with the risk of undermining the current constitution that Jawar’s book wants to maintain.
On the issue of Jawar’s political transformation, Moges’ sum total assessment is that the change we see in Jawar is primarily, if not nearly exclusively, a change in political strategy. There is little to discern in terms of change in ideology or political thinking. He put it thus: “ኦቦ ጀዋር ከዚህ በፊት ካደረጋቸው ቃለምልልሶች፣ ከጽሞና ጊዜ ዝምታው፣ ከሰላም ሰባኪነት ዘመቻው እና የዲፕሎማሲ ስራ፣ ሰሞኑን ወደ ሜዳው በሙሉ ጉልበት ሲመለስ የማንነት ድንበር ዘለል ማህበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ጉዳዮች ላይ ማተኮሩ እና ህገመንግስታዊ ስርዓቱ በሂደት መሻሻል እንደሚገባው፣ የማንነት ፖለቲካ እና ብሄራዊ አንድነትን ለማስታረቅ እሴታዊ አርበኝነት (progressive patriotism) የመሀል መንገድ እንደሆነ ካስረዳበት መጣጥፍ መረዳት ይቻላል። የእነዚህን የማሳያዎቹን ድምር ውጤት ብንመለከት የሚሰጠን ምስል ቢኖር ጀዋር በፖለቲካ አስተሳሰብ በጥቂቱ እና በስትራቴጂ ረገድ በእጅጉ መለወጡን ነው።”
I believe, Jawar has indicated notable ideological shift recently. We have seen continuous stop and go transformation since his release from prison. The first transformation was heralded in his February 2023 Oromo manifesto. The manifesto was a futile attempt to salvage some of the vital organs of Oromummaa with a window dressing reform.
A year letter, he adopted a more substantial transformation during his interview with Dereje Haile of Arts Tv World that was conducted in January 2024. During his interview, he stated: Tribal politics may be good to mobilize and organize dissent, but it is unsuitable for democratic governance.
Fast forward another year, he went further in an interview with Moges. He stressed the constitution that amplified tribal identity politics is the problem. He went as far as calling for a new constitutional design. This is a substantial shift from his past position that “Multinational federalism engrained in the current constitution is here to stay. It’s in not up for discussion, let alone negotiation. Anyone caught in some FANTASY should wake up from their hallucination.”
As I have noted in an earlier article, his stop-and-go transformation shows that he calculates his actions based on the threat Oromummaa faces. The more the political dynamic weakens the Oromummaa movement, the more he is willing to incrementally distance himself from the tenets of its theology. This explains why there are stronger statements in his 2024 declaration of change compared to his 2023 manifesto and his 2023 manifesto is stronger than any reform he had called before.
This is why I said in the above-noted earlier article that in a sort of a convoluted way, his transformation reminds me of the proverbial frog in a boiling water. If one puts the proverbial frog in a boiling water, it will jump out of the boiling water and save itself. On the other hand, if the frog is put in cold water whose temperature is slowly increased, the frog will adjust its body temperature to the water as it boils until the temperature reached to a point that killed it. Jawar appears to be gradually adjusting to Oromummaa’s decline instead of jumping ship. In 2023, he was of the opinion that the government could be saved by Oromos for Oromos. Today with the spread and military strength of Fano, the political dynamic has forced him to come to terms the wishful thinking of salvaging the government by Oromos and for Oromos is delusional, hence his incremental transformation.
Moges does not explicitly state it, but part of the undercurrent in his review seems to emit fear or at the very least soft concern that Jawar is pumping up the volume of his transformation to buy time to resuscitate Oromummaa.
My belief is that the only political space Jawar can reasonably function in is the center. First, the political dynamic will not allow the revival of Oromummaa. The Oromo people will not give him a second chance to relive Shahemenie.
They have seen his past that his tribal revolution has led to: (1) division within the Oromo community across religious, regional and ideological lines, (2) turned the Oromo youth into machete wielding and bloodletting gangsters, and (3) the emergence of Islamic hardliners who burned churches and killed Oromos, accusing them of being Amhara which is a term interchangeably used for Christians.
Jawar’s only hope is to move to the middle of the national political spectrum. That requires His success will depend on: (1) his ability to shift the center of gravity of the Oromo politics from the fanaticism of the Qeerroo enterprise to Oromo moderates and the silent Oromo majority; (2) winning the confidence and support of moderate forces outside of the Oromo universe, (3) being truthful to himself and the people of Oromo and Ethiopia at large, and above all (4) repenting his sins and redeeming his political standing. All else is idiotic insanity: Repeating a spectacularly failed political agenda over and over again and expecting a spectacularly successful outcome.
In summary, I found Moges’ review insightful and I encourage him to take the time to review the Affan Oromo version of the book, since the book was written in Affan Oromo. I admit my interest is not only if some key issues are lost in translation but also to see if there is notable differences in key issues. This is important because in the past Oromo elites have used a softer lexicon in Amharic and English while propagating fanatical positions in their mother tongue.
Another important point worth noting is that Moges’ review was notable more substantive in terms of addressing critical issues than his interview with Jawar. Perhaps a sequel interview may fill gaps left in the first lighter round.
