Yonas Biru, PhD
Fano’s problem is what economists call a low-level equilibrium trap — a state of stabilized paralysis, locked below its potential. Game theory, pioneered by John Nash and celebrated in the film A Beautiful Mind, helps explain why the Fano enterprise is stuck in survival mode and unable to scale up its movement through unity. Ten Nobel Prizes have been awarded for advances in this field, underscoring its power to illuminate collective dilemmas that shape nations and movements.
Game theory is most useful in non-cooperative situations where outcomes depend not only on one party’s choices but also on the strategies and expected actions of others. In its simplest form, with only two participants (say እሰጥ and አገባ), each strategizes in light of the other’s expected behavior. With more players (እሰጥ, አገባ, ዘገባ, and ወለባ), the game becomes more complex, as anticipating how each actor behaves to improve his position is harder. The problem is compounded under asymmetric information that arises when players (e.g., Fano commanders) cannot reliably gauge each other’s intentions, resources, or reliability. This fuels mistrust and incentivizes defection from cooperation.
The consequence is a stable suboptimal outcome, as selfish individual interests trump community interests. For Fano, this means being trapped below its potential, unable to rise to a higher and more productive level of organization and effectiveness. The problem is not merely stagnation, but stable stagnation. Every rational Fano leader knows the long-term costs of non-cooperation, yet no one deviates from short-term selfish strategies because each assumes others will not behave honorably. Mathematicians refer to it as a Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium. Economists call this a low-level equilibrium and describe it as the tragedy of the commons. Think of a plant stuck in a small pot: alive, but permanently stunted unless transplanted into richer soil.
To illustrate how collective rationality can produce collective ruin, consider overfishing in Lake Tana, straddled between Gondar and Gojam. Suppose ጎጃሜs and ጎንደሬs seek to maximize immediate economic gains, fishing recklessly without regard for sustainability. In the short term, each benefits from catching more fish. But when both act this way, the resource base collapses. This is a low-level equilibrium: seemingly stable, but ultimately destructive.
The same logic applies to Fano’s current situation. Multiple Fano factions compete for territorial expansion, legitimacy (popular support), and resources (tax collection, recruitment, and diaspora funding). Each faction assumes rivals are driven by ambition to become more powerful. No one wants to be የበይ ተመልካች — a bystander at the feast. Everybody takes part in counterproductive activity. The Amharic idiom “የአባትህ ቤት ሲዘረፍ አንተም አብረህ ዝረፍ” captures this mindset. This is Fano’s version of the tragedy of the commons and explains why the movement is bleeding support and losing momentum.
Game theory predicts that a threat from the central government or another external actor, or a drastic reduction in diaspora financial support, can temporarily eclipse internal power struggles and force cooperation for survival. Indeed, past federal offensives or territorial losses have brought about short-lived unity. But as soon as the threat subsided, things fell apart as Fano leaders reverted back to their game-theoretic posture.
Game Theory Simplified
The classic demonstration of game theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which illustrates the misalignment between individual and collective interests. Assume two trusted friends (ቶኪቾ and ጌቾ) commit a crime and pledged to each other not to confess. The dilemma begins when the police interrogate them separately, giving each an incentive to betray the other.
- If ቶኪቾ confesses but ጌቾ keeps the pledge, ቶኪቾ gets 5 years in prison and ጌቾ gets 30, and vice versa.
- If both defect, each gets 15 years.
- If both honor the pledge, since no independent evidence exists, they both go home free.
While honoring the pledge is the best outcome for both, each fears betrayal and is incentivized to defect. Each ends up with 15 years in prison. This is Nash’s Pareto-inferior equilibrium.
Now consider እሰጥ, አገባ, ዘገባ, and ወለባ as leaders of different Fano factions from Gondar, Gojam, Shewa, and Wello. Each faces three choices:
- a) Defect and remain independent, limiting ambition but retaining control.
- b) Join a loose alliance while maintaining autonomy — viable under external threat but unstable during expansion.
- c) Fully integrate into a unified Amhara Fano under a single command — risky because autonomy is lost and future marginalization is possible.
Given each leader’s focus on internal power struggles, the most rational strategy is defection. If one faction pushes for unity, others, mistrustful and protective of autonomy, may resist or even see the unifier as a threat. The result is an equilibrium of continued fragmentation.
Beyond Game Theory Payoffs
In standard game theory, payoffs in the Fano scenario are measured in immediate benefits: power, resources, legitimacy. But Amhara politics complicates this. Historical rivalries among Gondar, Gojam, Wollo, and Shewa amplify coordination failures. Problems of unity that might otherwise be modeled as coordination games turn into zero-sum — even negative-sum — games, where some factions prefer collective loss over rival dominance.
This rivalry complicates the strategic landscape: the payoff matrix is not only about present gains or survival, but also about identity, history, and mistrust. This is why even drafting a joint strategy paper has been elusive — each faction insists on its own manifesto. Layered on top of non-cooperative dynamics, this deepens the tragedy of the commons and locks Fano into a low-level equilibrium.
A Path Forward
To date, unity efforts have focused on mediation, most notably by the English-speaking Amhara Aba Gadaa community, which tried to reconcile Zemene Kassie and Eskinder Nega. Mediation assumes goodwill and compromise, but Fano factions operate under a power calculus where individual priorities outweigh collective interests. In such a setting, appeals to unity cannot break the equilibrium. Mediation has value, but only as a supplemental tool in a broader enforcement framework.
The way forward is not more pleas for unity, but institutional innovation that reshapes incentives. The challenge is to make defection costly and cooperation rewarding, with credible and enforceable commitments. In game-theory terms, this means shifting from a destructive Nash equilibrium of survival politics to a higher equilibrium of coordinated strength. This requires sequencing on three fronts:
Sequencing across space: Begin at the zonal level, then scale to regional (e.g., Gondar, Gojam, Shewa, Wollo), and ultimately culminate at the Amhara-wide level. Smaller coalitions reduce complexity, limit information asymmetries, and make early trust-building more feasible. Successes at the zonal level create positive spillovers that incentivize regional cooperation, which in turn builds momentum for Amhara-wide integration.
Sequencing of cooperation modality: Do not start with full integration. Begin with low-stakes cooperation — joint patrols, shared recruitment drives, pooled resources, or coordinated defensive operations. These early, reversible collaborations allow factions to test credibility and build “trust capital.” As trust solidifies, cooperation can be scaled up to medium-stakes commitments, such as integrated logistics or joint command structures. Only after this progression should factions attempt high-stakes, irreversible unification under a central command.
Diversifying the political space: When players have only one dominant strategy (e.g., the Amhara community relying solely on Fano for protection), the outcome is constrained, often leading to a low-level equilibrium trap. By expanding the political space through peaceful struggle and civil disobedience, the Amhara community can introduce new strategies into the game. This enlarges the strategy set, which can shift the equilibrium away from stagnation. Currently, the payoff matrix is skewed: if Fano weakens, the Amhara community has no fallback option. That makes Fano leaders feel indispensable and fuels rivalry. Expanding political space diversifies sources of power, creating external pressure on Fano leaders to change their behavior. This diversification acts as a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it bolsters Amhara opposition by creating multiple fronts against government excesses. On the other, it dilutes Fano’s monopoly on protection, potentially forcing factions to recalibrate their strategies toward cooperation to maintain legitimacy and resources.
Punishing defectors: The Amhara cultural norm of resolving conflicts quietly shields defectors from consequences. This must change. Those who sabotage cooperation should be excluded from political and financial support, signaling that betrayal carries a price.
Concluding Remarks
The lesson of game theory is clear: unity will not emerge from endless mediation or moral appeals but from redesigning the rules so that even self-interested actors find cooperation the rational choice. The English-speaking and Diaspora-Dwelling Amhara Aba Gadaa community needs to pay heed.
To those who turn to game theory for inspiration, trying to leap directly to Amhara-wide unity is like playing the grand coalition game without solving smaller games first — the probability of defection is too high and failure is all but assured.
The rational path forward is step-by-step: build zonal trust, expand regionally, then scale to the Amhara level. At each stage, begin with low-stakes cooperation, then escalate gradually to deeper forms of integration as trust accumulates. This two-tiered sequencing (spatial and modal) reduces complexity, generates positive spillovers, and strengthens institutions that enforce cooperation.
Only by changing the payoff structure (penalizing defectors and rewarding collaborators) can Fano break free from its low-level equilibrium trap. Unity, then, is not a leap of faith but a rational sequence of games — trust first, coalition second, integration last. Done this way, Fano can transcend survival politics and grow from a stunted plant in a small pot into a rooted force replanted in fertile institutional soil.
Creating external pressure is essential to force change in Fano Leaders behavior. Expanding the Amhara political space through civil disobedience is essential to diversify the Amhara political powerbase. Such diversification broadens the Amhara strategic option by creating a pressure point against opportunist Fano leaders.